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INTRODUCTION
In American Insurance Association v. Garamendi,' the U.S.
Supreme Court invalidated California's Holocaust Victim Insurance
Relief Act (HVIRA), which required insurance companies doing
business in California to disclose all policies they or their affiliates
sold in Europe between 1920 and 1945.2 According to the Court, the
state's law unconstitutionally interfered with the foreign affairs
power of the national government.' The decision easily was
overlooked in a Term of landmark cases addressing affirmative
action and sexual privacy.4 What coverage the case did receive
emphasized its federalism aspects, and excited little reaction
because the result seemed intuitively appropriate: the Court
overturned a state law that, in the words of one account, "amounted
to unconstitutional meddling in foreign affairs by a state."5 We
argue here that the decision demands substantially more attention,
as a challenge to fundamental aspects of constitutional structure.
A central tenet of separation of powers is that the executive is not
a lawmaker. A central tenet of federalism is that directives of the
federal government displace otherwise constitutional state law
through the Supremacy Clause of Article VI. One would hardly
1. 539 U.S. 396 (2003).
2. See Holocaust Victim Insurance Relief Act, CAL. INS. CODE §§ 13800-13807 (West
2004).
3. See Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 420-21 (suggesting that state insurance laws are
interfering with executive agreements with Germany and Austria that the President signed).
4. The Court announced Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003), and Grutter v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003), on the same day as Garamendi, and it announced Lawrence
v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), three days later. News coverage of the Court's term predictably
emphasized those cases rather than Garamendi.
5. Mark Sherman, Court Strikes Calif. Law on Nazi-Era Claims, PHILA. INQUIRER, June
24, 2003, at A10 ("Siding with the Bush administration and insurers, the court ruled 5-4 that
the law amounted to unconstitutional meddling in foreign affairs by a state."); see also Jessie
Mangaliman, Court Voids State Law Aiding Nazi Victims, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, June
24, 2003, at 14 (writing that the "court, in effect said California ... exceeded its authority by
seeking to address a foreign-policy issue meant for the federal government"); Henry
Weinstein, Holocaust Insurance Law Negated, L.A. TIMES, June 24, 2003, at B1 (writing that
the Bush administration's argument that the state law interfered with the ability to conduct
foreign affairs was "critical" to the Court's decision). But see Charles Lane, Court Rejects Law
Aiding Survivors of Holocaust, WASH. POST, June 24, 2003, at All (discussing implications
for executive power).
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suppose, therefore, that the President could unilaterally overturn
a state law the President, or the President's subordinates, thought
simply to be bad policy, without the support of any legislative action
and outside the scope of Supremacy Clause. If the President
thinks, for example, that as a policy matter a state's criminal
punishments are too harsh or its business regulations too onerous,
the President cannot change them by proclamation. This is true
even if the state is interfering with presidential policy initia-
tives-to foster a more humane criminal justice system or a more
open market, for example. Displacement of state law is a matter for
the lawmakers-generally Congress; in the case of treaties, the
President and the Senate; and in some other cases, the courts. The
President, acting alone, may exhort the states, but not command
them.
Although the foregoing principles may be uncontroversial in
domestic matters, perhaps things stand differently in foreign
affairs. Courts and commentators, including one of the present
authors, have identified independent presidential powers in foreign
affairs that go beyond anything the President can claim in the
domestic sphere.' Perhaps these independent powers include the
independent ability to displace state law, without regard to the
ordinary contours of separation of powers and federalism. But even
if one might suppose this to be a viable abstract principle, it would
have seemed contrary to two Supreme Court cases, Barclays Bank
PLC v. Franchise Tax Board7 and Breard v. Greene.' In each case,
the Court rejected the proposition that the President might displace
state laws with foreign affairs implications simply because the
President thought the state law was bad policy.9
The Court's conclusions in Garamendi thus come as something
of a surprise, for, as we will argue, the essence of the decision is
that the President, at least in some circumstances, does have this
preemptive power in foreign affairs. Much of the Court's opinion
6. See Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power over Foreign
Affairs, 111 YALE L.J. 231, 234-36 (2001) (arguing that the President enjoys various foreign
affairs powers as a result of Article II, Section 1 of the Constitution).
7. 512 U.S. 298 (1994).
8. 523 U.S. 371 (1998).
9. See Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 378 (1998); Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax
Bd., 512 U.S. 298, 329-30 (1994).
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obscured rather than explained this result, and sought to make its
decision flow routinely from prior foreign affairs cases. The final
outcome, however, was that a state law fell, not because the law
was in itself unconstitutional, but because the executive branch
disagreed with it as a policy matter. As the Court itself said, the
case was one of "preemption by executive conduct."1 °
It is, of course, uncontroversial that ordinarily state laws and
policies must give way to the foreign affairs objectives of the
national government. Establishing that proposition was one of the
Constitution's principal advances over the Articles of Confederation.
The critical question, though, is how these overriding federal goals
are developed and identified. The Constitution's Article VI places
the power of preemption in the legislative branch by making laws
and treaties, but not executive decrees, the supreme law of the
land.'1 In unusual cases, state laws might be displaced by the
judiciary, 2 or by the President pursuant to executive agreements
with foreign nations. 3 Giving mere executive policy preemptive
effect, as the Court did in Garamendi, bypasses these constitutional
processes and concentrates power in the executive branch.
That is particularly problematic in foreign affairs, where the
President's substantial authority over the military and the organs
of diplomacy already gives rise to broad independent power. The
President's lack of lawmaking authority balances these other
great executive powers, because without lawmaking authority,
the President needs the support of other branches to fully effectu-
ate foreign policy. This highlights an often overlooked way that
federalism reinforces checks and balances at the national level. A
robust foreign affairs federalism promotes a cooperative approach
10. Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 428.
11. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land."); see
Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372-73 (2000) (statutory preemption);
El Al Isr. Airlines, Ltd. v. Tsui Yuan Tseng, 525 U.S. 155, 160-61 (1999) (treaty preemption);
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 62-66 (1941) (statutory preemption).
12. See Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434,447.49 (1979) (displacing
state law under dormant foreign Commerce Clause doctrine); Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S.
429, 440-41 (1968) (displacing state law under dormant foreign affairs doctrine).
13. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 669-73 (1981); United States v. Pink, 315
U.S. 203, 233 (1942); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 330-31 (1937).
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to foreign affairs, because the President will need the support of
Congress to oust disruptive state laws; as a result, more foreign
affairs decision making will be done by Congress (or the Senate). In
contrast, allowing the President unilaterally to oust states from
foreign affairs, as the Court did in Garamendi, means that more
foreign affairs disputes may be decided only by the President,
through a concentration of executive and lawmaking power that is
contrary to the first principles of separation of powers.
As a result, one need not be a committed defender of state
authority 4 to have grave reservations about the decision's implica-
tions for separation of powers, federalism, and constitutional
theory. Specifically, we argue that the Garamendi decision has at
least three separate and substantial ill-effects on our constitutional
structure.
First, the Garamendi decision gives the President the power to
decide which state laws affecting foreign affairs survive and which
do not. This executive preemption concentrates foreign affairs
power in the President in a way not countenanced by the Constitu-
tion's text nor contemplated by its Framers, who emphasized the
importance of separating executive power from legislative power.
Previously, if the executive branch wished to pursue a foreign policy
with which a state law interfered, the President usually had to seek
the support of Congress (or the Senate via a treaty) to override the
competing state law through Article VI of the Constitution. This
procedure assured that state laws would not stand as obstacles to
federal foreign policy, as they had under the Articles of Confedera-
tion.'5 It also assured that federal foreign policy would be developed
cooperatively, as the policy of the whole of the federal government,
14. We have previously disagreed over the scope of the states' constitutional authority
in foreign affairs. See Brannon P. Denning & Jack H. McCall, Jr., The Constitutionality of
State and Local "Sanctions" Against Foreign Countries: Affairs of State, States'Affairs, or a
Sorry State ofAffairs?, 26 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 307 (1999) (arguing that many state foreign
policy activities are unconstitutional); Michael D. Ramsey, The Power of the States in Foreign
Affairs: The Original Understanding of Foreign Policy Federalism, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
341, 365-79 (1999) (defending a foreign affairs role for the states).
15. On the tension between state laws and federal foreign policy under the Articles, see
FREDERICK W. MARKS III, INDEPENDENCE ON TRIAL: FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE MAKING OF
THE CONSTITUTION 3-95 (1986), and Michael D. Ramsey, The Myth of Extraconstitutional
Foreign Affairs Power, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 379, 403-08 (2000) [hereinafter Ramsey,
Myth].
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and not merely as the policy of the executive branch. Under the
post-Garamendi system, the President has no incentive to pursue
a cooperative approach to foreign policy, and Congress must
assemble a veto-proof majority to intervene.
Second, the Court in Garamendi relied in part upon two execu-
tive agreements that seemed in tension with California's law,
although the Court made clear that the preemption it found
exceeded anything accomplished by the executive agreements
alone.16 The Court's opinion, nonetheless, contains broad and
unreflective language endorsing executive agreements-although
prior to the Garamendi decision, executive agreements always had
been described in cautious and guarded language, reflecting their
uncertain constitutional status. By abandoning the Court's earlier
caution and apparently giving executive agreements unconstrained
preemptive effect, Garamendi threatens the constitutional role of
the Senate. So long as the constitutional status of executive
agreements remained uncertain, the President was circumspect
about their use. The Court's apparent unqualified endorsement of
them may hasten the decline of the treaty.
Third, the decision's dilution of separation of powers in foreign
affairs undermines structural protections the Constitution affords
to the states. It centralizes preemptive power in a single branch
that is more disposed institutionally to value international objec-
tives over local ones. In an era of globalization, it is increasingly
likely that foreign policy objectives will trench upon state inter-
ests. Whatever one thinks of judicial protections of federalism
interests, in the past the difficult balance between local interests
and international ones received its evaluation in Congress or the
Senate, in the so-called "political safeguards of federalism."' 7
Garamendi, despite gestures toward the idea of traditional state
interests, appears to say that even in traditional areas state law
must give way to presidential foreign policy objectives in the case
of a direct conflict.
16. Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 416-17 (2003).
17. See Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79 TEX.
L. REV. 1321, 1342.46 (2001) [hereinafter Clark, Separation of Powers] (emphasizing the role
that states play in restricting federal lawmaking (quoting Herbert Wechsler, The Political
Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the
National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543, 558 (1954))).
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The Court did not discuss, nor even seem aware of, the novelty of
executive preemption or its implications, which highlights the
degree to which the link between federalism and separation of
powers in foreign affairs remains unacknowledged. The Court's
failure to engage the separation of powers implications of the case
also underscores the extent to which the Court's methodology
allows the Court to reach intuitively comfortable results without
seriously grappling with the important structural issues that
underlie them.
This Article is presented as follows. Part I discusses the
Holocaust-era insurance claims that formed the background of the
case. Part II outlines the constitutional relationships between the
state and federal governments in foreign affairs as they stood before
the Garamendi decision. Part III describes the Supreme Court's
decision, and points out its discontinuity with prior decisions. In
particular, Part III argues that Garamendi is not a true exercise in
doctrinal evolution, because it owes essentially nothing to prior
cases or practice, except as rhetorical cover.18 Part IV then turns to
the troubling structural implications of Garamendi, which we
regard as occurring primarily in the field of separation of powers.
As outlined above, we conclude that the Court ended up far from
the text, structure, and history of the Constitution. Part V ad-
dresses the decision's implications for federalism, particularly the
dangers of concentrating preemptive power over traditional state
functions in the federal executive branch.
In sum, we argue that the Court's lack of attention to constitu-
tional text, history, and structure, and its casual use of prior
decisions without proper attention to their specific facts or limita-
tions allowed the Court to reach an intuitively comfortable result
that is wrong both as a matter of federalism and, perhaps more
importantly, as a matter of separation of powers. Centrally, the
Court's failure to begin with constitutional first principles caused
it to overlook the critical relationship between federalism and
separation of powers in foreign affairs.
18. Cf. David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV.
877,904-05 (1996) (arguing that American constitutional law values common law over purely
textual arguments).
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I. THE HOLOCAUST-ERA INSURANCE CLAIMS
A. California and the Claims
Millions of people throughout Europe lost lives and property
during Nazi rule in the 1930s and 1940s. Many of these victims
carried life, casualty, and other insurance policies issued by
Europe's major insurance companies. One might suppose the losses
inflicted by the Nazis would have obligated the insurance compa-
nies to pay the beneficiaries of these policies. By the end of the
twentieth century, however, relatively few such payments had been
made.19
The leading problem was lack of documentary evidence. Many
Holocaust survivors, and heirs of Holocaust victims, thought they
were insured, but had little proof of it. Having been fortunate to
escape Europe with their lives, they could hardly be expected to
have salvaged documentation that would carry the day in court.
Many leading European insurance companies refused to pay most
Holocaust claims, on the grounds that their own records were
destroyed in the turmoil surrounding World War II, and that the
survivors could not demonstrate whether, and with whom, they had
been insured.
Claimants came to suspect, though, that the insurers might not
be fully forthcoming in providing documents that could require
the companies to pay substantial claims. In a case that received
much publicity, Alan Stern, a California businessman, believed that
his grandfather, Moshe Stern, had purchased insurance from
Assicurrazioni Generali, an Italian insurer. The grandfather, along
with a number of other family members, died at Auschwitz. The
Stern heirs made efforts to recover from Generali, but the company
denied the claim due to a lack of documentation, reporting that they
had no record of any policy issued to Moshe Stern.2" Then, according
19. See Hearing Before the House Gov't Reform Subcomm. on Gov't Efficiency, Fin. Mgmt.
& Intergovernmental Relations, 107th Cong. (2002) [hereinafter 2002 Hearing] (testimony
of Leslie Tick, California Department of Insurance), reprinted in Respondent's Brief in
Opposition app. D, at 23-34, Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (No. 02-722).
20. Henry Weinstein, Revoking of Insurance Firms'Licenses Urged, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 14,
1998, at A3.
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to press accounts, "in the winter of 1996-1997, the family, through
an act of almost pure luck, obtained a copy of the policy that had
been found at a Generali warehouse in Trieste-just a few months
after the company had issued a press release denying the family's
claim."21 Generali denied wrongdoing, but also continued to deny
the Sterns' claim.22
Stern and others23 brought the problem to the attention of the
California Department of Insurance. In 1998, as a partial response,
the Department-together with insurance regulators from other
states, several European insurance companies, European regula-
tors and nongovernmental organizations, and the government
of Israel-founded an organization called the International
Commission for Holocaust Era Insurance Claims (ICHEIC). The
idea of ICHEIC was to invite insurance companies to pursue a
cooperative approach to resolving the claims.24 Claims resolution
nevertheless continued to founder on the issue of documentation.
ICHEIC was a voluntary organization without means to compel
disclosure, and without access to the insurers' records, claimants
found that ICHEIC did little to improve their position.25
In the meantime, the California legislature, at the behest of
State Assemblyman Wally Knox, passed a series of measures in
1998 to facilitate recovery on the Holocaust-era insurance claims. 6
First, it authorized "any Holocaust victim, or heir or beneficiary of
21. Id.
22. Id. (reporting Alan Stern's testimony to the California Department of Insurance); see
Exhibit 2 to Commissioner's Opposition Brief, Gerling Global Reinsurance Corp. of Am. v.
Quackenbush, No. CIV.S-00-0875WBSJFM, 2000 WL 777978 (E.D. Cal. June 9, 2000).
23. The Sterns' situation was by no means unique. As of the late 1990s, thousands of
Holocaust survivors and beneficiaries of Holocaust victims lived in California, many of whom
believed that they had potential insurance claims. See 2002 Hearing, supra note 19, app. D,
at 23-24.
24. See Gerling Global Reinsurance Corp. v. Low, 240 F.3d 739, 750 (9th Cir. 2001), rev'd
sub nom. Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003) (describing ICHEIC).
25. See 2002 Hearing, supra note 19, app. D, at 25-27 (reciting problems with disclosure
and claims settlement at ICHEIC); Henry Weinstein, Insurers Reject Most Claims in
Holocaust Cases, L.A. TIMES, May 9, 2000, at A3 (reporting that the ICHEIC insurers had
rejected three-fourths of the early cases submitted to them, often for lack of documentation,
even though the initial cases were specifically selected by the claimants as being those with
the best documentation).
26. See Henry Weinstein, Assembly OKs Holocaust Claim Bill, L.A. TIMES, May 15, 1998,
at A3 (reporting Knox's reliance on the Stern case as evidence of the need for legislative
action).
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a Holocaust victim" residing in California and having "a claim
arising out of an insurance policy or policies purchased or in effect
in Europe before 1945 from an insurer" covered by the statute to
"bring a legal action to recover on that claim in any superior court
of the state for the county in which the plaintiff or one of the
plaintiffs resides" until December 31, 2010. This, in effect, provided
a cause of action and eliminated the statute of limitations for the
claims.27 Further, responding to the evidentiary problems, the
legislature required all insurance companies doing business in
California that sold insurance in Europe during the Holocaust era,
or had an affiliate that did so, to provide a list of their insureds
during that period together with relevant policy information. 2' The
disclosure provision, known as the Holocaust Victim Insurance
Relief Act (HVIRA), became the focus of the Garamendi litigation.
The HVIRA established a "central registry containing records and
information relating to insurance policies ... of Holocaust victims,
living and deceased."29 The law required insurers doing business in
California that sold insurance policies "directly or though a related
company, to persons in Europe ... in effect between 1920 and 1945"
to report to the state insurance commissioner the number of any
such policies; "[t]he holder, beneficiary, and current status of those
policies"; "[t]he city of origin, domicile, or address for each policy-
holder listed in the policies," and whether the proceeds of such
policies had been paid to beneficiaries or otherwise distributed.3 ° It
27. CAL. ClV. PROC. CODE § 354.5(b)-(c) (West 2004). The provision also allowed suit
against any "related company," basically an affiliate of a Holocaust-era insurer, responding
to the jurisdictional difficulty that many of the companies that actually issued the policies
did not do business directly in California. Id. § 354.5(a)(3).
28. Holocaust Victim Insurance Relief Act, CAL. INS. CODE §§ 13800-13807 (West 2004);
see also CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 10, §§ 2278-2278.5 (2002) (implementing regulations). The
disclosure provisions that became the HVIRA were originally enacted in 1998 along with the
other insurance-related statutes, but then-Governor Pete Wilson vetoed that part of the 1998
enactments. After Gray Davis replaced Wilson as governor, the legislature re-passed the
disclosure provisions as the HVIRA in 1999.
29. CAL. INS. CODE § 13803.
30. Id. § 13804(a)(1)-(3). A "related company" was defined in the Act as "any parent,
subsidiary, reinsurer, successor in interest, managing general agent, or affiliate company of
the insurer." Id. § 13802(b). Many European insurers operated in California through
affiliates that purported to be largely independent of the European operations, so in many
cases California sought to regulate not the company that actually had Holocaust claims
against it, but a distant corporate relative.
2004]
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also directed the Commissioner of Insurance to revoke the business
license of any insurer that failed to comply.3"
According to its preamble, the HVIRA sought to "ensure that
closure" on the question of unpaid insurance proceeds was "swiftly
brought to pass" for California's Holocaust survivors. It spoke
of insurers' "responsibility to ensure that any involvement they or
their related companies may have had with insurance policies of
Holocaust victims are disclosed to the state" to ensure "rapid
resolution" of these issues for victims and their families.33 The
legislature deemed the Act "necessary to protect the claims and
interests of California residents" in light of the "active negotiations"
underway through ICHEIC to "resolve all outstanding insurance
claims issues," and it sought to "encourage the development of a
resolution to these issues through the international process or
through direct action by the State of California."3 4
B. The United States and the Claims
-While these developments proceeded in California (and in
other states),35 the U.S. government began to take an interest in
Holocaust insurance claims.36 The U.S. Congress held hearings on
the matter in 1998, roughly contemporaneously with the forma-
tion of ICHEIC and the enactment of the HVIRA. At first it
31. Id. §§ 13804 (b)(1)-(4), 13806. Knowingly making false statements to the
commissioner was a misdemeanor, punishable by a civil penalty not exceeding $5,000. Id. §
13805.
32. Id. § 13801(d).
33. Id. § 13801(e).
34. Id. § 13801(f).
35. Florida, Maryland, Minnesota, New York, and Washington enacted legislation similar
to the HVIRA. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 626.9543 (West 2004); MD. CODE ANN., INS. §§ 28-
101 to 28-110 (2002); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 60A.053 (West Supp. 2004); N.Y. INS. LAW §§ 2701-
2711 (Consol. 2004); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 48.104.010-48.104.903 (West Supp. 2004); see
also ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-490 (West Supp. 2004) (suspending statute of limitations on
applicable insurance claims belonging to Holocaust victims or their heirs in Arizona); TEX.
INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.74 (Vernon Supp. 2004) (implementing protections for Holocaust
victims and their heirs with outstanding insurance policies from 1920-1945); S. 843, 183rd
Gen. Ct., Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2003) (proposing An Act Relative to Holocaust Victims Insurance
Relief), available at http://www.mass.gov/legislbills/st00843.htm.
36. For some of the background narrative here, we have drawn on Brannon P. Denning,
International Decisions-American Insurance Ass'n v. Garamendi and Deutsch v. Turner
Corp., 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 950, 950-53 (2003).
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seemed that the initiative would remain at the state level. That
was consistent with U.S. practice, where-despite insurance's
multistate and multinational character-regulation had been
conducted principally by the states. Congress had a long standing
policy of endorsing state insurance regulatory activities, as reflected
in the McCarran-Ferguson Act, which broadly authorized states to
regulate the industry despite its interstate character.37 As the Chair
of the House Banking and Financial Services Committee observed
to the Insurance Commissioners of California and Washington
State, when they testified before the committee on efforts at the
state level:
[L]et me say that because this is an issue of international
significance, there are aspects of the American system that are
not widely understood abroad, and one relates to the Federal
nature of America, particularly in the insurance arena, [where]
the decision of the United States Congress, in effect, either to
devolve or not to assume responsibility for basic insurance
regulation ... gives the States a significant role. And that means
that as two symbolic State insurance commissioners, there's a
great deal of authority that resides in your offices.38
The Washington state commissioner had testified previously that
states were trying to get the matter worked out cooperatively
(referring in particular to ICHEIC), but that "[i]f our requests for
cooperation are not satisfied, then the states may begin to exercise
[regulatory] powers."39 The California commissioner added that he
was "prepared to revoke [the] certificate of authority, which allows
a company to sell insurance in California" for companies that did
not provide appropriate disclosure.4 ° Congress was well aware,
37. McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1012 (2000). As we discuss below, infra Part
I.B.2, Congress initially passed the McCarran Act in 1945 to shield state insurance
regulation from constitutional attack under the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine. See
Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 429-31 (1946) (describing purposes of the
McCarran Act).
38. Hearing Before the House Comm. on Banking & Fin. Servs., 105th Cong. 83 (1998)
(statement of Rep. James Leach, Chair, House Comm. on Banking & Fin. Servs.). The Chair,
in noting the states' role in insurance regulation, was no doubt thinking principally of the
McCarran Act. See supra note 37.
39. Id. at 235 (statement of Deborah Senn, Washington State Insurance Commissioner).
40. Id. at 75 (testimony of Charles Quackenbush, California State Insurance
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therefore, of the developing initiatives at the state level to compel
disclosure of policy information. Several months later Congress
passed the U.S. Holocaust Assets Commission Act of 1998, which
established a commission "to examine issues pertaining to the
disposition of Holocaust-era assets in the United States."41 The
section of the Act relating to insurance policies stated among other
things that:
In carrying out its duties under this Act, the Commission shall
take note of the work of the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners [the association of state regulators] with regard
to Holocaust-era insurance issues and shall encourage the
National Association of Insurance Commissioners to prepare a
report on the Holocaust-related claims practices of all insurance
companies, both domestic and foreign, doing business in the
United States at any time after January 30, 1933, that issued
any individual life, health, or property-casualty insurance policy
to any individual on any list of Holocaust victims ....42
Congress thus seemed willing to let the states continue to work
towards a solution to the disclosure problem.
The insurance claims were soon overtaken by other events.
Insurance was only a small piece of the larger puzzle of claims
based on Nazi atrocities. The broader question of compensation for
victims of the Third Reich and its accomplices arose immediately
after the end of World War II, and by century's end it still had not
been resolved. The Cold War caused the Western allies to defer the
question of post-war reparations because of worries that "continued
reparations would cripple the new Federal Republic of Germany
economically," so responsibility for compensating victims of the
Nazis shifted to West Germany, which compensated its citizens and
signed a number of international agreements settling claims by
other countries' nationals against the German government.43 Once
Commissioner). The California commissioner was likely a little premature here, because the
HVIRA, which allowed revocation of business licenses, had not yet taken effect. See supra
note 28.
41. U.S. Holocaust Assets Commission Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-186, 112 Stat. 611,
611 (1998).
42. Id. 112 Stat. at 613, §3(a)(4)(A).
43. Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 403-04 (2003); see generally STUART E.
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the reunification of Germany occurred and a final settlement with
the German government was effected, German courts held that
a previous moratorium on claims by foreign nationals against
private parties had been lifted. 4 This ruling unleashed a torrent
of litigation against insurance companies, banks, manufacturers,
and others by Holocaust survivors seeking compensation for
financial losses inflicted by the Nazi regime.45
On the diplomatic front, the U.S. executive branch sought to
negotiate a settlement with the German government regarding
Holocaust-era claims, hoping to head off massive litigation that
would, in all likelihood, never be concluded in time to benefit most
of the survivors.46 In October 1998, German Chancellor Schroeder
invited the United States to facilitate negotiation of a "foundation"
to compensate slave labor victims. 47 As class-action suits mounted,
German companies and the German government were willing to
provide financial contribution in return for, as they put it, "legal
peace. '48 Though originally a response to slave labor litigation, the
proposed foundation ultimately expanded to include insurance and
other financial and property claims.49
These efforts resulted in an agreement between the United
States and Germany, signed in July, 2000. The agreement estab-
lished a fund, to be administered by a German foundation called
"Remembrance, Responsibility and the Future," to which the
German government and German corporations would contribute a
total of approximately 10 billion marks to compensate victims of
Nazi crimes, most prominently those who had been victims of slave
labor.5 °
EIZENSTAT, IMPERFECT JUSTICE (2003) (recounting the author's experiences as chief U.S.
negotiator); Ronald J. Bettauer, The Role of the United States Government in Recent
Holocaust Claims Resolution, 20 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 1, 6-8 (2002) (giving the U.S.
Government's legal perspective).
44. See Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 404-05.
45. See id. at 405. For accounts of the litigation, see Michael J. Bazyler, Nuremberg in
America: Litigating the Holocaust in United States Courts, 34 U. RICH. L. REV. 1 (2000); Burt
Neuborne, Preliminary Reflections on Aspects of Holocaust-Era Litigation in American
Courts, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 795 (2002).
46. See Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 405.
47. See EIZENSTAT, supra note 43, at 214.
48. Id. at 212-15.
49. See id. at 205-78.
50. Agreement Concerning the Foundation "Remembrance, Responsibility and the
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In return for the contributions, the German companies pressed
their interest in, as the preamble put it, an "all-embracing and
enduring legal peace in this matter" which was "fundamental to
the establishment of the Foundation."' 5' The preamble further
recognized "that German business, having contributed substantially
to the Foundation, should not be asked or expected to contribute
again, in court or elsewhere, for the use of forced laborers or for any
wrongs asserted against German companies arising from the
National Socialist era" and that "it is in the interest of both parties
to have a resolution of these issues that is non-adversarial and non-
confrontational, outside of litigation."52
To this end, the agreement imposed three obligations upon the
United States. First, Article 1 stated that "[t]he parties agree that
the Foundation ... covers, and that it would be in their interests for
the Foundation to be the exclusive remedy and forum for the
resolution of, all claims arising ... from the National Socialist era
and World War II.' 51 Second, according to Article 2:
The United States shall ... inform its courts through a Statement
of Interest ... that it would be in the foreign policy interests of
the United States for the Foundation to be the exclusive remedy
and forum for resolving such claims asserted against German
companies ... and that dismissal of such cases would be in its
foreign policy interest.
54
Future," July 17, 2000, U.S.-F.R.G., 39 I.L.M. 1298 [hereinafter Foundation Agreement]; see
generally EIZENSTAT, supra note 43, at 229-58 (recounting the negotiations regarding the
foundation's funding). The United States reached a similar agreement with Austria, id. at
279-314, and an informal arrangement with Switzerland. See Joint Statement Between the
Government of the Swiss Confederation and the Government of the United States of
America, Jan. 29, 2000 (on file with authors).
51. Foundation Agreement, supra note 50, pmbl. para. 5, 39 I.L.M. at 1298.
52. Id. pmbl. para. 8-9, 39 I.L.M. at 1298-99.
53. Id., art. 1(1), 39 I.L.M. at 1299.
54. Id., art. 2(1), 39 I.L.M. at 1300. Annex B of the Foundation Agreement set forth the
language of the "Statement of Interest" referred to in section 2(1), which the United States
agreed to file in any case where "a claim has been asserted against German companies."Id.
That "statement" provided, in its chief operative section, that "the United States believes
that all asserted claims should be pursued ... through the Foundation instead of the court[s],"
but went on to say that
[tihe United States takes no position here on the merits of the legal claims or
arguments advanced by plaintiffs or defendants. The United States does not
suggest that its policy interests concerning the Foundation in themselves
provide an independent legal basis for dismissal, but will reinforce the point
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Finally, Article 2 required that "[t]he United States, recognizing the
importance of the objectives of this agreement, including all-
embracing and enduring legal peace, shall, in a timely manner, use
its best efforts, in a manner it considers appropriate, to achieve
these objectives with state and local governments.""s
In the effort leading up to the Foundation Agreement, the
insurance claims were not the central focus. The settlement
allocated only about 300 million of its 10 billion mark budget for
insurance claims.56 The Foundation itself, moreover, had no
mechanism for resolving the factual and documentary aspects of
Holocaust insurance claims, which experience in California and
elsewhere had shown to be critical. The Foundation Agreement said
only that
[t]he Federal Republic of Germany agrees that insurance claims
that come within the scope of the current claims handling
procedures adopted by the International Commission of Holo-
caust Era Insurance Claims ("ICHEIC") and are made against
German insurance companies shall be processed by the compa-
nies and the German Insurance Association on the basis of such
procedures ......
The Agreement further stated that "[tihe Foundation legislation
will provide that all eligibility decisions will be based on relaxed
standards of proof." 8
During the negotiation of the Foundation Agreement, executive
branch officers contacted California's Governor and Insurance
that U.S. policy interests favor dismissal on any valid legal ground.
Id. Annex B, 2, 7, 39 I.L.M. at 1303-04.
This language represented a watered-down version of what Germany originally sought:
an agreement that the United States government state that the Foundation Agreement
required the court to dismiss the action. See EIZENSTAT, supra note 43, at 257-58, 268-74
(describing the negotiations on this point). Eizenstat recounts that "we [the U.S. negotiators]
would not take a formal legal position barring U.S. citizens from their own courts." Id. at 269.
55. Foundation Agreement, supra note 50, art. 2(2), 39 I.L.M. at 1300. The United States
also agreed to "take appropriate steps" to oppose any challenge to Germany's sovereign
immunity. Id., art. 3(4), 39 I.L.M. at 1300.
56. See EIZENSTAT, supra note 43, at 266-68. According to Eizenstat, the United States
originally did not understand the 10 billion mark cap on the Foundation funding to include
insurance claims.Id.
57. Foundation Agreement, supra note 50, art. 1(4), 39 I.L.M. at 1299.
58. Id. Annex A, 9, 39 I.L.M. at 1303.
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Commissioner, urging them to rethink their efforts against
Holocaust-related firms, and asserting that state involvement
risked "derail[ing]" the entire settlement enterprise. 9  The
California Department of Insurance pressed ahead under the
HVIRA, directing the insurers to provide policy information by
April 10, 2000, or face suspension of their business licenses.6"
That threat produced the suit that became the Garamendi case,
filed in federal court in Sacramento by the American Insurance
Association and three leading European insurance groups: Gerling
of Germany, Winterthur of Switzerland, and Generali of Italy.6
Among other claims, the plaintiffs contended that the HVIRA
represented an unconstitutional interference by the state in foreign
affairs, a field reserved to the federal government.62
II. FOREIGN AFFAIRS FEDERALISM BEFORE GARAMENDI
To show how the Supreme Court's decision reconfigured foreign
affairs law, we begin with an overview of the law that preceded it.
Prior to Garamendi, one could identify three general ways courts
might invalidate state laws as incompatible with the foreign affairs
powers of the federal government. In descending order of common
application and acceptance, these were: (i) Article VI preemption;
(ii) exclusions arising directly from the Constitution; and (iii)
59. See Eizenstat to California Insurance Commissioner Charles Quackenbush (Nov. 30,
1999) ("[The HVIRA] has the unfortunate effect of damaging the one effective means now at
hand to process quickly and completely unpaid insurance claims from the Holocaust period.");
Eizenstat to Gray Davis, California Governor (Nov. 30, 1999) ("[C]learly, for this deal to work
... German industry and the German government need to be assured that they will get 'legal
peace' not just from class-action lawsuits, but from the kind of legislation represented by the
[HVIRA].... [Aictions by California pursuant to this law have already potentially damaged
and could derail [the settlement negotiations]"), reprinted in Appellee's Petition for
Rehearing at app. D, at 1, Gerling Global Reinsurance Corp. v. Low, 339 F.3d 1078 (9th Cir.
2003) (No. 01-17023).
60. 2002 Hearing, supra note 19, at 28.Some insurers complied with the statute. See id.
at 35-42 (statement of David S. Waldman regarding activities of MONY Life Insurance
Company).
61. See Gerling Global Reinsurance Corp. of Am. v. Quackenbush, Nos. Civ S-00-
0506WBSJFM, 2000 WL 777978, at *3 (E.D. Cal. June 9,2000); see also 2002 Hearing, supra
note 19, at 28 (listing the plaintiffs who initiated federal lawsuits against California's
Insurance Commissioner).
62. See Gerling, 2000 WL 777978, at *3.
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non-Article VI executive branch preemption, chiefly by executive
agreement.
A. Article VI Preemption
A basic tenet of U.S. constitutional law is that federal laws and
treaties displace state laws with which they conflict. Article VI of
the Constitution provides in part: "This Constitution, and the Laws
of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and
all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority
of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land ...63
The natural effect of making federal law supreme is that it
overrides inconsistent state law. Indeed, preemption-and particu-
larly foreign affairs preemption-was a central purpose of the
clause, as explained in the founding era. Prior to the Constitution,
under the Articles of Confederation the national government lacked
power to displace state laws that interfered with its treaties and
foreign policy objectives, with the result that the nation could not
develop a coherent national foreign policy. Article VI's "Supremacy
Clause" conveyed that power, in material part to protect the federal
government's foreign affairs prerogatives.64
The inclusion of treaties, as well as statutes, in the Supremacy
Clause shows the extent to which the Constitution's framers
focused upon state interferences in foreign affairs under the
Articles. Perhaps the single greatest foreign affairs challenge under
the Articles was that states refused to implement and abide by
treaties negotiated by the national government. In particular,
key states like Virginia and Pennsylvania refused to implement
controversial provisions of the peace treaty with Britain that ended
the Revolutionary War, even though that settlement as a whole
greatly favored the United States. State intransigence provoked
63. U.S. CONST. art. VI.
64. On the origins of the Supremacy Clause, see JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS
171-77 (1996); Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 232-60 (2000). Madison had
wanted the Constitution to give Congress a "negative" over state legislation that it believed
contrary to "the articles of Union or any treaties subsisting under the authority of the
Union." His proposal encountered opposition on various grounds; the Supremacy Clause was
the resulting compromise. See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 27-29
(Max Farrand ed., 1937) [hereinafter FARRAND, RECORDS].Among other things, the change
limited Congress's "veto" to matters within Congress's enumerated powers.
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Britain to drag its feet in its own implementation of crucial clauses
of the treaty. Further, states failed to follow provisions of commer-
cial treaties negotiated by Congress, and once it became clear to
potential treaty partners that Congress had no effective enforce-
ment mechanism, further treaty making became impossible.65
Of course, the Constitution could have simply given Congress the
power to pass laws implementing treaties and overriding inconsis-
tent state law through the preemptive effect of statutes. This would
have been closest to the British system, in which treaties them-
selves did not override existing laws, but instead required parlia-
mentary implementation. The Constitution's drafters wanted
immediate implementation, though, and presumably saw no reason
to allow the House to block or delay the preemptive effect of treaties
already approved by the Senate. In any event, no one objected to
adding treaties to the Supremacy Clause, which made sense, as the
representation of the states in the Senate presumably alleviated
federalism concerns.66
Article VI, then, set the basic relationship between the federal
government and the states: states are obliged not to erect legal
regimes in conflict with federal legislative enactments-treaties
and statutes. Modern doctrine goes a bit beyond what might seem
absolutely required by the Supremacy Clause's plain language,
applying preemption not only in cases of direct conflict, 67 but also
when courts feel a state law 'stands as an obstacle"' to the desired
result of a federal act,68 even if technically the two could exist in
65. See MARKS, supra note 15, at 52-95; Ramsey, Myth, supra note 15, at 422-24 & nn.
161-73. As Hamilton described the problem:
The treaties of the United States under the [Articles of Confederation] are liable
to the infractions of the thirteen different legislatures .... The faith, the
reputation, the peace of the whole Union are thus continually at the mercy of
the prejudices, the passions, and the interests of every member of which it is
composed.
THE FEDERALIST No. 22, at 183 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987).
66. See FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 64, at 22, 28-29 (recording no opposition to the
supremacy of treaties, and reflecting unanimous approval of the Supremacy Clause).
67. Preemption seems absolutely required by Article VI when a statute explicitly directs
it, or when state and federal law irreconcilably conflict such that it is impossible to obey both
of them. Whether Congress must draft laws in such a way as to create conflict expressly, or
whether courts may find conflict by implication, does not seem directly addressed by the text.
See Nelson, supra note 64, at 265-90 (arguing against a constitutional basis for obstacle
preemption).
68. Gade v. Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992) (quoting Hines v.
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parallel.69 In unusual cases, federal legislation may be so compre-
hensive as to occupy the entire "field" of regulation, and thus, in the
modern view, exclude state laws that may not seem to be obstacles
in any tangible sense."°
These principles are familiar in domestic constitutional law, and
apply without serious dispute to foreign affairs. In its most recent
foreign affairs preemption case, Crosby v. National Foreign Trade
Council, the Supreme Court concluded unanimously that a federal
statute prescribing limited economic sanctions against Burma (now
Myannmar) displaced a similar, though more restrictive, regulation
by Massachusetts.' That was so even though both laws sought the
same ultimate object (lessening repression in Burma) and one could
comply with both the state law and the federal law at the same
time.72 It was sufficient for preemption, the Supreme Court pointed
out, that Congress intended a material, but limited and flexible
sanctions regime, whereas the state's restriction was both further-
reaching and fixed. 3
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
69. In treaty preemption cases, the Court has, for the most part, not suggested that
different rules apply. See, e.g., El Al sr. Airlines, Ltd. v. Tsui Yuan Tseng, 525 U.S. 155, 174-
76 (1999); Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 126, 143 (1938); Ware v. Hylton,
3 U.S. 199, 235-36 (1796). We assume here that preemption based on statutes and
preemption based on treaties operate similarly. A threshold question is whether the treaty
is "self-executing"; that is, whether the treaty intends its provisions to have direct domestic
effect. The Court has held that, notwithstanding the unqualified language of Article VI, some
treaties require domestic implementation and hence are not preemptive of their own effect.
See Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 253, 314 (1829); Carlos Manuel Vdzquez, The Four Doctrines
of Self-Executing Treaties, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 695, 701-03 (1995). In speaking of treaty
preemption, we refer only to the effect of self-executing treaties.
70. See Gade, 505 U.S. at 98 (finding preemption when the state law '"stands as an
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress"' (quoting Hines, 312 U.S. at 67)). The conventional account refers to "conflict
preemption," "obstacle preemption," and "field preemption." See BORIS I. BITTKER, BITTKER
ON THE REGULATION OF INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE § 5.06 (1999 & Supp. 2004); 1
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1176-77 (3d ed. 2000).
71. 530 U.S. 363, 366-88 (2000). For details on Crosby, see Brannon P. Denning & Jack
H. McCall, United States Supreme Court Decisions on Preemption of State Law by Federal
Statute: Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 94 AM. J. INT'L L. 750 (2000).
72. See Crosby, 530 U.S. at 379.
73. Id. at 373-82. The court first noted the long-standing rule preempting state laws that
pose an obstacle to federal statutory objectives even in the absence of a direct conflict, and
identified three ways the state law posed such an obstacle: (1) "Congress clearly intended the
federal Act to provide the President with flexible ... authority over economic sanctions
against Burma," while the state law did not permit any relaxation of sanctions in response
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Indeed, there was not much judicial dispute on the matter.
Twelve of the thirteen judges who heard the Crosby case thought
the federal law preempted the state sanctions.74 At the Supreme
Court, Justice Scalia concurred separately to chide his colleagues
for writing such a long opinion delving into the federal statute's
legislative history because, Scalia said, the statute's preemptive
effect was perfectly obvious on its face.75
To the extent one might look for judicial debate in the area, the
most one could find would be a mild one: whether there should be
a presumption for or against preemption in foreign affairs matters.
In domestic preemption cases, the Court purports to apply a
presumption that state laws are valid unless the federal law's
preemptive effect is clear.76 In Hines v. Davidowitz, an early foreign
affairs case, the Court suggested that this presumption might be
to good behavior; (2) "Congress manifestly intended to limit economic pressure against the
Burmese Government to a specific range" while the state law penalized activities that
Congress had decided to exempt from sanction; and (3) Congress had directed the President
to speak for the nation in developing "a comprehensive, multilateral strategy" toward Burma,
while the state law prevented the President from exercising full control over the range of
economic sanctions to which Burma was exposed. Id.
74. Id. at 388 (affirming the appellate court's decision in validating Massachusetts law
on preemption grounds without any dissents); Nat'l Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181
F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 1999) (affirming unanimously the decision of the district court invalidating
Massachusetts law). The district court found no preemption but invalidated the law under
the doctrine of Zschernig v. Miller.See id. at 48-49.
75. Crosby, 530 U.S. at 388-91 (Scalia, J., concurring). Curiously, academic commentary
found the case more difficult, with some commentators arguing that the federal statute
afforded little basis for preemption. See, e.g., Sarah H. Cleveland, Crosbyand the "One-Voice"
Myth in U.S. Foreign Relations, 46 VILL. L. REV. 975 (2001); Edward T. Swaine, Crosby as
Foreign Relations Law, 41 VA. J. IN'L L. 481 (2001); Mark Tushnet, Globalization and
Federalism in a Post-Printz World, 36 TULSA L.J. 11 (2000); Carlos Manuel Vizquez,
W[hJither Zschernig?, 46 VILL. L. REV. 1259, 1261 (2001); see also Sanford Levinson,
Compelling Collaboration with Evil? A Comment on Crosby v. National Foreign Trade
Council, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 2189 (2001) (criticizing the Court's decision). Given the Court's
embrace of "obstacle" preemption in domestic cases, we see no reason to view Crosby as
anomalous: the Court's explanation of how the state law frustrated the purpose of the federal
law seems wholly plausible and consistent with domestic cases such as Gade. Notably, the
Justices and academic commentators most sensitive to federalism issues did not find Crosby
objectionable. See Jack Goldsmith, Statutory Foreign Affairs Preemption, 2000 SuP. CT. REV.
175; Ernest A. Young, Dual Federalism, Concurrent Jurisdiction, and the Foreign Affairs
Exception, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 139, 139-41 (2001).
76. E.g., Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963) ("[Fjederal
regulation ... should not be deemed preemptive of state regulatory power in the absence of
persuasive reasons-either that the nature of the regulated subject matter permits no other
conclusion, or that the Congress has unmistakably so ordained.").
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reversed in foreign affairs because of the federal government's
naturally predominant role." In Crosby, the Court declined to
consider whether a presumption might exist, since it found the
preemption clear in any event. 8
In sum, one could find no serious dispute on core principles: that
Article VI is the principal way the federal government displaces
state laws it thinks interfere with its foreign policy objectives, and
that federal legislative acts that intend to preempt state laws
through Article VI will almost always be successful (even if that
intent can be found only by implication). It was also plain that
Article VI preemption could not be claimed in Garamendi: no
statute or treaty even arguably conflicted with California's HVIRA.
Thus Garamendi lacked the critical factor that made its Supreme
Court predecessor, Crosby, an easy case.
B. Constitutional Exclusions
Even absent Article VI preemption, the Constitution itself might
exclude states from foreign affairs activities, without the need for
preemptive federal action. Lacking a treaty or statute, this is where
the HVIRA's challengers turned. The Constitution and the Court's
prior cases offered three possibilities. First, the Constitution's plain
language might exclude states from foreign affairs. Second, states
might be excluded by the negative implication of clauses granting
particular foreign affairs powers to the national government. Third,
and more controversially, there might be a structural exclusion of
states from foreign affairs matters, not arising from any particular
constitutional clause: The question of whether these methods might
77. 312 U.S. 52, 66-68 (1941) The Court emphasized the importance of the national
government's role in foreign affairs:
In [determining preemption], it is of importance that this legislation is in a field
which affects international relations, the one aspect of our government that
from the first has been most generally conceded imperatively to demand broad
national authority. Any concurrent state power that may exist is restricted to
the narrowest of limits.
Id.
78. Crosby, 530 U.S. at 374 n.8; see also United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 108-09
(2000) (declining to apply any presumption in an area of "national and international
maritime commerce").
2004] 847
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
supplement Article VI preemption became the central issue in the
HVIRA litigation-at least at its outset.
1. Specific Exclusions
The Constitution's plain text excludes states from some specific
foreign affairs activities. Article I, Section 10 declares among other
things that no state shall make treaties, make other agreements
without the consent of Congress, engage in war unless actually
invaded, nor issue letters of marque and reprisal."v To the Framers,
these exclusions were obvious and non-controversial; for the most
part, they were carried over, with mild enhancements, from parallel
provisions in the Articles of Confederation. ° None of them, of
course, was implicated in Garamendi. The question, rather, was
whether Article I, Section 10 was an exhaustive list. One might
suppose, as some commentators have suggested, that the very
existence of a list of exclusions in the Constitution's text implies
that the list is complete, and that others should not be created by
implication."' As of the early twenty-first century, however, the
matter could not be resolved so easily.
79. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
80. Specifically, with respect to foreign affairs, Article I, Section 10 provides:
No state shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance or Confederation; grant Letters
of Marque and Reprisal.... No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay
any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports.... No State shall, without the
Consent of Congress, lay any Duty of Tonnage, keep Troops, or Ships of War in
time of Peace, enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State, or
with a foreign Power, or engage in War, unless actually invaded, or in such
imminent Danger as will not admit of delay.
Id. Corresponding provisions, except respecting imports and exports, existed in Articles VI
and IX of the Articles of Confederation. See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION AND PERPETUAL
UNION, reprinted in JAMES BAYARD, A BRIEF EXPOSITION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES 172-74, 176 (1845).
81. See Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts, Foreign Affairs and Federalism, 83 VA. L.
REV. 1617, 1642 (1997) (arguing that the "natural inference ... is that all foreign relations
matters not excluded by Article I, Section 10 fall within the concurrent power of the state and
federal governments until preempted by federal statute or treaty).
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2. The Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine and Exclusions by
Implication
A broad spectrum of opinion-supported by substantial judicial
authority-holds that clauses granting a specific power to the
federal government can, by implication, deny that power to the
states, even if the federal government has not acted and even if
the Constitution does not exclude the states in so many words.
The most familiar manifestation of this principle is the so-
called "negative" or "dormant" Commerce Clause doctrine, which,
according to the Court, excludes states from enacting certain
regulations affecting interstate commerce even absent federal
action, based upon a negative implication from the grant to
Congress of the authority to regulate interstate commerce in Article
I, Section 8.82 Some Justices and academic commentators have
attacked the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine at its very
foundations,83 but the sheer volume of cases the Court has devoted
to it seems to leave it firmly entrenched.
The doctrine, as the Court now applies it, does not exclude states
from all regulations of interstate commerce. Although at times in
the nineteenth century the Court flirted with the idea of mutually
exclusive state and federal commerce powers, 4 it ultimately
abandoned that idea, and instead settled upon an intermediate
approach that excludes states only from what seem to be the most
unjustifiable regulations of interstate commerce: in general, laws
that discriminate against out-of-state commerce, either on their
face or in their effects, and laws with putative local benefits that
"clearly exceed[" their burdens on interstate commerce. 85
82. BITTKER, supra note 70, §§ 6.01-6.06; 1 TRIBE, supra note 70, § 6-2; Donald H. Regan,
The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense of the Dormant Commerce
Clause, 84 MICH. L. REv. 1091 (1986).
83. See, e.g., Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 610
(1997) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc. v. Wash. State Dep't of Revenue, 483
U.S. 232, 259-65 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Julian N. Eule, Laying the Dormant
Commerce Clause to Rest, 91 YALE L.J. 425 (1982); Richard D. Friedman, Putting the
Dormant Commerce Clause Out of Its Misery, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1745 (1991); Martin H.
Redish & Shane V. Nugent, The Dormant Commerce Clause and the Constitutional Balance
of Federalism, 1987 DuKE L.J. 569.
84. See The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. 283, 308 (1849); Willson v. Black-Bird Creek Marsh
Co., 27 U.S. 245, 249-50, 252 (1829); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824).
85. See, e.g., City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978) (facial
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Presumably, then, Congress' Section 8 power to regulate
"[c]ommerce with foreign Nations" implies a similar "dormant"
exclusion of the states from regulating matters of international
commerce. 6 Indeed, the Court indicated in Japan Line, Ltd. v.
County of Los Angeles that this "dormant" exclusion of states from
foreign commerce was broader than the corresponding exclusion of
states from domestic interstate commerce, due to special federal
foreign affairs concerns.87 Specifically, the Court held, in addition
to being subject to traditional dormant Commerce Clause catego-
ries, state regulations of foreign commerce would be displaced if
they interfered with the federal government's ability to "speak with
one voice" in foreign affairs.88
At first blush that would seem to pose serious trouble for the
HVIRA, which, at least according to the executive branch, inter-
fered with the federal government's ability to speak with one
voice on the settlement of Holocaust-era claims. And indeed,
Japan Line figured prominently in the insurers' opening argu-
ments.8 9 But two substantial factors cautioned against too much
Japan Line-based optimism. First, the Court had retreated from
its Japan Line holding in a series of cases culminating in Barclays
Bank v. Franchise Tax Board in 1994.90 In Barclays, the Court
upheld California's system of taxing the world wide operations of
foreign corporations doing business in California, rejecting a Japan
Line challenge.91 The Court pointed out that the state tax was
neither discriminatory nor an undue burden on foreign commerce;
whatever further restrictions Japan Line had intended did not
apply because Congress appeared to endorse (or at least not to
discrimination); Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977)
(discrimination in effect); Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970) (undue burden).
86. The constitutional clauses are parallel: "The Congress shall have Power ... [t]o
regulate Commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian
Tribes." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
87. Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434 (1979).
88. Id. at 448-49; see BIT"KER, supra note 70, § 8.14.
89. In addition to the "one-voice" argument, the insurers also argued that the HVIRA
violated the dormant Commerce Clause because it regulated extraterritorially. Cf. Brown-
Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573 (1986); Fed. Trade Comm'n
v. Travelers' Health Ass'n, 362 U.S. 293 (1960).
90. Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298 (1994).
91. Id.
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oppose) the California tax.92 Congress, said the Court, is the "voice
of the nation" in foreign commerce, and so long as its "voice" is not
compromised, the Court need not police state foreign commerce
regulations.93 Although not repudiating Japan Line outright,
Barclays seemed almost to require active preemption by Congress
(in effect, Article VI preemption) to displace a state law.94
Even more problematic for the insurers' dormant Commerce
Clause arguments, though, was the McCarran Act, the federal law
authorizing states to regulate interstate insurance transactions.95
A leading theory of the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine (and
presumably of the dormant foreign Commerce Clause doctrine) is
that Congress is assumed not to endorse certain categories of state
commercial regulation. Congressional silence, then, is construed to
reflect congressional intent that these laws be displaced. Hanging
the matter on congressional intent, however, implies that Congress
affirmatively can manifest a contrary intent to allow state commer-
cial regulations that would otherwise be excluded by the dormant
Commerce Clause doctrine-as the Court in fact has held. 96
This was the point of the McCarran Act. In the post-New Deal
period of Commerce Clause expansion, the Court held for the
first time that insurance was a matter of interstate commerce. 97
Although the case concerned Congress's powers over insurance, one
corollary of the decision might have been that state insurance
regulation would be exposed to dormant Commerce Clause attack
even in the absence of congressional regulation. To protect state
92. Id. at 314.
93. Id. at 330-31.
94. Id.; see also Wardair Can. Inc. v. Fla. Dept. of Revenue, 477 U.S. 1 (1986); Container
Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159 (1983).
95. 15 U.S.C. § 1012 (2004); see discussion supra Part I.B.
96. See, e.g., Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (1946); see also BITTKER,
supra note 70, §§ 9.03-9.04; William Cohen, Congressional Power to Validate
Unconstitutional State Laws: A Forgotten Solution to an Old Enigma, 35 STAN. L. REV. 387
(1983); Brannon P. Denning, Why the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article 1VCannot
Replace the Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine, 88 MINN. L. REV. 384, 397-99 (2003). This
power of congressional "redelegation" goes back to the Wilson and Webb-Kenyon Acts of the
late nineteenth and early twentieth century, in which Congress used its positive commerce
power to disable the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine with respect to interstate
shipments of alcohol. Previously, the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine had prevented
states from enforcing their liquor laws. See Clark Distilling Co. v. W. Md. Ry. Co., 242 U.S.
311 (1917); In re Rahrer, 140 U.S. 545 (1891); BITTKER, supra note 70, § 9.02.
97. United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 544-46 (1944).
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insurance regulations, in 1945 Congress passed the McCarran Act,
which explicitly reversed the dormant Commerce Clause assump-
tion. As the Act stated, silence by Congress should not be construed
as disapproval of state regulation 9 -- a clear reference to the
dormant Commerce Clause.99
The McCarran Act cast a substantial pall upon the insurers'
dormant Commerce Clause claim, and thus more generally on the
idea that the HVIRA might be displaced by the negative implication
of a specific clause in the Constitution. 0 As a result, while the
dormant Commerce Clause doctrine remained a material issue
in the case, quite a bit more attention focused on the idea of a
structural exclusion of states from foreign affairs matters in
general-an issue taken up in the next subsection.
3. Zschernig v. Miller and Structural Exclusions
Far more controversial than the dormant Commerce Clause
doctrine is the proposition that there is a "dormant" exclusion of
state foreign affairs activity not tied to any particular clause, but
arising, apparently, from a constitutional structure that envisions
material foreign affairs decisions being made at the federal level. As
one of us has argued, "[T]he various provisions related to foreign
affairs can be read to contain a structural or 'penumbral' restriction
on state actions affecting foreign affairs, even in the absence of a
congressional enactment."1 0 ' That seemed, at any rate, to be the
basis for the Supreme Court's decision in Zschernig v. Miller° 2 -a
case that appeared to be at the center of the Garamendi arguments.
98. 15 U.S.C. § 1012 (2004).
99. The Court discussed and upheld this aspect of the McCarran Act in Metropolitan Life
Insurance Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869 (1985), and in Benjamin, 328 U.S. at 434.
100. Although other negative implications presumably exist, the dormant Commerce
Clause is the only one that has received much judicial development, and the only one with
immediate application to the HVIRA. For the suggestion, not endorsed by judicial authority,
of a broad negative implication from the Treatymaking Clause, see Edward Swaine,
Negotiating Federalism: State Bargaining and the Dormant Treaty Power, 49 DUKE L.J. 1127
(2000).
101. Denning & McCall, supra note 14, at 337. But see Ramsey, supra note 14, at 429-32
(rejecting, at least as a matter of original understanding, the existence of a structural limit
on state foreign affairs activities).
102. 389 U.S. 429 (1968).
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Cases before Zschernig had hinted at the idea of such an
exclusion by describing foreign affairs as exclusively a federal
concern, but did not explore the matter because a decision could
rest on more conventional propositions such as Article VI preemp-
tion or the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine. For example, in
Hines v. Davidowitz, the Court had observed that
[t]he Federal Government, representing as it does the collective
interests of [all] states, is entrusted with full and exclusive
responsibility for the conduct of affairs with foreign sovereign-
ties .... Our system of government is such that the interest of the
cities, counties and states, no less than the interest of the people
of the whole nation, imperatively requires that federal power in
the field affecting foreign relations be left entirely free from
local interference. 10 3
But this language was embedded within a paragraph that empha-
sized the Article VI supremacy of statutes and treaties, and the
case's actual holding was that the state law in question conflicted
with the federal Alien Registration Act. 104 Hines, like the Court's
subsequent decision in Crosby, did not consider what would happen
when a state statute affected foreign affairs but did not conflict
with a statute or treaty.105
Zschernig faced that issue directly, invalidating an Oregon
statute despite the lack of a preemptive federal act and the lack of
any applicable constitutional clause. 106 The case challenged a state
probate law allowing foreign citizens to inherit property only if their
governments gave reciprocal rights to Americans. Twenty years
before Zschernig, in Clark v. Allen,107 the Court upheld a similar
state statute, rejecting arguments that (i) the statute conflicted
with a treaty and (ii) the statute was "an extension of state power
into the field of foreign affairs, which is exclusively reserved by the
103. 312 U.S. 52, 63 (1941).
104. Id. at 62-64.
105. For similar broad language coupled with narrow holdings, see United States v. Pink,
315 U.S. 203 (1942), United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937), and Chy Lung v.
Freeman, 92 U.S. 275 (1875). For a possible early suggestion of a structural exclusion, see
Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. 540 (1840).
106. Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 440-41.
107. 331 U.S. 503 (1947).
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Constitution to the Federal Government."' 8 In rejecting the second
claim, Clark seemed to hold that when a state legislated on "local"
matters, only "an overriding federal policy, as where a treaty makes
different or conflicting arrangements," would operate to restrain the
states.10 9 Because there was "no treaty governing the rights of
succession to personal property," and the state had neither
impermissibly negotiated with a foreign nation nor made a compact
in violation of Article I, Section 10, it had not "cross[ed] the
forbidden line," though its law "will have some incidental or indirect
effect in foreign countries.""0
The statute challenged in Zschernig closely resembled the one
upheld in Clark. The Court nevertheless invalidated the Oregon law
in Zschernig, while declining "the invitation to re-examine our
ruling in Clark v. Allen.""' Justice Douglas, the author of both
Clark and Zschernig, defended the result in Clark by noting the
distinct posture of the challenge in Zschernig. "It now appears," he
wrote, that
the probate courts of various States have launched inquiries into
the type of governments that obtain in particular foreign
nations-whether aliens under their law have enforceable
rights, whether the so-called "rights" are merely dispensations
turning upon the whim or caprice of government officials,
whether the representation of consuls, ambassadors, and other
representatives of foreign nations is credible or made in good
faith, whether there is in the actual administration in the
particular foreign system of law any element of confiscation." 2
Such "state involvement in foreign affairs," Douglas continued, was
not approved by Clark v. Allen."' Unlike the "incidental or indirect"
effects found in Clark, "the type of probate law that Oregon enforces
affects international relations in a persistent and subtle way. '
Oregon's law, while "not as gross an intrusion in the federal
108. Id. at 516-17.
109. Id. at 517.
110. Id.
111. Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 432.
112. Id. at 433-34.
113. Id. at 436.
114. Id. at 440.
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domain" as a conflict with a statute or treaty, had "a direct impact
upon foreign relations and may well adversely affect the power of
the central government to deal with those problems"-and so was
unconstitutional.
115
Zschernig thus announced a rule of constitutional exclusion
limiting states' involvement in foreign affairs, much as the dormant
Commerce Clause doctrine limits states' regulation of interstate
commerce even in the absence of congressional legislation. The key
proposition for which it appears to stand-and which makes it
controversial-is that in the absence of a treaty provision, a law, or
even an executive branch policy, 116 a state law may still be struck
down if it has "more than 'some incidental or indirect effect in
foreign countries"' or carries "great potential for disruption or
embarrassment to" the Government's conduct of foreign affairs." 7
The Court's basis for its rule was difficult to discern from Justice
Douglas's opinion. Although the Court purported to rely on Hines
v. Davidowitz, Hines involved Article VI statutory preemption and
not the "dormant" exclusion of Zschernig."8 "This was," Louis
Henkin commented, "new constitutional doctrine.""' 9 It was not well
received by commentators. Henkin continued:
The Court did not build sturdy underpinnings for its constitu-
tional doctrine or face substantial arguments against it .... What
115. Id. at 441. Justices Stewart and Brennan would have gone further, to overrule Clark
and rest the outcome on "the basic allocation of the power between the States and the
Nation," which, according to Justice Stewart, excluded states from matters concerning the
conduct of foreign relations. Id. at 443 (Stewart, J., concurring). Justice Harlan disagreed
with the majority's analysis, preferring to provide the "full relief sought by the appellants"
by "overruling the construction of the 1923 treaty, rather than the constitutional holding, in
Clark v. Allen." Id. at 445 (Harlan, J., concurring). Only Justice White dissented, writing that
he was not persuaded "that the Court's construction of the 1923 treaty in Clark v. Allen ...
and of similar treaty language in earlier cases should be overruled at this late date." Id. at
462 (White, J., dissenting).
116. The executive branch told the Court that nothing in the Oregon probate laws
interfered with its conduct of foreign policy. Id. at 434. The Court replied that the
"Government's acquiescence in the ruling of Clark v. Allen certainly does not justify
extending the principle of that case ... for [the application of Oregon's law] has more than
'some incidental or indirect effect in foreign countries,' and has great potential for disruption
or embarrassment." Id. at 434-35.
117. See id.
118. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 62 (1941).
119. Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 163 (2d ed. 1996).
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the Constitution says about foreign affairs ... provides little basis
for the Court's doctrine.... Nor is the Zschernig doctrine the
natural inference from the expressed grants to the federal
branches or from "the Constitution as a whole" .... Nor is there
support for Zschernig in the history of the Constitution in
practice.12 °
Professor Harold Maier wrote that Douglas's opinion was "murky"
and that only Justice Stewart's structural analysis adequately
explained the result in the case.121 Recent scholars have expressed
even sharper criticisms.'22
While academic commentary as a whole expressed doubt about
the opinion's reasoning (or lack thereof), commentators divided over
the correct response. In the decades following Zschernig, that
opinion's cryptic rationale produced at least three divergent views.
Some academic commentators flatly rejected it as lacking any basis
in the Constitution's text and history.12 These commentators were
comforted by the fact that Zschernig lay dormant in the courts, not
clearly forming the basis of any federal appellate decision for some
thirty years after it was rendered;'24 no doubt they harbored hopes
that Garamendi would strike Zschernig off the books altogether.125
120. Id. at 436 n.64.
121. Harold G. Maier, Preemption of State Law: A Recommended Analysis, 83AM. J. INT'L
L. 832, 836-37 (1989). In particular, Maier notes that:
Justice Stewart, in classic common law decision-making tradition, applied the
general organizational principles of U.S. federalism to the facts before him to
arrive at his conclusion. Reiterating that the sole foreign affairs voice of the
nation lies in the national Government, he concluded that the [state law was]
outside the realm of state competence [because the state had trespassed on an
area reserved for the federal government].
122. See, e.g., Goldsmith, supra note 81, at 1661 ("[Clontrary to conventional wisdom, the
federal common law of foreign relations announced by ... Zschernig marked a sharp
departure from prior law."); Ramsey, supra note 14, at 357 & n.61 (terming Zschernig
"revolutionary" and noting that its "constitutional basis ... remains unexplained").
123. See, e.g., Goldsmith, supra note 81, at 1661-62; Ramsey, supra note 14, at 429-32.
124. That desuetude led still other commentators to suggest it might lack continuing force.
See HENKIN, supra note 119, at 165 (noting courts' lack of reliance on Zschernig and
suggesting that Zschernig might be "a relic of the Cold War"); Peter J. Spiro, Foreign
Relations Federalism, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1223, 1242, 1264-66 (1999). The first federal
appellate decision to rely on Zschernig outside of Zschernig's particular facts was the lower
court opinion in Crosby, sub nom. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38 (1st
Cir. 1999). The Supreme Court had never relied on Zschernig prior to Garamendi.
125. See Jack L. Goldsmith, The New Formalism in United States Foreign Relations Law,
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Others thought, as suggested above, that Zschernig might be
defended on the basis of constitutional structure and intent, even
though the Court itself had not made much of a case.12' For those
accepting at least some version of Zschernig, the question was
whether to emphasize its broad language or its specific facts. The
Court had said, among other things, that state laws with more than
an incidental effect on foreign affairs were unconstitutional,
without explaining what that meant. Taking that observation as the
case's core holding, however, suggested a fairly broad application,
depending on how one viewed "more than incidental." Professor
Maier, for example, proposed in an influential article that courts
undertake a balancing of federal and state interests and exclude
states from areas in which federal foreign affairs interests clearly
predominated.'27
Zschernig, though, was an unusual case on its facts, and to some
this suggested that it could be reserved to specific and fairly narrow
categories of state acts. The principal problem in Zschernig had
been that courts applying the state law made intrusive and
inflammatory investigations into the good faith of foreign govern-
ments. The Court's focus on these facts in its opinion-and its
insistence that it was not overruling its prior precedent of Clark v.
Allen-indicated that the Court might not have intended as wide-
ranging an exclusion as Maier proposed. Professor Carlos Wzquez,
for example, suggested effectively confining Zschernig to its
facts-state laws that displayed overt hostility toward foreign
governments would be invalid. 2 '
As one might expect, the battle lines in Garamendi initially
formed largely on these grounds. According to the insurers, the
70 U. CoLo. L. REV. 1395, 1426-27 (1999) (suggesting that Barclays had overruled Zschernig
sub silentio).
126. For defenses of some aspects of Zschernig, with varying degrees of enthusiasm, see
Richard Bilder, The Role of Cities and States in the Foreign Relations, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 821,
824-30 (1989); Denning & McCall, supra note 14, at 337; Howard Fenton, The Fallacy of
Federalism in Foreign Affairs: State and Local Foreign Policy Trade Restrictions, 13 NW. J.
INT'L L. & BUS. 563, 588-90 (1993); Maier, supra note 121, at 838-39; Spiro, supra note 124,
at 1242; Vizquez, supra note 75, at 1259, 1260-65.
127. Maier, supra note 119, at 838-39.
128. Vizquez, supra note 75, at 1321. One merit of this proposal was that it would be
relatively easy to apply. Maier's balancing test, in contrast, invited courts to make policy
judgments in an area where judicial expertise was conventionally suspect.
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dormant Commerce Clause doctrine invalidated the HVIRA under
Japan Line, but in any event the HVIRA fell under a broad reading
of Zschernig that excluded state laws with more than "incidental"
effects on foreign affairs.129 According to California, Congress's
McCarran Act answered the dormant Commerce Clause argument
by authorizing the interstate regulation of insurance at the state
level, and Zschernig should be read narrowly (much in the manner
advocated by Professor Vzquez) to exclude only insults to foreign
governments. 3 ° As the Supreme Court took up the case, these
debates appeared to be the focus of its attention.
C. Preemption by Executive Acts
Executive agreements remained one substantial category of
limits on state foreign affairs activities beyond pure Article VI
preemption, explicit constitutional prohibitions, and the "dormant"
exclusions.' 3' Despite three Supreme Court cases directly on point,
executive agreements remained perhaps the least understood of the
categories. There was at least one executive agreement directly
implicated in Garamendi-though it did not fit easily into either
side's view of the case.
The modern President commonly concludes some agreements
with foreign nations independently-that is, without the approval
of Congress or the Senate. Some academic commentators take
strong issue with that practice as inconsistent with the
Treatymaking Clause of Article II.32 Treaties require approval of
two-thirds of the Senate; therefore, if all agreements with foreign
nations are treaties, it would seem that the President lacks
unilateral power to agree to anything on the nation's behalf.'33
129. Gerling Global Reinsurance Co. v. Quackenbush, 2000 WL 777978, at *9-*10 (E.D.
Cal. June 9, 2000).
130. Gerling Global Reinsurance Corp. of Am. v. Low, 240 F.3d 739, 752-53 (9th Cir. 2001).
131. We use the term "executive agreements" to mean international agreements concluded
on the sole authority of the President, as opposed to "congressional-executive agreements,"
which are approved by Congress but not by a supermajority of the Senate.
132. See U.S. CONST. art. 2, § 2, cl. 2 ("[The President] shall have Power, by and with the
Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators
present concur.").
133. David Gray Adler, Court, Constitution and Foreign Affairs, in THE CONSTITUTIONAND
THE CONDUCT OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 19, 20-22, 27-32 (David Gray Adler & Larry N.
858 [Vol. 46:825
2004] EXECUTIVE PREEMPTION IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS 859
Perhaps, as others have argued, Congress also has the power to
approve international agreements, 34 but that would not support
the common practice of Presidents making them alone. None-
theless, in all three cases in which the Court considered the
matter-United States v. Belmont,'35 United States v. Pink,'36 and
Dames'& Moore v. Regan 37 -it had little difficulty in approving the
executive agreements in question, and various academic and
historical arguments have been made in support of the Court's
decision. 3 '
It is a somewhat larger step to conclude that executive agree-
ments are not only constitutional but preemptive.'39 After all, they
are not mentioned in Article VI, the usual source of preemption. 4 °
The Court's three cases, nonetheless, gave preemptive effect to the
agreements they approved without elaborate discussion.
Of course, at least one executive agreement was relevant to the
Garamendi case.' 4 1 If the state law posed an obstacle to the
implementation of an executive agreement, the Court's precedents
suggested that this could be a basis for preemption-and the
insurers did make this claim, albeit somewhat indirectly. But
several obstacles prevented an easy resolution on this ground. First,
the scope and extent of executive agreement preemption remained
George eds., 1996); Raoul Berger, The Presidential Monopoly of Foreign Relations, 71 MICH.
L. REV. 1, 55 (1972).
134. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 HARV. L.
REV. 799 (1995).
135. 301 U.S. 324 (1937).
136. 315 U.S. 203 (1942).
137. 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
138. See HENKIN, supra note 119, at 219-30.
139. For elaboration of this point, plus the observation that the two issues are usually not
viewed separately, see Michael D. Ramsey, Executive Agreements and the (Non)Treaty Power,
77 N.C. L. REV. 133 (1998) [hereinafter Ramsey, Executive Agreements]. Leading recent
academic discussions of executive agreements include Joel R. Paul, The Geopolitical
Constitution: Executive Expediency and Executive Agreements, 86 CAL. L. REV. 671 (1998) and
Ingrid Brunk Wuerth, The Dangers of Deference: International Claim Settlement by the
President, 44 HARV. INT'LL.J. 1, 14-41 (2003). See also David Sloss, InternationalAgreements
and the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1963 (2003) (arguing that
executive agreements must be subject to "judicially enforced federalism limitations").
140. An executive agreement approved by Congress would presumably be preemptive in
the same way as a statute, but the issue here is an agreement based solely upon the
President's power.
141. See supra notes 50-55 and accompanying text (discussing agreements with Germany
and Austria).
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hazy despite the Court's precedents. As noted, executive agree-
ments stand outside the traditional methods of preemption by
statute or treaty. Perhaps in recognition of this, the Court's prior
cases-and commentators' evaluations of them-had been fairly
cautious. The Pink and Belmont cases involved an area of unique
presidential competence-recognition of a foreign government.
Both concerned an executive agreement that Franklin Roosevelt
concluded with the Soviet Union, as part of Roosevelt's recognition
of the Soviet government in 1934. The Court made some mention of
that context, and it was surely plausible to argue (as a number of
commentators did) that their relationship to recognition gave the
executive agreements particular constitutional force despite the
fact that they rested on presidential power alone. 142 One could
almost think of this as a negative implication of the President's
power to receive ambassadors: states could not do anything that
would interfere with the President's ability to establish diplomatic
relations with another government.
The Court's third and most important executive agreement case,
Dames & Moore v. Regan, seemed to confirm the need to read Pink
and Belmont narrowly. The Dames & Moore litigation challenged
executive orders made pursuant to President Carter's executive
agreement ending the Iran hostage crisis in 1980. In upholding
the President's action, the Court proceeded extremely cautiously,
emphasizing the emergency nature of the international situation
and the implicit consent it found Congress had given to Carter's
settlement. 143 The Court carefully avoided a blanket holding that
executive agreements were either constitutional or preemptive,
cautioning that it was deciding only the facts of the immediate
case. 144 Dames & Moore seemed to signal that not all executive
agreements were preemptive, though without identifying their
constitutional limit; otherwise it would have been a much easier
case than the Court appeared to believe.
A second problem with relying too heavily on executive agree-
ments in Garamendi was that the principal agreement, the German
Foundation Agreement, seemed to disclaim preemptive effect. It did
142. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 229 (1942); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S.
324, 330 (1937); see HENKIN, supra note 119, at 219-30; Wuerth, supra note 139, at 12-13.
143. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 677-80 (1981).
144. Id. at 680, 688.
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not contain any language specifically overriding inconsistent state
laws, especially not disclosure laws. Instead, it contained puzzlingly
tepid language. The United States agreed that in any case in which
a claim was asserted against a German company, the United States
would submit a brief saying that it was in the "policy interests of
the United States for the Foundation [Agreement] to be the
exclusive remedy.' 14' The Agreement also said that these "policy
interests" do not "in themselves provide an independent legal basis
for dismissal" even with respect to actual claims. 4 6 With respect to
state regulatory actions, the U.S. agreed only to use "best efforts,
in a manner it considers appropriate.' 4' None of this seemed to
invalidate state laws, even with respect to claims. That was,
moreover, how the United States read the agreement in its amicus
brief to the court of appeals. The U.S. brief in the court of appeals
made the statement contemplated by the agreement, but went on
to say that "[Appellee] is mistaken ... if... [it] means to suggest that
the Agreement by its terms preempts the California statute.' 48
A third factual difficulty stood in the way of deciding the case
on the basis of the executive agreements: they did not apply to all
the plaintiffs. The German Foundation Agreement affected only
German companies. There was also an agreement with Austria and
an informal arrangement with Switzerland, in each case covering
those governments' nationals. The HVIRA applied to all insurance
companies doing business in California (and their affiliates), and
some of these companies were based in countries other than
Germany, Austria, and Switzerland. Generali, for example, was an
145. Foundation Agreement, supra note 50, Annex B, 39 I.L.M. at 1303.
146. Id. Annex B, 39 I.L.M. at 1304.
147. Id. art. 2(1). 39 I.L.M. at 1300; see also supra Part I.B.
148. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Affirmance, Gerling
Global Reinsurance Corp. v. Low, 240 F.3d 739 (9th Cir. 2001), reprinted in Respondents'
Brief in Opposition app. H, at 48, Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003) (No. 02-
722); see also id. at 44, 47-48 (noting that the "agreements do not, of their own force,
extinguish any claims that Holocaust victims or their families might assert in court against
foreign insurance companies" but that they "make clear, however, that United States policy
disfavors the imposition of further obligations on companies subject to the agreements,
whether through regulation or litigation, beyond the obligations contemplated by the
agreements themselves"); id. at 48 ("Nor does the Foundation Agreement itself preclude
individuals from filing suit on their insurance policies in court."). This comports with chief
negotiator Eizenstat's statement that "we would not take a formal legal position barring U.S.
citizens from their own courts." EIZENSTAT, supra note 43, at 269.
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Italian company, and no agreement existed (or was even in the
works) with Italy or Italian companies. So at best the executive
agreements seemed to support a decision invalidating the HVIRA
as applied to some of the insurers, but not others.
Although the executive agreements were not an obvious winner
for the insurers, they posed conceptual difficulties for the state. The
state wanted to argue that the only categories of exclusion were: (i)
Article VI preemption; (ii) the clause-based exclusions of Article I,
Section 10, and negative implications of specific clauses like the
dormant Commerce Clause doctrine; and (iii) a narrow version of
Zschernig. Executive agreements did not fit comfortably within this
constitutional universe. Even if executive agreements could not win
the day (or at least the whole day) for the insurers, the state lacked
a good explanation for how they, or at least some of them, achieved
their preemptive effect.
One possibility is that executive agreements on matters of
plenary presidential power, such as recognition, are enough like
treaties to draw their preemptive effect from Article VI, even
though they are not mentioned in the Article's text.149 That
claim finds support in at least one of the Court's executive agree-
ment cases, United States v. Belmont, where the Court directly
analogized the executive agreement to treaties made preemptive
by Article VI. 1'50 A second possibility is that executive agreements
depend to some extent upon the approval, or at least acquiescence,
of Congress, and that they draw their preemptive effect from the
fact that, like statutes but less formally, they reflect the will of
Congress. Dames & Moore supports this view, for the Court in that
case emphasized Congress's acquiescence as a key component of its
149. See U.S. CONST. art. VI.
150. See Belmont v. United States, 301 U.S. 324, 330 (1937) (holding that "the Executive
had authority to speak as the sole organ of [the federal] government" in settling claims with
the Soviet Union and that "[t]he assignment and agreements in connection therewith did not,
as in the case of treaties ... require the advice and consent of the Senate"); id. at 331 (stating
that "the external powers of the United States are to be exercised without regard to state
laws or policies"); id. (noting that the Supremacy Clause operates "in the case of all
international compacts and agreements from the very fact that complete power over
international affairs is in the national government and is not and cannot be subject to any
curtailment or interference on the part of the several states"); see also United States v. Pink,
315 U.S. 203, 230-31 (1942) ("[S]tate law must yield when it is inconsistent with, or impairs
the policy or provisions of, a treaty or of an international compact or agreement.").
[Vol. 46:825
2004] EXECUTIVE PREEMPTION IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS 863
decision.'' Neither possibility worried the state in Garamendi, as
recognition was not involved and if anything Congress seemed to
endorse the state's actions.
A third possibility is that executive agreements draw their
preemptive power from the President's independent power in
foreign affairs.'52 This was obviously the most troubling to the state
in Garamendi, as it might suggest that other executive acts, such
as mere policy formulation, might be preemptive as well. The Court,
however, had never explained executive agreements on this ground,
and among other things it seemed inconsistent with the Court's
cautious approach in Dames & Moore. Little judicial or academic
authority hinted that presidential policies could have preemptive
effect. Several lower court opinions, and perhaps one Supreme
Court opinion, suggested that some state law causes of action that
interfered with presidential policies might be barred, although the
courts attributed their decisions to "federal common law" rather
than anything explicitly constitutional.'53 Beyond this, the idea
151. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 680 (1981); see Michael D. Ramsey,
Presidential Declarations of War, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 321, 371 (2003) (suggesting that
Dames & Moore could be read as a non-statutory delegation of congressional power to the
President).
152. As the Court stated in Pink:
The powers of the President in the conduct of foreign relations included the
power, without consent of the Senate, to determine the public policy of the
United States with respect to Russian nationalization decrees.... That authority
... includes the power to determine the policy which is to govern the question
of recognition.... Power to remove such obstacles to full recognition as
settlement of claims of our nationals ... certainly is a modest implied power of
the President who is the "sole organ of the federal government in the field of
international relations."
315 U.S. at 229; see also United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319-21
(1936) (describing the President's power in foreign affairs as including, among other things,
executive agreements); Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 6, at 252-65 (arguing for a textual
basis for the President's independent power in foreign affairs but denying that the power is
preemptive).
153. E.g., Torres v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 113 F.3d 540, 542-43 (5th Cir. 1997). Some
academic commentators suggested that these decisions really amounted to using executive
policy to override state law, and found this to be constitutionally inappropriate; Pravin
Banker Assocs., Ltd. v. Banco Popular del Peru, 109 F.3d 850, 855-56 (2d Cir. 1997). See
Goldsmith, supra note 81, at 1695-98; Michael D. Ramsey, Escaping International Comity,
83 IOWA L. REV. 893, 937-51 (1998). The possible Supreme Court case is Boyle v. United
Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500 (1988), where the Court invalidated a state tort claim
against a defense contractor who followed a design submitted by the military. For varying
views of Boyle, see Bradford Clark, Federal Common Law: A Structural Reinterpretation, 144
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that a presidential policy could, in itself, displace a state law
seemed barely to have been contemplated. It was not even men-
tioned in the leading foreign affairs law casebook, published only
months before the Court's decision. 154 The Court, moreover, seemed
firmly opposed, at least in commercial cases. In Barclays, the
President had pointed to executive branch opposition to California's
tax law as a reason for invalidating it; the Court took this as a
claim that executive policies could preempt state law, and rejected
it in strong terms.
155
The matter of executive agreements, therefore, clouded the
Garamendi case but did not squarely help either side. The insurers
needed to claim something broader than executive agreement
preemption, because neither the existing law of executive agree-
ments nor the agreements actually at issue seemed strong enough
to carry their case. The state, however, had a difficult explanatory
problem. Its essential argument was that preemption of state law
could only arise from Article VI, from an exclusion or a negative
implication of a specific clause (like the dormant Commerce Clause
doctrine), or from a narrow interpretation of Zschernig. Executive
agreements did not fit into any of these categories, yet at least some
of them were clearly preemptive.
As a result, the parties' arguments focused on the dormant
Commerce Clause doctrine and upon Zschernig, not upon preemp-
tive effects of executive action. To be sure, the insurers emphasized
the President's actions, especially the German settlement, and
the degree to which the state law (supposedly) interfered with
them. Their principal thrust, though, was to argue that the matter
U. PA. L. REV. 1245, 1368-75 (1996); Ramsey, supra note 14, at 395-96; Vilzquez, supra note
75, at 1302-04.
154. See CURTIS A. BRADLEY & JACK L. GOLDSMITH, FOREIGN AFFAIRS LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS 275-335 (2003) (discussing state power in foreign affairs under four heads:
statutory preemption, treaty preemption, "dormant" preemption-meaning Zschernig and
related matters-and the federal common law of foreign affairs). Prior to Garamendi, the only
academic article of which we are aware that explicitly discussed the idea of executive
preemption was by one of the current authors. See Ramsey, supra note 14, at 390-429
(considering and rejecting, as a matter of original understanding, the idea that the
President's executive power in foreign affairs has a negative implication preempting
inconsistent state laws).
155. Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298, 328-30 (1994) ("Executive
Branch communications that express federal policy but lack the force of law cannot render
unconstitutional California's [tax laws].").
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implicated foreign affairs, as shown by the President's involvement
with foreign governments over the issue, and thus that Zschernig
and Japan Line invalidated the HVIRA.
D. The HVIRA in the Lower Courts
The decisions in the lower courts followed the sketch of the law
set forth above. Although the facts were novel, the courts' ap-
proaches were not. At the outset, the insurers had their way on
both of the closely contested issues. The district court took the
broad view of Zschernig, highlighting its "no more than incidental
effect on foreign affairs" language.156 Reciting the foreign policy
objectives of the President, and the executive branch statements as
to the HVIRA's perverse effect upon negotiations, the district court
thought it evident that the state law had more than an incidental
effect on foreign affairs.157 The court made clear that it was relying
on a constitutional exclusion of the states from foreign affairs, as
suggested by Hines and related cases and confirmed by Zschernig.155
On the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine, the district court took
the Japan Line approach, ignoring Barclays altogether and
emphasizing the imperative to "speak with one voice" in foreign
affairs.159 The court accordingly entered a preliminary injunction
against enforcement of the HVIRA in June 2000. 160
The court of appeals did not differ fundamentally in its vision of
foreign affairs law, but in reversing, simply adopted the opposite
view of the critical cases. With respect to Zschernig, the court
followed California's suggestion to confine Zschernig to its facts.
The court emphasized that the HVIRA was not a regulation of, and
certainly not an insult to, Germany or any other European govern-
156. Gerling Global Reinsurance Corp. of Am. v. Quackenbush, No. CIV.S-00-
0506WBSJFM, 2000 WL 777978, at *9 (E.D. Cal. June 9, 2000) ("Zschernig requires that the
statute have 'more than some incidental or indirect effect in foreign countries."' (emphasis
omitted) (quoting Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 434 (1968))).
157. Id. at *6-*9.
158. Id. at *5-*6.
159. Id. at *12 (quoting Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 449
(1979)).
160. The court threw out the insurers' challenge to California's other Holocaust-related
statutes as unripe (since no one had actually filed suit under them yet). Id. at *1 n.2.
2004] 865
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
ment, but rather a regulation of private European companies.'61
Noting that it was "rarely invoked by the courts" and that "the
Supreme Court has not applied it in more than 30 years," the court
declined to take the insurers' broad view of Zschernig. 6 2 "HVIRA
regulates insurance companies that do business in California .... No
plaintiff is a foreign government, nor is any Plaintiff owned in
whole or in part by a foreign government; they are, simply, busi-
nesses."' 63 Further, according to the court, the HVIRA did not
target a particular country, nor did it raise the sensitive "diplomatic
concerns mentioned in Zschernig," specifically the risk of state
actions giving offense to a particular foreign regime.'64
On the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine, the appeals court
thought the McCarran Act shielded the state law: "Congress has
expressly delegated to the states the power to regulate insurance,
free from the constraints of the dormant Commerce Clause....
HVIRA is a California insurance regulation of California insurance
companies that affects foreign commerce only indirectly."'65 As a
result, "[t]he McCarran Act applies and the dormant Commerce
Clause does not."'166 In any event, while conceding that the HVIRA
did "touch[]on" foreign commerce "indirect[ly]," the court empha-
sized the extent to which Barclays had undercut Japan Line.'67 The
court observed that under Barclays, Congress is the "voice" of the
nation in foreign commerce, and found that "Congress has spoken
affirmatively in the area of Holocaust-era insurance policies and
has acquiesced in state laws like HVIRA" by passing the Holocaust
Commission Act.168 The court acknowledged that the HVIRA might
be in some tension with the Foundation Agreement and executive
policy more generally, although it downplayed the extent of direct
conflict. It pointed out, however, that there was no preemptive act
under Article VI, that the executive agreement itself did not claim
161. Gerling Global Reinsurance Corp. of Am. v. Low, 240 F.3d 739, 753 (9th Cir. 2001).
162. Id. at 752.
163. Id. at 753.
164. Id.; see Vzquez, supra note 75, at 1324 (arguing that courts should "interpreto
Zschernig to bar state laws that single out a state or group of states for unfavorable
treatment").
165. Gerling, 240 F.3d at 746.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 747; see also the discussion of the Holocaust Act supra Part I.B.
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preemptive effect, and that neither Zschernig nor Japan Line (the
principal methods of constitutional exclusion it recognized) required
reversal.169
Thus, as the case headed for the Supreme Court, it appeared to
pose two central questions about the scope of two key lines of
cases. 7 ° First, how broadly should one read Zschernig (assuming
Zschernig did not meet the fate its harshest academic detractors
wished upon it)? Second, did Barclays leave intact anything of the
enhanced dormant Commerce Clause doctrine envisioned by Japan
Line, and if so, did the McCarran Act nonetheless protect the state
law? 1 ' Looming above both questions was the broader matter of
169. The court was unimpressed by the "letters in which executive branch officials
argue[d] that HVIRA does conflict with the federal government's policy concerning
Holocaust-era claims," writing that the Supreme Court had in the past-particularly in
Barclays-rejected arguments that such executive branch declarations should be
determinative. Gerling, 240 F.3d at 751.
170. For the sake of simplicity, this Article's summary of the lower court proceedings is
abbreviated. In its initial opinion, the court of appeals disagreed with the district court's
reasoning, but left the preliminary injunction in place to allow the district court to consider
the insurers' further argument that the HVIRA violated the Due Process Clause by taking
"away the licenses of California insurers for failure to perform tasks that are literally
impossible." Id. at 753-54. On remand, the district court granted summary judgment for the
insurers on the ground that the HVIRA violated the requirements of procedural due process.
Gerling Global Reinsurance Corp. of Am. v. Low, 186 F. Supp. 2d 1099, 1113 (E.D. Cal. 2001).
The Ninth Circuit again reversed. Gerling Global Reinsurance Corp. of Am. v. Low, 296 F.3d
832 (9th Cir. 2002). The court of appeals found that the district court had "conflate[d] the
analytically distinct concepts of procedural and substantive due process" because "[riegulated
parties generally have a right to meaningful hearing only with respect to those defenses
actually allowed under a given statute. Thus, if a particular defense is deemed irrelevant
under the statute, a party has no procedural due process right to a hearing ...." Id. at 845.
The question was whether the state's denial of defenses violated substantive due process-a
question properly analyzed under the rational basis test. Id. The court then found that the
state law had a rational basis. Id. at 845-47. As a result, the insurers had no constitutional
right to "raise defenses premised on their lack of control over the required information or the
illegality under foreign law of their disclosure of the information," and the HVIRA was not
"unconstitutional on its face because it makes no provision for a hearing prior to revocation
of an insurance company's license." Id. at 845-49. The court of appeals also reaffirmed its
conclusions on the Zschernig and Japan Line issues. Id. at 849.
In the ensuing discussion, we do not consider the due process aspects of the case, and
express no opinion on the appropriate outcome. Although the Supreme Court granted
certiorari on the due process question as well as the foreign affairs and dormant Commerce
Clause issues, it did not address that part of the case in its decision. We return briefly to the
due process aspects of the case in the Conclusion infra.
171. Petitioners' "Questions Presented" were "Whether the HVIRA, which the United
States government has called an 'actual interference' with U.S. foreign policy, and which
affected foreign governments have protested as inconsistent with international agreements,
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whether Zschernig and Barclays could be reconciled, or if one would
have to give way-Zschernig with its direction that states stay out
of foreign affairs controversies and Barclays with its approval of a
state law that infuriated most of the nation's major trading
partners. 17 2 These were important questions, to be sure, but not
new ones. They had been debated in academic commentary on more
or less these exact terms, and as discussed these were the questions
that divided the district court from the court of appeals, and the
insurers from the state.
As we discuss in the next section, the outcome in the Supreme
Court was, in contrast, quite novel. The Court did not answer either
of the questions seemingly posed to it, but instead found a new
basis for preempting the state law outside both Zschernig and the
dormant Commerce Clause doctrine. It was that shift, we argue,
that converted Garamendi from an important case to, potentially,
a landmark one.
III. THE SUPREME COURT DECISION: REINVENTING FOREIGN
AFFAIRS FEDERALISM
In Garamendi, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals
on foreign affairs grounds. As it did three years earlier in Crosby,
the Court invoked preemption analysis to avoid larger questions
about Zschernig's dormant foreign affairs power and the dormant
foreign Commerce Clause doctrine.173 But instead of repeating
violates the foreign affairs doctrine of Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968)"; "Whether the
HVIRA, which regulates on an extraterritorial basis in an area where the United States must
speak with one voice, violates the Foreign Commerce Clause and exceeds the scope of
legitimate state regulation under the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015"; and
"Whether the HVIRA, which regulates insurance transactions that occurred overseas
between foreign parties more than half a century ago, exceeds California's legislative
jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause." See Brief for the Petitioners at 1, Am. Ins. Ass'n
v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003) (No. 02-722), available at 2003 WL 834719. The
Respondents' formulation was essentially the same. Brief for the Respondents at i, Am. Ins.
Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003) (No. 02-722), available at 2003 WL 554499.
172. See Goldsmith, supra note 81, at 1704-05 (finding the two cases irreconcilable); Spiro,
supra note 124, at 1266 (suggesting that the reasoning of Barclays "could be deployed to
reverse the rule[ of Zschernig").
173. Compare Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 413 n.7:
Our grant of certiorari ... encompassed three of the questions addressed by the
Ninth Circuit: whether HVIRA intrudes on the federal foreign affairs power,
violates the self-executing element of the Foreign Commerce Clause, or exceeds
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Crosby's unanimity, the Court managed only a 5-4 majority, and
it would be a mistake to conclude that, like Crosby, Garamendi was
a narrow decision. Unlike Crosby, Garamendi did not involve the
routine application of preemption analysis, despite the Court's
contrary suggestions. Rather, the language of preemption used in
Garamendi masks profound implications for separation of powers
and federalism.
This Part describes the Court's analysis in Garamendi, and
shows that it did not follow from prior law. We argue that, taken
at face value, Garamendi's embrace of broad executive branch
lawmaking power far exceeds that recognized by the Court's prior,
carefully-qualified decisions. By relying on those opinions, without
acknowledging their limiting language and distinguishable facts,
the Court expanded executive power without grappling with the
serious constitutional questions that such expansion raises. The
next two Parts consider whether the Court's new rule is structur-
ally sound, from the distinct but inextricably related perspectives
of foreign affairs federalism and separation of powers.
Our criticisms of the Court's handling of the federalism and
separation of powers issues in Garamendi have a common element.
In both areas, the Court presented its conclusions as following
ineluctably from its own precedents. As we demonstrate, however,
Garamendi furnishes an excellent example of "doctrine creep,"
whereby entirely new principles of law are justified on the basis of
prior cases, while ignoring important facts or limiting language
that were important-perhaps decisive-in the previous cases.
Garamendi, we argue, calls into question the desirability of
privileging so-called "common law constitutional interpretation"-in
which precedent, as opposed to text, history, or structure, does the
heavy lifting of constitutional decisionmaking-as a mode of
the State's 'legislative jurisdiction.' ... Because we hold that HVIRA is
preempted under the foreign affairs doctrine, we have no reason to address the
other questions.
Id. (citation omitted) with Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 374 n.8
("Because our conclusion that the state Act conflicts with federal law is sufficient to affirm
the judgment below, we decline to speak to field preemption as a separate issue ... or to pass
on the First Circuit's rulings addressing the foreign affairs power or the dormant Foreign
Commerce Clause.") (citation omitted). On the narrowness of the Crosby decision, see supra
notes 72-78 and accompanying text; Goldsmith, supra note 75, at 177-78, 215-21; Denning
& McCall, supra note 71, at 750-57.
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constitutional interpretation.'7 4 As Garamendi suggests, common
law constitutional interpretation can easily devolve into an
expedient way to legitimize intuitive reactions to difficult cases
while avoiding important questions raised by text, history, and
structure.
A. Overview of the Garamendi Opinion
Justice Souter's analysis for the majority began with several
premises claimed to be "beyond dispute."'75 First, "an exercise of
state power that touches on foreign relations must yield to the
National Government's policy"'76 at some point, given the interest
in uniformity that necessitated the grant of that power to the
federal government in the first place. Second, "there is executive
authority to decide what the policy should be" stemming from the
President's independent foreign affairs power, as grounded in
history, custom, and usage.'77 The President, moreover, could
express that policy through executive agreements with foreign
nations, which, unlike treaties, do not require Senate ratification.'
The Court thus presented a simple syllogism: national foreign
policy preempts inconsistent state acts; the President has the power
174. See Strauss, supra note 18, at 904-05.
175. Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 413-14. Our description of the Court's decision here draws
on Denning, supra note 36, at 950-56.
176. Garmendi, 539 U.S. at 413.
177. Id. at 414.
178. Id. ('While Congress holds express authority to regulate public and private dealings
with other nations in its war and foreign commerce powers, in foreign affairs the President
has a degree of independent authority to act."); id. at 415 ("[Olur cases have recognized that
the President has authority to make 'executive agreements' with other countries, requiring
no ratification by the Senate or approval by Congress, this power having been exercised since
the early years of the Republic.") (citations omitted). The Court dismissed the objection that
the settlement involved claims against purely private parties rather than governments;
"Historically, wartime claims against even nominally private entities have become issues in
international diplomacy," and "[a]ccceptance of this historical practice is supported by a good
pragmatic reason for depending on executive agreements to settle claims against foreign
corporations associated with wartime experience," viz., "untangling government policy from
private initiative during war time is often so hard that diplomatic action settling claims
against private parties may well be just as essential in the aftermath of hostilities as
diplomacy to settle claims against foreign governments." Id. at 416. For a challenge to this
conclusion, see Wuerth, supra note 139, at 14-41.
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to determine national foreign policy; and, therefore, the President's
foreign policy preempts inconsistent state laws.
Applying these principles to the HVIRA, the Court concluded
that, though California and the federal government pursued
common ends, the means used by the state conflicted with policies
of the federal government. Moreover, the Court said, "resolving
Holocaust-era insurance claims that may be held by residents of
this country is a matter well within the Executive's responsibility
for foreign affairs," because settling claims is important to the
maintenance of cordial relations among nations. As a result, "state
law must give way where, as here, there is evidence of clear conflict
between the policies adopted by" the state and the federal govern-
ment.1"9 Federal policy, "expressed unmistakably" in the agree-
ments concluded with Germany and Austria, "has been to encour-
age European governments and companies to volunteer settlement
funds in preference to litigation or coercive sanctions," and included
provisions for cooperative policy disclosure procedures."'
Specifically, the Court stated that the path pursued by the
federal government balanced competing interests: the maintenance
of "amicable relationships with current European allies"; survivors'
interests in recovery; and insurers' interests in removing the cloud
of potential liability that remained as long as claims went unre-
solved.1"' Procedures for the disclosure of information established
by the United States and the Europeans, moreover, sought to secure
"the companies' ability to abide by their own countries' domestic
privacy laws limiting disclosure of policy information."'8 2 California,
on the other hand, chose to compel disclosure, using its power to
revoke business licenses as a lever. Despite the common goals of
both California and the federal government--"obtaining compensa-
tion for Holocaust victims"' 83-"[t]he basic fact is that California
seeks to use an iron fist where the President has consistently
chosen kid gloves.' 8 4 California's aggressive approach, the Court
said, threatened to undermine the federal government's efforts to
179. Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 421.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 422-23.
182. Id. at 423.
183. Id. at 425.
184. Id. at 427.
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encourage both voluntary disclosure and contributions to the
foundations established through the executive agreements de-
scribed above.185
Even if the conflict was not as sharp as the evidence suggested,
"it would have to be resolved in the National Government's favor,
given the weakness of the State's interest, against the backdrop of
traditional state legislative subject matter, in regulating disclosure
of European Holocaust-era insurance policies in the manner of
HVIRA." 1"6 The Court pointed out that only a fraction of the
nation's 100,000 living Holocaust survivors resided in California.
"As against the responsibility of the United States of America," it
noted, "the humanity underlying the state statute could not give the
State the benefit of any doubt in resolving the conflict with national
policy."1 7
In short, the Court's analysis made the case sound like Crosby:
Although the state and federal objectives were similar, the Court
said, the federal approach was flexible and measured, while the
state adopted a hard line to the point of overreaching. As in Crosby,
there was not a direct conflict, in the sense of the two being
irreconcilable, but the one-sided nature of the state approach
interfered with the balanced, cooperative federal approach and thus
stood as an obstacle to the accomplishment of federal objectives. As
a result, the HVIRA was preempted, much as the state law in
Crosby had been.
Finally, the Court rejected arguments that Congress had
implicitly authorized the HVIRA, either through the McCarran Act
or the Holocaust Commission Act. In the Court's estimation,
"Congress has not acted on the matter addressed here," and
significantly, "Congress has done nothing to express disapproval of
the President's policy," though federal HVIRA-like statutes had
been proposed. 88 Absent congressional disapproval, the Court
concluded, the President was free to act in the area of foreign policy,
and conflicting state laws had to yield.89
185. Id.
186. Id. at 425.
187. Id. at 426-27.
188. Id. at 429.
189. Id. The McCarran Act's purpose, the Court wrote, "was to limit congressional
preemption under the commerce power, whether dormant or exercised," and "a federal
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Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justices Stevens, Scalia and Thomas,
dissented. Absent a clear expression of intent to displace state
authority, the dissenters would have upheld the HVIRA. 19 °
Although conceding the majority's premises-the President may
conclude executive agreements with foreign countries that settle
claims, and those agreements may displace otherwise valid state
laws or state litigation-the dissenters pointed out that "no
executive agreement before us expressly preempts the HVIRA.
Indeed no agreement so much as mentions the HVIRA's sole
concern: public disclosure."'' Even "[i]f it is uncertain whether
insurance litigation may continue given the executive agreements
on which the Court relies," Justice Ginsburg wrote, "it should be
abundantly clear that those agreements leave disclosure laws like
the HVIRA untouched.' 92
The dissent gave little weight to executive branch statements
that the HVIRA interfered with the policy of the national govern-
ment, "lest we place the considerable power of foreign affairs
preemption in the hands of individual sub-Cabinet members of the
Executive Branch."'9 3 Though those officials no doubt accurately
represented the President's policy, "no authoritative text accords
such officials the power to invalidate state law simply by conveying
the Executive's views on matters of federal policy. The displacement
of state law ... requires a considerably more formal and binding
federal instrument."'94 Justice Ginsburg and her fellow dissenters
would have "reserve[d] foreign affairs preemption for circum-
statute directed to implied preemption by domestic commerce legislation cannot sensibly be
construed to address preemption by executive conduct in foreign affairs." Id. at 428. As to the
Holocaust Act, "[t]he Commission's focus," the Court found, "Was limited to assets in the
possession of the Government"; references in the act encouraging the state commissioners
to assist by collecting information on foreign and domestic insurers doing business in the
United States were limited "to the degree the information is available." Id. at 429. This
proviso, the Court concluded, "can hardly be read to condone state sanctions interfering with
federal efforts to resolve such claims." Id. On the McCarran Act and the Holocaust Act, see
infra Part III.C.
190. Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 430. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("Absent a clear statement
aimed at disclosure requirements by the 'one voice' to which courts properly defer in matters
of foreign affairs, I would leave intact California's enactment.").
191. Id. at 438 (citation omitted).
192. Id. at 441.
193. Id. at 442.
194. Id.
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stances where the President, acting under statutory or constitu-
tional authority, has spoken clearly to the issue at hand," and she
counseled the judiciary to resist establishing national foreign policy
predicated "on no legislative or even executive text, but only on
[the] inference and implication" that state law is preempted "when
the President himself has not taken a clear stand."'95
B. Garamendi and Its Precedents
1. Crosby: The Irrelevant Precedent
The Court's first sleight-of-hand was its invocation of the prior
statutory decision, Crosby. "The situation created by the California
legislation," Justice Souter wrote, "calls to mind the impact of
the Massachusetts Burma law on the effective exercise of the
President's power, as recounted in the statutory preemption
case, Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council."'96 As in Crosby,
"HVIRA's economic compulsion to make public disclosure, of far
more information about far more policies ... undercuts the Presi-
dent's diplomatic discretion and the choice he has made exercising
it."'97 The opinion then discussed how the threat of litigation and
sanctions posed obstacles to the federal government's attempt to
encourage voluntary participation with the German Foundation and
the ICHEIC. Though the Garamendi Court admitted that Crosby
could be distinguished because
the President in this case is acting without express constitu-
tional authority ... we were careful to note [in Crosby] that the
President possesses considerable independent constitutional
authority to act on behalf of the United States on international
195. Id. at 442-43; see id. at 423 & n. 13 (relying on executive statements). With respect
to Zschernig, the dissenters indicated that they would take the view expressed by the court
of appeals (and Professor Vdzquez): "Zschernig... resonates most audibly when a state action
'reflects a state policy critical of foreign governments and involves 'sitting in judgment' on
them' .... [The HVIRA] takes no position on any contemporary foreign government and
requires no assessment of any existing foreign regime." Id. at 439-40 (quoting HENKIN, supra
note 119, at 164); see also Vdzquez, supra note 75, at 1262, 1321.
196. Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 423.
197. Id. at 423-24.
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issues ... and conflict with the exercise of that authority is a
comparably good reason to find preemption of state law.'98
As one of us commented at the time, "the ultimate outcome of
Crosby seems to have hinged not on any inherent powers of the
presidency or on any presumed expertise uniquely possessed by the
executive branch, but rather on the powers delegated to the
president by Congress through statute."'99 Indeed Crosby's entire
decision was premised on the notion that the President, acting
pursuant to statutory authorization, was exercising maximum
power under the Constitution. As for Crosby's supposed discus-
sion of the President's "considerable independent ... authority,""2 °
the Court merely cited a page of the Crosby opinion listing the
President's foreign affairs powers enumerated in Article II and
noted the "capacity of the President to speak for the Nation with
one voice in dealing with other governments." '' Of course no one
doubts these powers, but to the extent the citation suggested that
Crosby discussed the President's ability to displace state law
without statutory authority (a matter not the least at stake in
Crosby), it is entirely misleading.
The Court's invocation of Crosby, then, was pure misdirection. In
Crosby, everyone assumed (correctly) that presidential authority,
based upon a congressional enactment, would override conflicting
state law. The whole question was whether the state law posed a
conflict.2"2 Everyone assumed conflict would result in preemption
because Article VI of the Constitution declares that rule. In
Garamendi, the question was whether presidential authority, not
based upon a congressional enactment, would override conflicting
state law. As the Court itself said later in the opinion, the case was
a matter of "preemption by executive conduct in foreign affairs."20 3
Article VI, the entire basis of Crosby, says nothing on this question,
so Crosby was essentially irrelevant. Invoking it only obscured the
198. Id. at 424 n.14 (citations omitted).
199. Denning & McCall, supra note 71, at 757 (citation omitted); see also Goldsmith, supra
note 75, at 218-20.
200. Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 424 n.14.
201. Id. at 424 (quoting Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 381 (2000)).
202. See supra notes 71-75 and accompanying text.
203. Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 428.
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question posed in Garamendi: whether an executive branch policy
could override a state law when Article VI did not apply.
2. Zschernig: The Misstated Precedent
The Court's second disingenuous move involved Zschernig v.
Miller. Its opinion reads as if Garamendi follows a fortiori from
Zschernig. Comparison of the opinions, however, shows that
Garamendi not only does not follow from Zschernig but in fact
brushes it aside, creating an entirely new way of looking at the
matter.
As discussed above, Garamendi seemed to present the Court with
the opportunity to clarify which of the three leading approaches to
Zschernig was the correct one-and, along the way, either to
provide the dormant foreign affairs doctrine with the constitutional
grounding that Zschernigs opinion lacked, or to abandon it. Despite
doubts expressed about the continuing viability of Zschernig by a
range of commentators, °4 Garamendi invoked it prominently to
support its decision, but clarified neither its constitutional basis nor
its scope. Instead, Garamendi relied on Zschernig in an indirect
way that did not require the Court to defend or explain it.
Garamendi began with the assertion that "valid executive
agreements are fit to preempt state law, just as treaties are. '2 °5
Citing Pink and Belmont, in which the Court held that an executive
agreement with the Soviet Union establishing diplomatic relations
preempted state policies regarding the legality of Soviet expropria-
tion of private property, 211 the Court continued: "[i] f the agreements
here had expressly preempted laws like HVIRA, the issue would be
straightforward. '207 As described below, we think this statement in
204. HENKIN, supra note 119, at 165 (calling Zschernig "a unique statement and a sole
application of constitutional doctrine"); Goldsmith, supra note 81, at 1705 (suggesting that
Barclays implicitly overruled Zschernig); Spiro, supra note 124, at 1242, 1264-66 (suggesting
that doctrine and the end of the Cold War have operated to sap Zschernig of its vitality). But
see Ramsey, supra note 14, at 358-65 (warning that announcements of Zschernig's demise
were premature); Vfizquez, supra note 75, at 1266-78 (arguing on the basis of Crosby that
Zschernig retained doctrinal force).
205. Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 416 (citation omitted).
206. See United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 552 (1942); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S.
324 (1937).
207. Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 416-17.
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itself seriously oversimplified existing law.2 °8 The majority then
conceded that, unlike the agreement in Pink and Belmont, "the
agreements include no preemption clause" and that petitioners'
preemption claim must "rest on asserted interference with the
foreign policy those agreements embody."'2 9 Thus, the Court seemed
to concede that the executive agreements in themselves did not
resolve the matter.
The Court then turned to Zschernig. Its opinion simply ignored
the problems scholars have identified with Zschernig's rule of
constitutional preemption, and instead recharacterized Zschernig
as something like a statutory preemption case. As Justice Souter
wrote, the Court did not need to choose between "the contrasting
theories of field and conflict preemption evident in the Zschernig
opinions" of Justices Douglas and Harlan, respectively, because
"even on Justice Harlan's view, the likelihood that state legislation
will produce something more than [an] incidental effect in conflict
with express foreign policy of the National Government would
require preemption of the state law."21 This made it sound as if
Garamendi was an easier case than Zschernig because the issues
that troubled Harlan were not present in Garamendi. It also
allowed the Court to avoid explaining what Zschernig meant, and
yet retain it as a purported basis for its opinion.
There are several problems with this approach. First, Douglas's
Zschernig opinion was not rooted in field preemption. Field
preemption is a type of implied preemption in which either "a
federal regulatory scheme [is] 'so pervasive' as to imply that
'Congress left no room for the States to supplement it,"' or the
federal interest in the field is 'so dominant' that federal law 'will
be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same
subject."211 It arises, like other kinds of preemption, from the intent
of Congress. Because there was no claim in Zschernig that the state
law conflicted with any congressional enactment or even with
208. Infra Part IV.E.
209. Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 417.
210. Id. at 419-20 (citation omitted).
211. Goldsmith, supra note 75, at 206 (quoting English v. General Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72,
79 (1990) and Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Co., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)); see also BIrTKER,
supra note 70, at § 5.06[E] ("State statutes can also be preempted ... because the federal rules
are so pervasive that they 'occupy' the field, leaving no room for additional or supplemental
state regulations.") (footnote omitted).
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executive policy, it is wrong to discuss Justice Douglas's analysis
using statutory preemption terms. Zschernig made clear that
Oregon's statute involved state officials "in foreign affairs and
international relations-matters which the Constitution entrusts
solely to the Federal Government ...." Despite the bootstrapping
citations to Hines v. Davidowitz, Douglas's opinion barred Oregon's
statute as a matter of constitutional exclusion, not statutory
preemption.212
Second, the Court misstated Justice Harlan's position. According
to the Court, Harlan would have displaced state law if there was a
"likelihood that state legislation will produce something more than
[an] incidental effect in conflict with express foreign policy of the
National Government ...."' That description implied that Harlan
endorsed preemption where any federal policy existed, regardless
of the branch from which it emanated. But this is not what Harlan
said. It is true that Harlan stated, without elaboration: "in the
absence of a conflicting federal policy or violation of the express
mandates of the Constitution the States may legislate in areas of
their traditional competence even though their statutes may have
an incidental effect on foreign relations." '214 But he concurred on the
ground that a treaty preempted the Oregon law; all of the cases he
cited as examples of "federal policy" preempting state law involved
statutes or treaties, and he made no reference to preemption by
executive policy.215 It seems clear that by "federal policy" Harlan
meant policy expressed in either a treaty or congressional statute,
which would, by operation of the Supremacy Clause, preempt
contrary state law. It is unlikely that he would have endorsed the
result in Garamendi-that state laws not in conflict with any law,
treaty, or executive agreement were nevertheless preempted on the
strength of executive branch statements that the state law inter-
fered with its conduct of foreign affairs. In any event, Harlan
212. Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 436 (1968) (emphasis added); see also id. at 432
("Mhe history and operation of this Oregon statute makes clear that [it] is an intrusion by
the State into the field of foreign affairs which the Constitution entrusts to the President and
the Congress.").
213. Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 420.
214. Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 458-59 (Harlan, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
215. Id. at 458-59 & n.25 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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plainly did not mean to decide the matter; it was not presented by
Zschernig nor established by any prior case.
Again, the rhetorical force of Garamendi's discussion depends
upon a misleading invocation of statutory preemption. Justice
Souter's "synthesis" of the two.Zschernig opinions did nothing to
advance his central claim that executive action alone can have
preemptive effect, because neither Harlan nor Douglas made that
claim.2"' Approaching the case in this way, however, allowed the
Court to avoid answering the two critical questions about
Zschernig: (i) did it remain good law, despite its lack of clear
constitutional foundation and lack of judicial citation, and (ii) if so,
what was its scope-the relatively broad formulation of "all but
incidental effects" adopted by the district court or the narrower
"insults and hostility" version preferred by the court of appeals?
Put another way, Souter made it appear that if there had been a
contrary executive policy in Zschernig, that would have solved
Justice Harlan's objections; that simply is not correct.
The principal effect of the Court's discussion was to make
Zschernig a precedent for executive policy preemption, which it
assuredly was not. The executive branch in Zschernig had expressly
disclaimed any desire to see Oregon's statute displaced.' Douglas,
for the majority, was talking about a "dormant" constitutional
exclusion, and Harlan, in concurrence, was talking about Article VI
preemption. As with its discussion of Crosby, the Court's use of
Zschernig was camouflage rather than reasoning-it obscures
rather than clarifies the issue the Court confronted.
216. Even if the Court had characterized Justice Douglas's opinion correctly, it is
incoherent for the Court to talk of "synthesizing" Douglas and Harlan's opinions because they
embody two distinct (and irreconcilable) types of preemption. Field preemption operates
regardless of the presence of an actual, or even a potential, conflict between federal and state
statutory schemes. Conflict preemption, on the other hand, permits complementary state
regulation, as long as it does not render compliance with both impossible, or pose an
"obstacle" to the stated goals of congressional legislation. The degree to which a state statute
does or does not conflict with or obstruct the federal legislation is simply irrelevant under
field preemption analysis, because the very action of Congress is said to "occupy the field"
and leave no room for states to act. See supra notes 151-53 and accompanying text.
217. See Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 434-35.
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3. Barclays and Breard: The Missing Precedents
Crosby and Zschernig essentially exhaust the Court's precedents.
The only other cases the Court cited even marginally in its favor
were Curtiss-Wright (on presidential power in foreign affairs) and
the Pink-Belmont-Dames & Moore line of authority on executive
agreements.21 The Court itself acknowledged, however, that the
executive agreement cases did not settle the matter, and whatever
scope Curtiss-Wright gave to executive power in foreign affairs, it
said nothing about displacement of state law by unilateral presiden-
tial policy. On the other hand, at least two cases pointed in the
other direction, because they upheld state interferences with
executive branch foreign policy, and yet they received no serious
attention from the Court.
The conflict the Garamendi Court identified depended heavily
upon statements by the executive branch that the HVIRA repre-
sented an obstacle to the goals set out in the executive agreements.
Even with respect to the insurers covered by the Foundation
Agreement, the conflict was a bit of a stretch. Though the Agree-
ment called for resolution of claims through ICHEIC rather than
through litigation, it had little enough to say about disclosure,
which was needed for any sort of claims resolution. In any event,
some of the insurers in Garamendi were not covered by the
Foundation Agreement, or any other agreement. What seemed
critical was that the executive branch saw the HVIRA as an
interference with its policy, and had said so repeatedly.219
With no congressional approval for the executive agreements,
and with no intent to preempt expressed in the agreements
themselves, the facts in Garamendi seem much closer to those of
Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Board22 ° than to cases like
Crosby.22' If the Court believed the executive policy in Garamendi
was preemptive, one would think it would need a fairly strong
explanation for why the executive policy in Barclays was not
preemptive.
218. Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 415-17.
219. See discussion supra Part I.B (discussing executive branch statements).
220. Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298, 301-03 (1994).
221. Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000).
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Barclays addressed whether California's method for computing
taxes for multinational corporations violated the Japan Line
principle that state taxation of foreign commerce cannot inhibit the
ability of the federal government to "speak with one voice" in the
regulation of international trade.222 The Barclays Court found
evidence of congressional intent to permit state tax structures like
California's, and so it found that California's requirement did not
violate the "one voice" requirement.223 Arguments that the method
of taxation was "unconstitutional because it [was] likely to provoke
retaliatory action by foreign governments," the Court wrote, were
"directed to the wrong forum., 224 The Court specifically refused to
give force to executive branch representations that California's tax
laws interfered with the foreign policy interests of the country.
Noting that Congress, not the President, possessed the power to
regulate foreign commerce, the Court remarked: "[t]hat the
Executive Branch proposed legislation to outlaw a state taxation
practice, but encountered an unreceptive Congress, is not evidence
that the practice interfered with the Nation's ability to speak with
one voice, but is rather evidence that the preeminent speaker
decided to yield the floor to others., 225 The Court concluded that the
communications from the executive branch "express[ing] federal
policy but lack[ing] the force of law cannot render unconstitutional
California's otherwise valid, congressionally condoned, use of
worldwide combined reporting. ,226
Barclays seemed directly relevant to Garamendi, which appeared
similarly to turn on the effect of executive branch communications
"express[ing] federal policy but lack[ing] the force of law." '227 The
Garamendi majority declined to apply Barclays, explaining in a
brief footnote that Barclays involved the regulation of foreign
commerce, which is vested in Congress, not the President. "[I]n the
222. Barclays, 512 U.S. at 302-03 (quoting Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441
U.S. 434, 449 (1979)).
223. Id. at 316-17, 326-27.
224. Id. The "one voice" formulation arose from the Court's prior decision in Japan Line,
as explained supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
225. Barclays, 512 U.S. at 328-29.
226. Id. at 330.
227. Id.
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field of foreign policy," the Court said without further discussion,
"the President has the 'lead role."'
228
This distinction seems unsatisfactory. Even if one accepts the
President's "lead role" in foreign policy, Justice Souter did not
explain why the HVIRA was not a regulation of foreign commerce.
After all, California's disclosure requirements applied to entities
doing business in the state, and made compliance a condition of
continued licensing. In other words, the HVIRA set conditions
under which private companies did business in California. It is hard
to see it as anything other than a commercial regulation. 9
To be sure, the HVIRA was a commercial regulation that
implicated foreign affairs, so perhaps the Court meant that
Barclays could be distinguished on that ground. California's
taxation methods in Barclays, however, also affected foreign policy,
as the executive branch in that case pointed out.23° This confirms
the obvious: regulations of "commerce" also affect "foreign policy."
These are not inherently separate categories. Garamendi provided
no intelligible principle to distinguish between them, and it seems
plain that they overlap. 231 The Court's distinction does not really
distinguish Barclays from Garamendi. Each case involved a state
228. Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 423 (2003) (quoting First Nat'l City Bank
v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 767 (1972)).
229. Indeed, the Court in South-Eastern Underwriters had previously held that regulation
of insurance was a matter of interstate commerce, see United States v. South-Eastern
Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 552-53 (1944), and one of the central issues in the
Garamendi litigation from its inception was that the HVIRA violated the dormant Commerce
Clause doctrine. See discussion supra Part II. In three years of litigation, no one had argued
that the HVIRA was not a regulation of commerce.
230. See Barclays, 512 U.S. at 329; see also Jacqueline R. Fields, The Need for a Uniform
United States Separate Accounting Policy: The After Effects of the Barclays Bank Case and
How It Hinders International Business Transactions, 2 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & BUS. 75, 79-83
(2001) (discussing foreign opposition to California's use of the worldwide combined reporting
system of accounting, which potentially results in over taxation); Peter J. Spiro, International
Decisions, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 766, 769 (1994) (discussing foreign opposition to California's
taxing scheme).
231. As with Justice Souter's focus on traditional and nontraditional state regulations, his
distinction between commerce and foreign policy is surprising coming from a Justice who
excoriated the Lopez and Morrison majorities for "categorical formalism" in making an
inquiry into the commercial or noncommercial nature of activity-a central feature of its
inquiries into the scope of congressional power over interstate commerce. See United States
v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 652 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting); United States v. Lopez, 514
U.S. 549, 608-09 (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting).
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commercial regulation that interfered with an executive branch
foreign policy.232
Barclays seems even more relevant when one considers the
existence of two federal statutes suggesting that Congress con-
sented to the passage of statutes like the HVIRA. Barclays
construed the failure of Congress explicitly to disapprove of
California's tax as an implicit endorsement of the state's tax
structure.3 Whatever the merits of construing the failure of
congressional proposals as an endorsement of the opposite
position, the Court's conclusion is in keeping with its employment
of "clear statement rules" designed to protect federalism by
requiring Congress to be explicit when altering the allocation of
responsibilities between the federal government and the states.234
In Garamendi, as in Barclays, neither Congress nor the President
had formally disapproved of the HVIRA, except through executive
policy statements of the sort Barclays found insufficient to
preempt state law. Rather than applying a similar clear statement
rule, however, Justice Souter discussed the lack of congressional
disapproval of the President's actions in signing the executive
agreements (which were not preemptive on their own terms and did
not affect all of the parties). Despite the fact that "[1]egislation
along the lines of HVIRA has been introduced in Congress," he
noted that "none of the bills has come close to making it into law." '235
Because the President had "independent authority" in foreign
affairs, he wrote, Congress's silence should not be equated with
disapproval.236 Though it went unremarked, the Court seemed to
suggest that clear statement rules do not apply when the executive
branch is reallocating responsibilities between federal and state
232. Of course, the commercial/noncommercial distinction might serve to distinguish
Zschernig from Barclays, since Zschernig was not a commercial case. Cf. Goldsmith, supra
note 81, at 1698-1705 (discussing tensions between Zschernig and Barclays). Looking at the
case in this way, though, suggests that Garamendi was more like Barclays than like
Zschernig.
233. Barclays, 512 U.S. at 324-26.
234. See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460-61 (1991) ("[I]f Congress intends to
alter the usual constitutional balance between the States and the Federal Government, it
must make its intention to do so unmistakably clear in the language of the statute.")
(internal quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted).
235. Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 429 (2003).
236. Id.
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governments. In any event, none of this distinguishes Barclays,
which also implicated the President's authority in foreign affairs
and yet employed the opposite presumption.23
In addition to Barclays, the Court's discussion showed tension
with at least its language, if not its result, in a case the Garamendi
decision did not mention: Breard v. Greene.2 3 Breard, a Paraguayan
citizen, had-been sentenced to death in the Virginia state courts. At
his arrest, and throughout the prosecution, he was never informed
of his right to contact the Paraguayan embassy for assistance-a
right guaranteed by the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations,
to which the United States is a party. Breard claimed this violation
entitled him to a retrial, a claim that seemed weak under U.S. law,
both because it had been procedurally defaulted and because Breard
had a difficult time showing prejudice from the failure. In a parallel
proceeding, however, Paraguay raised the matter before the
International Court of Justice (ICJ), which requested--or, depend-
ing on one's view, ordered-the United States to stay Breard's
execution pending its hearing of the matter."' The U.S. executive
branch then requested, on the basis of the ICJ order, that Virginia
stay the execution. Virginia refused, however, and the Supreme
Court held that it lacked legal grounds to intervene. As the Court
put it:
Last night the [U.S.] Secretary of State sent a letter to the
Governor of Virginia requesting that he stay Breard's execution.
If the Governor wishes to wait for the decision of the ICJ, that
is his prerogative. But nothing in our existing case law allows us
to make that choice for him.240
237. The only distinction that seems relevant to what the Court was saying is that in
Barclays, legislation to override the states had been introduced in Congress but had failed
to pass; in Garamendi no such legislation had even been introduced. We cannot imagine how
the second situation places the executive in a better position in terms of congressional assent
than the first, at least so long as Congress was aware of the state activities. Alternatively,
one might focus on the lack of executive agreements in Barclays, and their presence in
Garamendi. If that were the distinction, however, presumably the President could have
reversed the outcome in Barclays by creating executive agreements overriding California's
system of taxation, which European nations would have been happy to do. Surely this cannot
be what the Court intended in Barclays.
238. Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371 (1998) (per curiam).
239. Id. at 374.
240. Id. at 378.
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Most of Breard's arguments, and the subsequent academic
discussion, focused on the claim that the Vienna Convention and
the treaty establishing the ICJ constituted supreme law binding
Virginia under Article VI of the Constitution. At the time, that
seemed a correct analysis because otherwise it was difficult to
locate another source of law superior to Virginia's.2 41 To the extent
Congress had spoken on the matter, in general terms it had
endorsed the idea that state procedural bars should be honored. The
executive's position on the matter was somewhat equivocal, and in
any event-consistent with what we have argued above-no one
seemed to think that executive branch policy standing alone could
displace state law. As the United States put it, in its brief to the
Court: "The measures at the United States' disposal under our
Constitution may in some cases include only persuasion .... [T]hat
is the case here. 242
To be sure, Breard might be distinguishable from Garamendi on
various grounds, though not the commercial/non-commercial basis.
One would have thought, nonetheless, that at least some explana-
tion of Breard should have been forthcoming, as Breard plainly
depended on the proposition that executive branch foreign affairs
objectives do not bind states in all cases.243
241. See id. at 375-77 (describing Breard's arguments). For academic discussion, see
Symposium, Agora: Breard, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 666 (1998); Curtis A. Bradley, Breard, Our
Dualist Constitution, and the Internationalist Conception, 51 STAN. L. REv. 529 (1999); Sanja
Djajic, The Effect of International Court of Justice Decisions on Municipal Courts in the
United States: Breard v. Greene, 23 HASTINGS INT'L & CoMP. L. REV. 27 (1999); Erik G. Luna
& Douglas J. Sylvester, Beyond Breard, 17 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 147 (1999). We take no
position on whether there was a treaty-based obligation in Breard.
242. The Solicitor General further wrote that "our federal system imposes limits on the
federal government's ability to interfere with the criminal justice system of the states" and
acknowledged "Virginia's right to go forward," while requesting that it not do so. See Curtis
A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, The Abiding Relevance of Federalism to U.S. Foreign
Relations, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 675, 675-76 (1998) (discussing and endorsing the executive's
position). But see Frederic L. Kirgis, Zschernig v. Miller and the Breard Matter, 92 AM. J.
INT'LL. 704, 707 (1998) (arguing on the basis of Zschernig that the Virginia Governor's action
was unconstitutional because it "not only denigrated the role of the International Court of
Justice ... but also ignored or subordinated foreign policy concerns expressly pointed out to
him by the Secretary of State."); Carlos Manuel Vdzquez, Breard and the Federal Power to
Require Compliance with ICJ Orders of Provisional Measures, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 683, 685
(1998) (arguing that because compliance with the ICJ order was a treaty-based obligation of
the United States, the President could require the state to comply with it).
243. See Breard, 523 U.S. at 378.
2004]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
C. Congressional Authorization in Garamendi
The Court's endorsement of extravagant preemptive effect of
the executive's policy in Garamendi contrasts markedly with its
parsimonious reading of relevant congressional statutes. Two
congressional statutes, the McCarran Act and the Holocaust
Commission Act, indicated congressional acquiescence in the
HVIRA's disclosure requirement. Employing scanty analysis, the
Court found neither statute material to its resolution.244
1. The McCarran Act
The McCarran Act "redelegates" to states the ability to regulate
the business of insurance, and was intended to disable the
dormant Commerce Clause doctrine as to those state regulations.
The Act begins with a declaration that "the continued regulation
and taxation by the several States of the business of insurance is
in the public interest" and instructs that "silence on the part of the
Congress shall not be construed to impose any barrier to the
regulation or taxation of [the business of insurance] by the several
States.'245 The operative part of the statute directs, without
qualification, that the business of insurance "shall be subject to the
laws of the several States which relate to the regulation or taxation
of such business.'"246
The Court simply sidestepped the Act. Assuming that the
"HVIRA would qualify as regulating the 'business of insurance'
given its tangential relation to present-day insuring in the State,"
the Court wrote, "a federal statute directed to implied preemption
by domestic commerce legislation cannot sensibly be construed to
244. Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 426-27.
245. 15 U.S.C. § 1011 (2000). See Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 428 ("[T]he point of McCarran-
Ferguson's legislative choice of leaving insurance regulation generally to the States was to
limit congressional preemption under the commerce power, whether dormant or exercised.");
Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 429-30 (1946); BI"TKER, supra note 70, § 9.04.
246. 15 U.S.C. § 1012(a) (2000). The Act also disables implied statutory preemption,
requiring Congress clearly to state an intention to regulate insurance and that "fnlo Act of
Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede any law enacted by any State
for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance ... unless such Act specifically relates
to the business of insurance." Id. at § 1012(b).
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address preemption by executive conduct in foreign affairs. 247
There are several problems with this conclusion. First, despite
the Court's insinuation, the HVIRA was obviously a regulation of
the "business of insurance" because it regulated the relationship
between insurers and policy holders (including policy holders
residing in California and insurers doing business in California). As
to such regulations, McCarran's language is categorical: they "shall
be subject to the laws of the several States. 248
Second, the Court provided no explanation for its assertion that
the Act "cannot sensibly be construed to address" preemption by the
executive branch.249 This comment confirms what we have
suggested-that Garamendi is about executive policy preemption.
The Act naturally did not address executive preemption; prior to
Garamendi, it likely never occurred to Congress that there was
such a thing as executive preemption, at least as Justice Souter's
opinion formulated it. The text of the McCarran Act, however, is
comprehensive; it says that congressional silence should never be
construed to invalidate a state insurance law. Yet the Court
argued that there had been no congressional disapproval of the
executive's action, 251 and that lack of disapproval (i.e., Congress's
silence) supported displacing the state law-in other words, doing
exactly what the Act says not to do.
Finally, the unhelpful divide between "foreign affairs" and
"foreign commerce" that furnished the basis for the Court's clumsy
attempt to distinguish Barclays reappeared here, though in an even
less coherent form. The Act plainly applies to state regulation of
foreign insurance companies, and no one has seriously suggested
otherwise. As Garamendi illustrates, such "commercial" regulations
often have important foreign policy overtones. Trying to demarcate
a line of separation between the two areas is bound to fail; the
Court's own inability to explain even roughly, where the line is,
illustrates the difficulty and provides no useful yardstick for lower
247. Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 428.
248. 15 U.S.C. § 1012(a) (emphasis added). At the 1998 hearings, members of Congress
seemed to think it obvious that McCarran applied to state regulations like HVIRA. See supra
notes 37-38.
249. Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 428.
250. 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b).
251. Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 429.
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courts or state policy makers to gauge the constitutionality of
future state legislation. It seems unikely that Congress intended
such a division in the Act, particularly in light of its comprehensive
language.5 2
2. The Holocaust Commission Act
The Holocaust Commission Act created a federal commission to
study and report on the disposition of Holocaust-era assets
controlled or possessed by the federal government.253 Section 3 of
the Act instructed the commission to "take note of' the efforts of the
National Association of Insurance Commissioners-the association
of state regulators-"with regard to Holocaust-era insurance
issues. the Act, moreover, instructed the commission specifically
to encourage the state commissioners to provide reports "on the
Holocaust-related claims practices of all insurance companies, both
domestic and foreign, doing business in the United States at any
time after January 30, 1933, that issued any individual life, health,
or property-casualty insurance policy to any individual on any list
of Holocaust victims," and further specified that the commission's
report should include---"to the degree the information is avail-
able"-the number of policies issued by companies, the value of
each policy when issued, the total number and amount of claims
paid, and the present-day value of assets of each insurance
company held in the United States.255 California claimed that this
statute showed congressional awareness of the actions of the state
insurance commissioners in trying to secure information on
Holocaust-era policies and, far from disapproving of these efforts,
encouraged them to aid the work of the federal Holocaust commis-
256sion.
252. The insurers pressed the distinct argument that the McCarran Act did not authorize
states to regulate extraterritorially. This depended on the proposition that the HVIRA
regulated extraterritorially, which was rejected by the court of appeals. Gerling Global
Reinsurance Corp. of Am. v. Low, 286 F.3d 832, 843-44 (9th Cir. 2002). In any event, this did
not seem to be the distinction the Court had in mind.
253. U.S. Holocaust Assets Commission Act of 1998, Pub. L. 105-186, 112 Stat. 611, 611
(1998).
254. Id.
255. Id. § 3(a)(4)(B), 112 Stat. at 613.
256. Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 427 (2003).
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The Court disagreed. Justice Souter wrote that the "Commis-
sion's focus was limited to assets in the possession of the Govern-
ment, and if anything, the federal Act assumed it was the National
Government's responsibility to deal with returning those assets."
Souter also wrote that the Act's language limiting collection of
information to that which was available "can hardly be read to
condone state sanctions interfering with federal efforts to resolve
such claims." '257
That seems a hasty conclusion. When Congress passed the Act,
it obviously knew of state plans to compel disclosure. This is evident
from the face of the statute, and from the fact that the state
commissioners had testified about those plans just prior to
enactment of the law. The Act instructed the commission, then, to
undertake its work against the backdrop of on-going state-level
research into the disposition of Holocaust-era assets, including
insurance policies. That the commission focused on assets owned or
possessed by the federal government does not cut against the
argument that state efforts to compile information (and because
of Souter's reference to "sanctions," it is important to emphasize
again that disclosure is all the HVIRA mandated) were tacitly
approved.25 It is true that Congress, in 1998, did not know much
about the executive's impending effort to settle claims, or the
executive's subsequent concerns about interference by the states. It
seems clear from the Act, however, that Congress had no objection
to the state actions in 1998, and it did not subsequently do anything
to show a different view.
Justice Souter added that Congress had not acted to disapprove
of the President's actions in entering into the executive agree-
ments or formulating the executive policy with which the HVIRA
supposedly conflicted. "Legislation along the lines of HVIRA has
been introduced in Congress ... but none of the bills has come close
to making it into law," he wrote, and because of the President's
257. Id. at 429.
258. U.S. Holocaust Assets Commission Act of 1998 § 3(a)(3), Pub. L. 105-186, 112 Stat.
611, 611 (1998). This seems particularly clear taken in conjunction with the legislative
history, recounted supra Part I.B., which shows that Congress was aware of the activities of
the state insurance commissioners, especially in California.
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"independent authority" in foreign affairs, Congress's silence should
not be equated with disapproval.259
Souter's observation here is a non sequitur. Although the lack
of congressional disapproval may be relevant to an inquiry into
the President's authority to enter into executive agreements or
formulate policy in the first place, it sheds little light on the
intended preemptive effects of those agreements and policies. Given
that the executive agreement itself never indicated that it was to
have preemptive effects, and explicitly disclaimed such effects, 26 °
and that the HVIRA's disclosure requirement does not address the
subject of those agreements-resolution of claims-why would
Congress have thought it had to express disapproval of anything?
Further, since members of Congress presumably saw the HVIRA as
a regulation of insurance companies, they would have thought
Congress had spoken, in the McCarran Act, and could not have
foreseen the distinction the Court invented between "real" insur-
ance regulations and those whose foreign affairs implications
pushed them outside the scope of the Act.
In any event, none of the Court's statutory discussion advances
its central claim that executive policy alone can displace state
law. The Court did not claim to find congressional approval, just
lack of disapproval. This assumes, however, that presidential
policies displace state law unless Congress affirmatively disap-
proves-a proposition hardly established by any of the Court's
authorities.
D. Garamendi and Constitutional Interpretation: An Aside
There is a final troubling aspect to the Garamendi decision.
Despite the recent appearance of a number of detailed and sophisti-
cated scholarly treatments of foreign affairs questions, the Court
seemed sublimely indifferent to those studies and their conclu-
sions. In contrast to many of its other recent decisions involving
federalism and the scope of governmental powers,261 the Court
259. Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 429.
260. See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
261. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517
U.S. 44 (1996); U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995); United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992); INS v. Chadha,
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ignored the usual interpretive trinity of text, history, and structure
in resolving the issues before it.262 Other than a glancing reference
to custom, and three citations to The Federalist,26 the Court
purported to build the case for Garamendi on its past decisions.
Though scholars such as David Strauss have made claims that
"common law constitutional interpretation" is, both descriptively
and normatively, a superior methodology for deciding constitutional
cases," 4 Garamendi is a good illustration of its dangers.
A full-blown critique of common law constitutional interpretation
would take us far afield, but we think that Garamendi, while only
one case, is a troubling example of the misuse of precedent by the
Court. As such, we argue it flags potential problems with common
462 U.S. 919 (1983). Even Lopez, in which the Court synthesized over 100 years of doctrine,
invoked "first principles" of constitutional structure-enumerated powers and federalism,
in particular-to inform that synthesis. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 552. In addition, the dormant
Commerce Clause doctrine, which Henry Monaghan characterized as being "constitutional
common law," has been defended throughout its history as a principle consistent with the
intentions and expectations of the framers and ratifiers of the Constitution. E.g., Camps
Newfound/Owatonna v. Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 571-72 (1997); H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v.
DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 534-35 (1949).
262. See, e.g., Printz, 521 U.S. at 905 (lacking an explicit textual provision on point, the
answer to constitutional question depends upon "historical understanding and practice, in
the structure of the Constitution, and in the [Court's] jurisprudence"); id. at 939 (Stevens,
J., dissenting) (invoking text, history, and structure in dissent); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 585
(Thomas, J., concurring) (supplementing the Court's doctrinal discussion with "a discussion
of the text, structure, and history of the Commerce Clause and an analysis of our early case
law"); see also U.S. Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 806 (relying on text, history, structure, and
precedent to strike down state term limits of federal officials).
263. See Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 414.
264. Strauss, supra note 18, at 879 ('The common law approach ... provides a far better
account of our practices" than either textualism or originalism and "best explains ...
American constitutional law today."); id. at 885 ("[Olur written constitution has, by now,
become part of an evolutionary common law system, and the common law-rather than any
model based on the interpretation of codified law-provides the best way to understand the
practices of American constitutional law.") (citation omitted); id. at 887 ("Constitutional law
in the United States today represents a flowering of the common law tradition and an
implicit rejection of any command theory [based on text or the intent of the Framers]."); id.
at 888 ("The common law approach captures the central features of our practices as a
descriptive matter."); id. ("[T]he common law provides the best model for both understanding
and justifying how we interpret the Constitution. The common law approach ... justifies our
current practices, in reflective equilibrium, to anyone who considers our current practices
to be generally acceptable...."); id. at 904 ("In practice constitutional law is, mostly, common
law. What matters to most constitutional debates, in and out of court, is the doctrine the
courts have created, not the text.") (citation omitted); see also David A. Strauss, Common
Law, Common Ground, and Jefferson's Principle, 112 YALE L.J. 1717, 1726 (2003)
[hereinafter Strauss, Common Law, Common Ground]:
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law constitutional interpretation, a methodology for which strong
claims are being made. Specifically, common law constitutional
interpretation does not easily restrain judicial decision making,
and may be worse on that score than interpretive methods using
text, history, and structure, at least as aids to doctrinal modes of
interpretation. In particular, the lack of rigor attending common
law constitutional interpretation results in the use of cases as mere
rhetorical cover for decisions reached on other grounds.
In brief, Strauss has argued that common law constitutional
interpretation permits current generations to escape the "dead
hand" of the past by updating and translating textual provisions.
The common law method can promote the development of the law
by encouraging analogical reasoning from precedent that enables
the law to evolve, providing a counterweight to troublesome
textual provisions or anachronistic traditions that might otherwise
cause a constitutional regime to degrade.265 Strauss acknowledged
a potential objection to common law constitutional interpretation:
that it does not sufficiently restrain judges.266 He responded that
[Wihile arguments based on a careful parsing of the text of the Constitution
sometimes play a large role in resolving relatively unimportant issues, the text
plays essentially no operative role in deciding the most controversial
constitutional questions ... which are resolved on the basis of principles derived
primarily from the cases.
Id. But see id. at 1719 (noting that although "[m]uch of American constitutional law consists
of precedents that have evolved in a common-law-like way, with a life and logic of their
own," it "would be a mistake to say that American constitutional law consists entirely of
precedents and is independent of the text and the Framers"-both "continue to play a
significant role"); id. at 1720 (noting that precedent can provide a common ground for
discussion of issues among those with widely varying belief systems, especially if rooted in
a text commonly regarded as authoritative). For other treatments, see, for example,
RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION (2001); K.N. Lewellyn, The
Constitution as an Institution, 34 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1934); Henry P. Monaghan, The
Supreme Court, 1974 Term-Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1
(1975).
265. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT 79-81 (1996).
266. Strauss, supra note 18, at 925. The other objection was that "a theory of common law
constitutional interpretation overlooks the crucial difference that common law judges can be
overruled by the legislature but judges interpreting a constitution ordinarily cannot." Id. We
do not discuss this objection here, but Strauss argued that "the principles developed through
the common law method"-examples of which he listed---"are not likely to stay out of line for
long with views that are widely and durably held in the society," and the Court's decisions
"now rest on a broad democratic consensus," despite being controversial at the time initial
decisions were handed down. Id. at 929-30. As a result, he argued, the common law method
actually suffers from less of a democracy-gap than does textualism or intentionalism, since
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when a judge works within the constraints of existing precedent,
the judge "is significantly limited in what she can do," whereas "a
judge who acknowledges only the text of the Constitution as a limit
can ... go to town" because of textual indeterminacy.267 Although
conceding that "precedents can be treated disingenuously," he
pointed out that "no system is immune from abuse" and offered that
fear of criticism can remove the temptation of judges to overreach
when applying precedent.268
We see two related objections to Strauss's theory highlighted by
the Garamendi case. First, there is no positive account in Strauss's
work of what, precisely, "common law constitutional interpretation"
requires of those employing it. By defining common law constitu-
tional interpretation largely by what it does not rely on-the
Constitution's text or the intention of its framers-Strauss lacks
a positive account of what it should be, other than to say that
future principles are derived, in some part, from past cases. His
primary article on the subject repeatedly referred to the "common
law tradition" without fully defining it, 269 other than to say that
its components are "traditionalism" and "innovation," as well as
"conventionalism." 2 ° A more recent article contained a few more
hints-a common law system has "elaborate doctrinal struc-
ture"-but again devoted more space to justifying it in either
descriptive or normative terms.27 ' For Strauss's theory to have any
purchase, as a normative matter, he would seem to need some
account of the qualities of common law constitutional interpreta-
tion, lest its open outputs be seen merely as result-oriented
decisions masked by rhetorical adherence to past decisions.27 2
the latter methods subject present generations to the past's dreaded dead hand. Id. at 928.
267. Id. at 926.
268. Id. at 927.
269. Id. passim.
270. Id. at 891-97, 906-13. Strauss defines "conventionalism" as "a generalization of the
notion that it is more important that some things be settled than that they be settled right."
Id. at 907.
271. Strauss, Common Law, Common Ground, supra note 264, at 1729; see, e.g., id.
(describing the common law approach as "central to many of the most important areas of
constitutional law"); id. at 1730 (arguing that "[t]he practice of following precedent can be
justified in fully functional terms" and is "unavoidable").
272. As stated by Philip Bobbitt:
Doctrinal ideology requires that decisions be based on premises of general
applicability, otherwise they would be ad hoc or 'legislative.' At the same time
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Elaborating a theory of common law decision making would take us
far afield indeed, but its idealized form-a "doctrine of precedent in
which a proposition descriptive of the first case is made into a rule
of law and then applied to a next similar situation"2" 3-seems
absent in Garamendi and in many of the cases employed to justify
Garamendi's result.
This lack of guidelines for its use deprives us of a yardstick to
measure whether common law constitutional interpretation is being
done well or poorly. The lack of such criteria would seem to limit
the possibility of criticism-the very thing that Strauss argues
will stay judges' hands.27 It increases the chance that cases will be
cited merely as rhetorical cover, as we argue they were in
Garamendi, rather than as steps in a carefully reasoned argument
linking points of law articulated in prior cases with the result in
the present case. The foreign affairs cases on which Garamendi
purported to rely simply do not involve close readings of prior cases
and applications of the existing rules and doctrines to new facts. In
turn, the Court's citations to those prior cases seems more rhetori-
cal than principled. Consider the following examples:
(i) Though Hines v. Davidowitz expressly denied any inten-
tion to address the constitutionality of state laws in the
absence of congressional action,275 Justice Douglas's
Zschernig opinion cited it for precisely that proposition:
that even absent congressional action, federal supremacy
in foreign affairs could constitutionally preempt state
law.276 Garamendi then recharacterized Zschernig as
laying down rules of preemption relevant to the question
whether the President's policy regarding Holocaust
litigation preempted the HVIRA, even though in Zschernig
there was no conflicting executive branch policy.
2 77
the doctrinal method requires that adjudication be neutral, thereby claiming
the allegiance of litigants through a tacit arrangement of reciprocity. In short,
doctrinal argument is the ideology of the common law tradition of deciding
appeals.
PHILIP BOBBirr, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 57 (1982).
273. EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 2 (1949).
274. See Strauss, supra note 18, at 927.
275. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 62-64 (1941).
276. Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 432 (1968); see supra Part III.B.
277. Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 417-20 (2003).
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Garamendi also cited and relied on the parallel with
Crosby, even though Crosby, like Hines, was a statutory
preemption case.
278
(ii) Garamendi failed to distinguish Barclays persuasively,
suggesting that the Court's decision not to apply relevant
precedent is as questionable as its choice of the cases it
found to be controlling. As discussed, Barclays was the
only case prior to Garamendi where the Court had consid-
ered a claim of preemptive effect of an executive policy
standing alone-and had rejected it. The Court similarly
had nothing to say about Breard, in which the Court had
thought it obvious that mere executive policy was not
preemptive. 79
(iii) In Dames & Moore v. Regan, the Court stressed the limited
reach of its decision, and disclaimed an intent to establish
the broad proposition that the President can settle its
citizens' claims by executive agreement s.2 ' Garamendi did
not quote, or even acknowledge, that limiting language,
while citing Dames & Moore as one of a number of cases
allegedly standing for the proposition that "our cases have
recognized that the President has authority to make
'executive agreements' with other countries, requiring no
ratification by the Senate or approval by Congress, this
power having been exercised since the early years of the
Republic. ' 8 '
(iv) Garamendi cited Belmont and Pink as establishing the
preemptive effects of executive agreements. The Court
passed over the fact that the executive agreement in those
cases expressed preemptive intent, while the Foundation
Agreement-which in any event was addressed solely to
the issue of litigation of Holocaust-era claims- expressly
disclaimed any such preemptive effects.282
(v) In Youngstown and Dames & Moore, the Court focused
upon finding express or even implied statutory authority
for presidential actions with domestic effects. The
Garamendi Court made no effort to find congressional
278. Id. at 424-25.
279. See supra Part III.B.
280. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 688 (1981).
281. Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 415. For more on this point, see infra Part IV.
282. See supra Part I.B.
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approval of presidential actions, yet cited both cases as
authorizing the President's actions.28 3
While Strauss's work conceded that precedents can be treated
disingenuously, he apparently thought that would be the unusual
case, without explaining why. If one takes another of his arguments
seriously-that common law constitutional interpretation produces
more "democratic" results-it suggests a built-in incentive continu-
ously to expand precedent to authorize more action, to "[g] radual ly]
innovat[e] in the hope of improvement" through "sharp, critical
challenges" to the past while piously claiming only to apply
principles developed in the past." 4
Garamendi is powerful evidence that the Court's prior foreign
affairs decisions do not constrain it, or indeed even meaningfully
inform its subsequent decisions. In this respect the Garamendi
Court followed the pattern of previous foreign affairs decisions,
which also owed little to their predecessors. If the Court has
engaged in common law constitutional interpretation, it has done
so largely to provide rhetorical cover. The common law method, as
practiced by the Court in Garamendi, is not a constraint, nor does
it provide doctrinal stability.
Again, we acknowledge that we are basing this critique on a
single case. We believe, though, that even a single case like
Garamendi can signal problems with a particular interpretive
methodology. The common law method should be used with caution
in constitutional law. The benefits of the method-it can provide
points of departure for analogical reasoning, it can cabin disagree-
ment about first principles, and it can provide stability and
predictability without stagnation-should not render us insensitive
to its problems. First, precedent can be manipulated so past cases
become authority for future action despite compelling differences in
facts or despite express disclaimers contained in earlier cases.
Second, this manipulation can occur at a low level of visibility.
283. See Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 414 (citing Youngstown for the proposition that the
President has large responsibility for conduct of external affairs and that the President has
some independent authority to act in the absence of congressional action); id. at 415-16
(citing Dames & Moore for the proposition that the President can make executive
agreements, including agreements to settle claims, without congressional authority). We
elaborate this critique infra Part IV.
284. Strauss, supra note 18, at 935.
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Third, the relatively narrow focus on particular cases can obscure
future implications. Fourth, the court-centered focus on doctrine
can diminish the status of the Constitution as the supreme law of
the land, elevating courts above the document from which they
draw their power. Finally, defending the common law method by
reference to popular acceptance of the principles it has produced
begs the question whether popular opinion would have coalesced
the same way around contrary decisions.
Not only do the Court's cases not add up to the result reached in
Garamendi, we are also troubled by the lack of an attempt, even in
passing, to harmonize the results in Garamendi with the text,
structure, and history of the Constitution. Such a focus might
sensitize the Court to the substantial structural implications of its
decision. At least such a discussion might provide some needed
support to decisions, like Zschernig, whose foundations have always
been open to question. This is not to say that strong arguments
could not be made supporting decisions reached by the Court, but
that on important constitutional questions like those presented in
Zschernig, to close one's eyes to text and structure, is (at least) as
much a danger to our constitutional enterprise as would be a
constant resort to first principles. Especially where the important
constitutional questions are unlikely to command popular attention;
where the costs of judicial error have profound implications (as they
do in foreign affairs cases); where the cases on which the Court
sought to construct its decision have been questioned; and where
material exists, as it does now, to guide the Court, it has a responsi-
bility to bolster its bland citations of prior cases with textual,
structural, and historical analysis. Constitutional common law can
all too often provide a rhetorical shield to avoid such an undertak-
ing.
In sum, it is difficult to believe that the Court thought the result
in Garamendi was required by its precedents, or even that it
followed from a reasoned elaboration of them. Perhaps the clearest
evidence of the Court's re-invention of foreign affairs law is that its
opinion bore little relationship to the course of argument and
decision in the lower courts. In the lower courts, matters turned
upon the scope of Zschernig and its relationship to Barclays; the
Court deflected both opinions almost without analysis to seize upon
a discourse of preemption that had played essentially no role in the
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lower courts. That does not mean it was wrong--only that it
demands justification in some way other than reliance on prece-
dent.
IV. GARAMENDI AND SEPARATION OF POWERS
If Garamendi does not follow inevitably, or even comfortably,
from its precedents, it should be evaluated instead by its fit with
the Constitution's text, structure, and history. Garamendi is on its
face a federalism case, and as we discuss in the next Part, there are
reasons to believe it erred in its assessment of the federalism values
at stake. We nonetheless think Garamendi is fundamentally a case
about separation of powers, and that it is open to its most serious
criticisms on that ground. Accordingly, we begin with its separation
of powers problems.
A. Garamendi as a Case of Executive Preemption
In saying that the state law must give way to the "National
Government's policy"28 in foreign affairs, the Court really meant
that the state law must give way to the foreign policy of the
executive branch. No congressional act authorized the executive
policy, even implicitly. Nor did the executive branch negotiate the
Foundation Agreement as a treaty and present it to the Senate for
its advice and consent. Had either course been followed, no one
would have doubted the federal policy's superiority over the state
law. The doubt arose only because the President asserted an
independent power to oust the state law, based solely upon a policy
formulated within the executive branch. In this sense, the case was
not about whether the state law should be preempted, but rather
about which branch of the federal government could do the
preempting.2" 6
In the lower courts, the central foreign affairs question was the
scope of the Court's Zschernig decision, involving the so-called
285. Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 413.
286. Although the Court declared that "an exercise of state power that touches on foreign
relations must yield to the National Government's policy," id., its actual holding was that an
exercise of state power that touches on foreign relations must yield to the executive branch's
policy, which is a fundamentally distinct proposition.
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"dormant" foreign affairs power. The theory of Zschernig was that
certain foreign affairs-related activities are simply off-limits to
states, regardless of what the federal government might be doing.
The question-the lower courts thought-was the breadth of that
category. The district court thought that it included matters that
touched upon foreign affairs in general; the court of appeals read it
more specifically to involve principally state activities that insulted
or showed hostility toward foreign governments.8 7
The Supreme Court, in effect, disclaimed any need to identify an
area of "dormant" federal foreign affairs power because, it said, the
federal government had acted and thus made the case one of
"active" preemption.2 8 For this reason, the Court said that it did
not decide whether the HVIRA would be valid in isolation,28 9 and we
assume for purposes of discussion that it would have been. As a
result, the case-as the Supreme Court saw it-depended upon
identifying a preemptive federal action.
At first glance one might suppose that this preemptive federal
action arose from the executive agreements discussed above.
Indeed, prior cases had said that some executive agreements were
preemptive,29 ° a matter we discuss at greater length below.29' As the
Court seemed to appreciate, however, there were several problems
with relying on the executive agreements alone. As the dissent
pointed out, the agreements themselves seemed to disclaim
preemptive effect.292 Assuming that the law of preemptive executive
agreements parallels the law of preemptive statutes, the central
question should have been the intent of the agreements.293 If the
agreements reflected a nonpreemptive intent, that was a serious
difficulty. In fact, the problems were even more intractable. The
agreements with Germany and Austria, on which the Court relied,
covered claims against German and Austrian insurance companies.
Those companies did not make up all of the insurance companies
affected by the California statute, or all of the companies party to
287. Supra Parts II.B, II.D.
288. Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 420-21.
289. Id. at 427.
290. See supra Part II.C.
291. See infra Part IV.E.
292. See Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 435 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
293. E.g., Gade v. Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 96 (1992) (describing the
"purpose of Congress" as "the ultimate touchstone" of preemption analysis).
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the suit. Yet the Court purported to invalidate the HVIRA across
the board, not merely as applied to insurers covered by an executive
agreement. 294 The Court, therefore, must have been relying on a
source of preemption beyond the executive agreements, as the Court
itself conceded.295
Nor did the Court seem to be relying on an action or acquiescence
of Congress. To the extent Congress had done anything in the field,
it seemed to have endorsed state activity.296 The Holocaust Act
had directed the President to collect information and give a report
to Congress, but did not appear to authorize executive settlement.
Although the Court acknowledged the Holocaust Act, it did so
mainly in the context of arguing that Congress had not authorized
the HVIRA.297 Congress had not taken steps even implicitly
authorizing preemption of state law, and the Court did not claim
otherwise.
If the preemption did not come from Congress, and did not come
from the executive agreements (or, obviously, a treaty), then the
only possible source is the President's power in foreign affairs. The
Court's language seems to support this conclusion. According to the
Court, the executive agreements reflected a wider executive policy
that Holocaust-era insurance claims should be settled through
294. See Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 401.
295. Id. at 417. The first district court decision arising after Garamendi confirms this
view. The court dismissed claims by Holocaust-era policyholders against Generali, one of the
plaintiffs in the Garamendi litigation, on the basis of the Supreme Court's decision. The
claimants argued, among other things, that Generali was not covered by the executive
agreements on which the Supreme Court relied on Garamendi. The district court found
instead that the 'laws supporting litigation of plaintiffs' benefits claims are preempted by a
federal Executive Branch policy favoring voluntary resolution of Holocaust-era insurance
claims through ICHEIC." In reAssicurazioni Generali S.p.A. Holocaust Insurance Litigation,
No. MDL 1374 M21-89, at 3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 14, 2004). As the court explained:
Plaintiffs argue that the executive agreements at issue in Garamendi do not
address claims against Generali, and stress that the United States and Italy
have not entered into a comparable agreement governing such claims....
However, the Garamendi ruling strongly implies that an executive policy need
not be formally embodied in an executive agreement in order for the policy to
have juridical effect.... Although the agreements were said to be 'exemplars' of
the Executive's position on this issue, evidence of that position was not limited
to the agreements. Thus, it was to the Executive's position, and not simply to
the agreements, that the Court deferred.
Id. at 20-21.
296. See supra Part III.C.
297. See supra Part III.C.
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cooperative means-specifically ICHEIC-rather than through
litigation.298 Relatedly, according to the Court, the executive's policy
was to seek disclosure through cooperative means, not through
coercive measures like the HVIRA.299 These were policies produced
wholly within the executive branch. If they were preemptive, and
apparently they were, that means executive branch policies are
preemptive; hence, our characterization of Garamendi as a case of
"executive preemption. 3 °°
B. The Novelty of Executive Preemption
We emphasize again that the Court had no real precedent for its
rule of executive preemption. The Court did not point to any prior
case in which an executive branch policy, standing alone, ousted an
otherwise valid state law. 30 1 All of the Court's authorities-and all
of the authorities of which we are aware-involved statutory or
treaty preemption, executive agreements, or dormant preemption.
Indeed, we are not aware even of any direct lower court authority
for the proposition. The only Supreme Court case, moreover, in
which this sort of claim was even argued was Barclays, in which the
Court rejected the idea that executive branch statements of policy
displaced state law.30 2
298. Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 422-23.
299. Id. at 424. On this point, the Court relied on statements by executive branch officials
that disclosure statutes like the HVIRA had the potential to hinder the settlement
negotiations. Id. at 424-25.
300. As noted, the Court itself described its decision at one point as involving "preemption
by executive conduct in foreign affairs." Id. at 428; see also In re Assicurazioni Generali S.p.A.
Holocaust Insurance Litigation, at 7 ("The Court [in Garamendi] ruled that HVIRA was
preempted by an Executive Branch policy favoring voluntary resolution of Holocaust-era
insurance claims through ICHEIC.").
301. We say "otherwise valid" because any contention that the HVIRA was ousted by a
"dormant" power would convert the case back into a Zschernig analysis, which was not the
basis of the Court's opinion. We do not take any position, here or elsewhere in this article,
on whether any such "dormant" power should be recognized by the Court.
302. See supra Part III.B.3. In this sense, we think the dissent understated in arguing that
there was no clear presidential policy because the only evidence of that policy were
statements of lower-level executive branch officials. Whether that was true, the fact remains
that no prior case had accorded precedential effect to a statement of policy, even if made
clearly by the President. See also Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371,378 (1998), discussed supra
Part III, in which the Court assumed that a statement of executive policy would not bind a
state, even in a foreign affairs matter.
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Instead, the Court relied on what it characterized as the inevita-
ble result of two incontestible propositions: that national foreign
policy overrides conflicting state law, and that the executive had the
power to establish national policy with respect to the Holocaust
settlement. Both of these propositions appear correct, subject to
some minor qualifications, but they add up to less than the Court
seemed to believe. First, national foreign policy reflected in treaties
and statutes overrides conflicting state law.3"3 Second, the Presi-
dent's power in foreign affairs allows the President to establish a
presidential policy with respect to the Holocaust settlement.3 4
There is a substantial further step required to reach the Court's
destination: does the presidential policy with respect to the
Holocaust settlement have the same preemptive effect as a policy
established by a treaty or statute? That is the question which the
Court simply assumed, without any constitutional analysis or
support in prior law.
That does not mean, necessarily, that the Court was wrong on
this proposition. We do not deny that the President has broad
powers to conduct the foreign affairs of the United States. Nor do
we deny that at some point, a state's interference with the Presi-
dent's ability to act would be unconstitutional-just as a congressio-
nal attempt to interfere with the exercise of an independent
presidential power would be unconstitutional. Given its novelty,
however, the proposition needs to be examined in light of the text,
history, and structure of the Constitution, because it has important
implications for separation of powers.
C. The Importance of Executive Preemption to Separation of
Powers
In this section we argue that the question of executive preemp-
tion has enormous implications for the separation of powers in
foreign affairs. Specifically, we argue that to the extent executive
preemption is accepted as a constitutional power, it broadens the
President's ability to conduct foreign affairs without a congressional
check. Correspondingly, we argue that in the absence of executive
303. U.S. CONST. art. VI.
304. See Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 6, at 262-63.
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preemption, the existence of competing state laws will force the
President to pursue a cooperative foreign policy with Congress, or
with the Senate. In other words, rejecting executive preemption
enhances checks and balances in foreign affairs; accepting it
reduces them. The question should be approached, we believe, with
this implication firmly in mind.
In considering the matter, it is important to see that the execu-
tive's Holocaust settlement was by no means a universally ap-
plauded result. °5 From the perspective of the insurance claimants,
it had serious difficulties, particularly if it displaced state efforts to
compel disclosure of policy information, as the Court said it did. The
essential problem, in the view of policy holders, was that in the
insurance context the Foundation settlement and ICHEIC itself
were empty remedies without, at minimum, a disclosure regime
with teeth. Whatever else the executive policy provided, it did not
provide a disclosure regime with teeth. Without disclosure, the
insurers could simply deny claims on the basis of lack of documen-
tation. It seemed that the documentation issue-which was largely
confined to the insurance claims-had been ignored in the negotia-
tions leading up to the Foundation Agreement, in which insurance
claims were a small minority of the total, dealt with only at the
eleventh hour.30 6 One could easily believe that the insurance claims
had been sacrificed to the desire to effect a wider settlement on non-
insurance claims.
As a result, many insurance claimants remained committed at
least to forced disclosure, if not also to litigation, as a supplement
to the procedures established by the executive branch.3"7 To this
extent, at least, the insurance claimants and their allies wanted to
upset the executive settlement. The question was how they could do
that. In this sense it is important to see that the principal losers in
305. As many claimants had feared, ICHEIC proved to be a less than satisfactory remedy,
in large part due to its inability to solve the disclosure issue. See Bad Policies - More
Trouble for the Body Created to Settle Holocaust Insurance Claims, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 18,
2003, at 76 (discussing problems with ICHEIC); see also Tom Tugend, Holocaust Claims
Commission Mired in Strife, JERUSALEM POST, June 15, 2004, at 6.
306. See EIZENSTAT, supra note 43, at 266-68.
307. For example, a leading survivor group participated in the case as amicus curiae
supporting the state. See Brief of Bet Tzedek Legal Services and Simon Wiesenthal Center
as Amicus Curie in Support of Respondent, Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003)
(No. 02-722).
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Garamendi's allocation of constitutional power were Congress and
the Holocaust insurance claimants themselves. We assume that
the President's executive power in foreign affairs is sufficient to
allow unilateral negotiation of the relevant executive agreements
with Germany and Austria, and generally to place the diplomatic
weight of the United States behind a negotiated resolution to
disclosure and liability issues."' The question, then, was how
claimants and their legislative allies could block the executive's
proposed settlement-or conversely, how the President could
force the insurance claimants to accept the settlement without a
disclosure provision. In a constitutional world without executive
preemption, the claimants likely would have been able to force the
issue to the U.S. Congress. Claimants had sufficient power in the
states in which they were concentrated-California, New York, and
Florida in particular-to press for laws like the HVIRA (and
broader ones facilitating litigation in state courts). Assuming these
laws were otherwise constitutional, the executive branch seemed
correct that these had the potential to upset the settlement. Indeed,
we are assuming in this part of our discussion that this is what they
were designed to do, at least to the extent of pressing for a more
demanding disclosure regime.30 9
Without the power of executive preemption, the President would
have had two possible remedies. He could have negotiated the
Foundation Agreement and related undertakings as treaties, or
he could have asked Congress to pass a law preempting the state
legislation. Either move would have faced difficulties. In addition
to their power at the state level, the claimants had substantial
congressional allies: some members of Congress had taken strong
public positions in support of California's disclosure requirements,
and indeed against the whole structure of the settlement crafted by
the executive.310 That is not to say that the claimants commanded
308. See Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 6, at 262-63 (discussing textual foundations of the
President's power to establish foreign policy).
309. We assume here that the Court was correct in assessing the executive policy. We
think that assessment is not as clear as the Court indicated. In fact, the executive seemed
to be avoiding a firm position on whether the settlement agreements precluded supplemental
remedies, a point noted in the dissent. See EIZENSTAT, supra note 43, at 269. It is, moreover,
worth re-emphasizing that the executive branch policy displaced state disclosure laws even
as applied to companies that were not part of the settlements.
310. See 2002 Hearing, supra note 19, at 12-18 (statement of Rep. Waxman). The hearings
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a majority in Congress-whether they did was never determined,
given the outcome in Garamendi. They had enough support,
however, that the President would have been undertaking a
legislative battle. In any event, the claimants and the President
would have faced off in Congress, with the winner being the one
that could command majority support. The President's ability to
compel the claimants to accept an unsatisfactory settlement would
have been constrained greatly, and the ultimate decision likely
would have rested with a majority of Congress.
Now note the effect of executive preemption. If the President has
a unilateral power to overturn state law, the need to secure
Congress's cooperation disappears. Rather, the President has a
greatly expanded power to force his version of the settlement
upon the claimants, and the claimants' ability to resist is corre-
spondingly reduced. Once the claimants lose the ability to appeal to
independent power centers at the local level, they lose access to any
meaningful independent forum to oppose presidential policy. True,
Congress could pass a law overturning the President's settlement,
but since the President presumably would veto it, the claimants
would then need sufficient votes to override the veto, rather than
merely a majority. Further, the burden of overcoming legislative
inertia shifts from the President to the claimants. In short, an
enormous presumption is established in favor of the President's
solution.
As a result, the President's ability to pursue a unilateral foreign
policy agenda is enhanced and Congress's role in deciding foreign
policy priorities is diminished by the constitutional innovation of
executive preemption. Had Garamendi come out the other way,
involved H.R. 2693, a bill that amounted to a federal version of the HVIRA, which Waxman
described as "address[ing] one of the most difficult problems faced by Holocaust survivors and
their families when they seek restitution from insurance companies that have refused to pay
claims held by victims of Nazi persecution: How to identify the insurance company that
issued the policy." Id. at 14; see also Brief of Amici Curiae Rep. Henry A. Waxman and 51
Other Members of Congress at 1, Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003) (No. 02-
722) [hereinafter Waxman Brief]; Letter from Rep. Waxman and 44 Other Members of
Congress to Lawrence Eagleburger, Chairman of ICHEIC, Sept. 29, 2000, reprinted in
Waxman Brief, supra, at app. E (objecting to inclusion of insurance claims in the Foundation
settlement, and "reject[ing] the notion that insurance claims estimated to be worth billions
could be satisfied by the arbitrary DM 300 million set aside in the German Foundation
Fund").
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Congress would have been in the position of ratifying-or declining
to ratify-the executive settlement. Another way to put this is to
say that the states perform a vital role in enhancing checks and
balances at the federal level. Without executive preemption, the
states form independent power centers that require the coopera-
tion of the branches at the federal level to overcome them. Parties
opposed to a presidential policy, such as the claimants in
Garamendi, thus need only to get the ear of some state govern-
ments-an easier proposition-in order to demand coordination on
the federal level. Of course, the unified policy of the federal
branches will triumph-that is the point of the Supremacy
Clause-but it must be a unified, not unilateral, policy. In contrast,
if the states are removed as independent power centers, there is no
need for cooperation at the federal level in Garamendi-type cases,
because the President can overcome opposition to executive policy
by unilateral force alone. Under this model, all of the policymaking
takes place in the executive branch, with Congress reduced to the
difficult position of assembling a blocking supermajority. This, in
short, is what was at stake in Garamendi.
D. The Constitutional Case Against Executive Preemption
Having identified the importance of the issue, we now turn to the
constitutional case against executive preemption, viewed from a
separation of powers perspective. As set forth below, we think the
Constitution's text, structure, and history favors the balanced
approach to foreign policy formulation much more than it favors
unchecked presidential power.
First, the Constitution's text speaks directly to the allocation
of the preemptive power among the branches of the federal
government. The Supremacy Clause of Article VI states that the
Constitution itself, treaties, and federal statutes have preemptive
effect. Reading the clause strictly will most evidently protect the
states, as it means that state law can be displaced only by the
procedures underlying the creation of each of these sources of
law.311 Yet Article VI is also an allocation of power among the
311. See Clark, Separation of Powers, supra note 17, at 1489. For further discussion of this
point in the context of the Garamendi case, see infra Part V.E.
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federal branches. Federal courts have the power of preemption
when interpreting the Constitution; the President (plus two-thirds
of the Senate) has the power of preemption in undertaking treaties;
and the President plus a majority of Congress, or two-thirds of
Congress acting alone, has the power of preemption when enacting
statutes. Absent from this scheme is any suggestion that the
President acting alone has the power of preemption. By setting
forth specific allocations of preemptive power, the Constitution
contains a strong negative implication that it does not contain
additional allocations of preemptive power sub silentio.
As we have argued above, the allocation of preemptive power has
important consequences for which branch controls the decision
making on issues such as the Holocaust insurance settlement.
Because the states opposed at least part of the settlement, effecting
a settlement contrary to the wishes of the insurance claimants
required an exercise of the preemptive power; whichever branch
had the preemptive power would be the decision maker. As a result,
the fact that the Constitution's text specifically allocates preemp-
tive power in one direction and not the other seems to be a direct
statement as to which branch should and should not be the decision
maker in such cases. This illustrates how the Supremacy Clause is
an element of checks and balances among the various branches of
the federal government, not merely an allocation of power between
the federal government and the states. Creating an executive
preemption power allocates federal power differently from the way
explicitly contained in the Constitution's text-a matter that should
not be done lightly.
Second, the Framers' understanding of separation of powers
underlies the textual allocation. The preemptive power is, funda-
mentally, a legislative power. In Garamendi, it was the power to
determine whether the claimants would be compelled to accept the
President's settlement. Before the President exercised the preemp-
tive power, the claimants' remedies were governed by state law;
afterward, they were governed by the President's settlement.
Preemption effected a shift in the law governing the claims.312
312. The same point can be made from the perspective of the insurers. Before the
President exercised the preemptive power, the insurers had a legal obligation to disclose the
policies or cease doing business in California. After preemption, the insurers had the legal
right to continue doing business without disclosure.
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Article VI confirms that preemption is a legislative power, as it
makes certain acts preemptive by deeming them the "supreme Law
of the Land." '313 As Louise Weinberg has noted, the Supremacy
Clause functions as a conflicts-of-law provision, privileging the law
of the Constitution, federal treaties, and statutes over the law of the
states.314 The Supremacy Clause, then, presupposes a conflict of law
that requires resolution, and that preemption is the result of a
conflict of law. To say that an executive branch policy is preemptive
is to give it the force of supreme law.
Saying that an executive policy can have the force of supreme
law is not only counter to the negative implication of Article VI but
also counter to the most basic propositions of eighteenth century
separation of powers theory. At its most fundamental level,
separation of powers meant that executive power is separated
from the legislative power. As Montsequieu wrote: "When the
legislative and executive power are united in the same person, or in
the same body of magistrates, there can be no liberty." '315 Blackstone
made a similar point, in a way that directly addresses executive
lawmaking. Speaking of proclamations of the monarch, Blackstone
began by saying:
These proclamations have then a binding force, when ... they are
grounded upon and enforce the laws of the realm.... [They] are
binding upon the subject, where they do not either contradict
the old laws, or tend to establish new ones; but only enforce the
execution of such laws as are already in being, in such manner
as the king shall judge necessary.316
313. U.S. CONST. art. VI.
314. See Louise Weinberg, The Federal-State Conflict of Laws: "Actual Conflicts, 70 TEX.
L. REv. 1743, 1747-50 (1992).
315. BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS 151 (1748) (Prometheus ed. 2002); see
M.J.C. VILE, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 91-106 (2d ed. 1998)
(discussing Montesquieu's vision of separation of powers). As Vile puts it, Montesquieu
thought "[t]he executive officer ought to have a share in the legislative power by a veto over
legislation, but he ought not to have the power to enter positively into the making of
legislation." Id. at 103. On the history of separation of powers in English thought, see
generally WILLIAM B. GWYN, THE MEANING OF SEPARATION OF POWERS: AN ANALYSIS OF THE
DOCTRINE FROM ITS ORIGIN TO THE ADOPTION OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (1965).
316. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 261.
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He then gave an example based on an existing law prohibiting arms
to Catholics:
A proclamation for disarming papists is also binding, being only
in execution of what the legislature has first ordained: but a
proclamation for allowing arms to papists, or for disarming any
protestant subjects, will not bind; because the first would be to
assume a dispensing power, the latter a legislative one; to the
vesting of either of which in any single person the laws of
England are absolutely strangers.317
"Indeed," Blackstone continued,
by the statute 31 Hen. VIII c.8 it was enacted, that the king's
proclamations should have the force of acts of parliament: a
statute, which was calculated to introduce the most despotic
tyranny; and which must have proved fundamental to the
liberties of this kingdom, had it not been luckily repealed ...
about five years after.318
As a result, the Framers placed the preemptive power in the
hands of Congress, an allocation that followed directly from the
basic principles of separation of powers. Preemption resulted from
making one law supreme over another. The creation of supreme law
was a legislative power, and so preemption entailed a legislative
act. Indeed, the unusual part of the Supremacy Clause was the
preemptive status it gave treaties. Treaty making under the British
system was an executive power, and the Senate was conceived, by
at least some at the time, as a quasi-executive body. Treaties had
not been supreme law under either the British system or under
the Articles; to some it seemed a violation of separation of
powers principles to give lawmaking authority to anything less
than the whole of the legislature. 39 Although these reservations
317. Id.
318. Id. That principle was confirmed in the early state constitutions. See, e.g., VA. CONST.
art. III, § 1 (1776) ("[The legislative and executive powers of the state should be separate and
distinct from the Judiciary; and ... the members of the two first may be restrained from
oppression .... '); MASS. CONST., art. XXX (1780) ("the executive shall never exercise the
legislative and judicial powers"). On the influence of Montesquieu and Blackstone upon the
framers, see Prakash and Ramsey, supra note 6, at 271-72.
319. On the status of treaties as executive acts in Founding-era discourse, see Prakash &
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were overcome, they indicate the extent to which the constitutional
generation identified preemption with lawmaking.
Third, the association of preemption with lawmaking is con-
firmed by Youngstown, the Court's leading modern decision on the
separation of executive and legislative power."' In that case,
President Truman, on his own initiative, ordered the seizure of
steel mills in the United States during a labor dispute, to ensure
that the supply of steel for the Korean War was not interrupted.
The Court invalidated this move as executive lawmaking. Justice
Black wrote for the Court that the executive was altering the legal
rights of the mill owners, and that was a legislative act to which the
executive had no constitutional warrant.2 1 As he explained:
In the framework of our Constitution, the President's power to
see that the laws are faithfully executed refutes the idea that he
is to be a lawmaker. The Constitution limits his functions in the
lawmaking process to the recommending of laws he thinks wise
and the vetoing of laws he thinks bad.322
This account of Youngstown is quite familiar, and confirms in the
broad sense the constitutional separation of executive and lawmak-
ing authority.3
It is less commonly recognized, however, that Youngstown posed
a question of executive preemption. The mill owners' claim to a
property right, which the President attempted to divest, was a right
under state law. The President's action was lawmaking because it
Ramsey, supra note 6, at 289-94. On Founding-era objections to treaties' status as law of the
land without the approval of Congress, see generally John C. Yoo, Globalism and the
Constitution: Treaties, Non-Self-Execution and the Original Understanding, 99 COLUM. L.
REV. 1955 (1999); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 75, at 425 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac
Kramnick ed., 1987) (responding to claims that the President would improperly exercise
legislative power by treaty).
320. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
321. Id. at 585-90.
322. Id. at 587. The Court continued: 'The President's order does not direct that a
congressional policy be executed in a manner prescribed by Congress-it directs that a
presidential policy be executed in a manner prescribed by the President." Id. at 588.
323. See Christopher Bryant & Carl Tobias, Youngstown Revisited, 29 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 373 (2002); see also Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 655 (Jackson, J., concurring) (stating that
"[Tihe Executive ... has no legislative power" and the order at issue constituted "an exercise
of authority without law"); id. at 630 (Douglas, J., concurring) (calling Truman's order "an
exercise of legislative power" and hence unconstitutional).
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would have changed the state law right. Thus, in the first instance
the case was a question of federalism: Did the President's policy-to
keep the mills operating-trump the state property law that
allowed the mill owners to close the mills if they wished? 2 4 But
Justice Black rightly saw the case principally as one of separation
of powers, that is, which branch of the federal government had the
power to preempt the state property law. According to Black, that
power was a legislative power, squarely in the hands of the
Congress. Presidential policy did not trump state law because to say
otherwise would be to make the President a lawmaker. 25
In this sense Youngstown is closely analogous to Garamendi. As
in Garamendi, the President sought to implement executive policy,
but to do so he needed to displace state law. If the Court had
permitted executive preemption, that would have allowed Truman
to set policy unilaterally, with the mill owners' only recourse to seek
a veto-proof vote in Congress. The decision whether to seize the
mills largely would have been taken out of the hands of Congress
and placed in the hands of the President. When the Court declined
to find executive preemption, the existence of the competing
state policy required Truman to have the support of a majority of
Congress to override the state. Truman could not get a majority
(Congress had previously declined to give it), 26 and so Congress had
the last word. The preservation of the state as an independent
power source that could stand up to presidential policy protected
the checks and balances at the federal level. Without the competing
state policy, there would have been no meaningful check upon
Truman's decision to subordinate the mill owners' rights to the
national imperative of ensuring a steady supply of steel. Allowing
the state to frustrate executive policy served the important function
of making sure that Truman's policy had the approval of the
nation's lawmakers, and was not a unilateral formulation.
324. See Clark, Separation of Powers, supra note 17, at 1393, 1396-1400 (discussing the
federalism aspects of Youngstown). Professor Clark makes the point that the separation of
powers aspects of Youngstown protected the states by making preemption more difficult-a
point we discuss in Part V infra. Our point here takes an opposite, though complementary,
perspective. Congress's role in foreign affairs is protected by preserving the states as
independent power centers. As a result, federalism reinforces separation of powers, as
separation of powers reinforces federalism.
325. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 587-88.
326. Id. at 586.
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Of course, one might agree that the foregoing propositions hold
in domestic matters but argue that the area of foreign affairs is
different. We conceive that this is exactly what the Court was
saying in Garamendi. Presumably the Court did not believe that
executive branch policy in domestic matters would override state
law-a proposition that would have run counter to Youngstown and
basic separation of powers theory. The Court in Garamendi relied
heavily on the President's unique powers in foreign affairs as the
basis of the preemption." 7 The Court must have been saying that
the executive foreign affairs power makes the President a lawmaker
in foreign affairs, despite the fact that the President cannot be a
lawmaker in other areas.32
The question, then, is whether anything supports the idea of a
foreign affairs exception to the broader rule against executive
lawmaking.2 9 Nothing in the Constitution's text indicates such an
exception, perhaps leaving aside military matters and questions of
recognition where the President has a textually explicit role. The
Garamendi Court invoked, without elaboration, the President's
supposed broad power in foreign affairs, which does not have an
obvious basis in text. It seems most easily located in the President's
"executive Power" of Article II, Section 1, but that formulation
invokes the traditional understanding of executive power, which did
not include foreign affairs lawmaking.3"' As one of us has demon-
strated elsewhere, the historical understanding of executive power
327. Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 414-15 (2003).
328. There is at least some suggestion of this foreign-affairs-is-different attitude in the
concurring opinions in Youngstown. Justices Jackson and Frankfurter in particular offered
some reservations about Black's simple, bright-line conclusions. This likely had to do with
the fact that Youngstown had foreign affairs implications. See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 598
(Frankfurter, J., concurring); id. at 634-40 (Jackson, J., concurring).
329. As one of us has commented, "[t]o distinguish Garamendi from, say, Youngstown, on
the ground that the former more directly involves the conduct of foreign relations, which is
the President's bailiwick, merely begs the question whether the Constitution's text or the
framers intent consigns Congress to a secondary, reactive role in foreign affairs." Denning,
supra note 36, at 959.
330. Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 6, at 265-72, 340-46. The failure to identify a source
for presidential power in foreign affairs is another serious shortcoming of the Garamendi
opinion. Although we do not deny presidential power in foreign affairs, we think it important
to say from whence it comes. To the extent one believes that it comes from the traditional
understanding of executive power, as reflected in Article II, Section 1, there is little basis for
saying that it includes lawmaking power in foreign affairs. Declining to clarify the source of
the President's power allowed the Court to finesse this difficulty.
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in the eighteenth century did not include lawmaking power in
foreign affairs (save in narrow areas not applicable here). In
particular, the eighteenth century British monarch did not have a
domestic rulemaking power in support of foreign affairs objec-
tives-even foreign affairs objectives specified in treaties.331 It is
hard to imagine that the Framers constituted their President with
greater powers than the British monarch.
Thus the "foreign affairs exception" to separation of powers
cannot be located in constitutional text, and it is equally difficult to
ground the exception in longstanding practice. The Court appealed
to custom and usage in identifying the President's "independent
authority to act" in foreign affairs.332 Although we do not dispute
the tradition of independent presidential acts in some aspects of
foreign affairs, there is no longstanding practice of the President
acting independently to displace state laws, even ones that touch
upon foreign affairs. As we have discussed, the preemption by
executive policy found in Garamendi was essentially unprece-
dented.
Moreover, at least one part of the Constitution's text, and of
traditional constitutional discourse, stands squarely against the
idea of executive lawmaking in foreign affairs: the inclusion of
treaties in the Supremacy Clause. One can hardly imagine a better
example of executive policy in foreign affairs than a policy reflected
in a treaty. Surely the executive policy on which the Court relied in
Garamendi would have been at least as strong had it been incorpo-
rated into a treaty, signed by the U.S. President and the European
nations whose companies were involved, and stating that any
disclosures should be voluntary rather than mandated. According
to the conventional understanding of Article VI, for such a treaty to
have preemptive effect would require approval of two-thirds of the
Senate. It is assumed that treaties awaiting Senate action, or never
submitted to the Senate, do not displace state law, and there is no
evidence of such treaties ever having done so.
Executive preemption, in contrast, would seem to allow unap-
proved treaties to be preemptive at the option of the President,
331. See id. at 252-56.
332. Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 414.
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since they reflect a presidential foreign policy.3 3 That proposition
is inconsistent with the way the Supremacy Clause was understood
at the time of the Constitution's framing and the way it is under-
stood today. Our system has always understood that treaties
are preemptive because of the Supremacy Clause.334 Indeed, as
discussed, that was the reason the Framers added treaties to the
Supremacy Clause. Otherwise, they would have depended upon
Congress to implement treaties and thus risk repeating the
errors of the Articles, in which states routinely violated treaty
obligations.335 Yet if executive foreign policy is preemptive, as the
Court claimed in Garamendi, and if treaties reflect executive
foreign policy (as they surely do), then the Supremacy Clause is
unnecessary to make them supreme over state law-something that
plainly escaped the notice of the Framers.
The suggestion that treaties are preemptive without regard to
the Supremacy Clause seems implausible, not merely because it
has never been seriously advanced, but also because the preemptive
effect of treaties was itself a substantial innovation over previous
models. Neither the British system nor the Articles of Confedera-
tion gave domestic legislative effect to treaties; in each case treaties
were executive initiatives that required legislative implementation
to become domestic law (in one instance by parliament, and in the
other by state legislatures)."' The Treatymaking Clause of Article
VI was an exception to the broader principle of separation of
powers that the legislative branch must make the laws, justified by
333. Presidents have sometimes unilaterally declared that they will comply with
unratified treaties, or parts of unratified treaties. This has not been thought to displace
contrary state laws, but only to establish a rule for the executive branch.
334. See Ramsey, Executive Agreements, supra note 139, at 219-31 (discussing early
understandings of the Supremacy Clause as it related to treaties). According to Justice
Iredell, treaties did not override state law under the Articles, but:
The extreme inconveniences felt from such a system dictated the remedy which
the [C]onstitution has now provided, "that all treaties made or which shall be
made under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the
Land...." Under this Constitution, therefore, so far as a treaty constitutionally
is binding ... it is also by the vigor of its own authority to be executed in fact. It
would not otherwise be the supreme law.
Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. 199, 277 (1796) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. VI); accord JOSEPH STORY,
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 685-86 (1833).
335. See supra Part II.A.
336. See Ramsey, Executive Agreements, supra note 139, at 225-29 (discussing the British
system of treaty making); ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IX, cl.6.
[Vol. 46:825914
EXECUTIVE PREEMPTION IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS
the imperative, felt strongly as a result of experience under the
Articles, of complying with treaty obligations. As Hamilton noted,
moreover, the participation of the Senate softened the objection
that treaties were executive lawmaking, because at least a part
of the legislative body would have a hand in them.33 v Treaties,
however, are a special case because they are addressed by a specific
constitutional clause, they respond to a particular problem felt
keenly under the Articles, and they do not represent unilateral
presidential power. None of these points applies to executive policy
preemption. Thus the basic principle of separation of powers should
remain the rule. The legislature makes the laws, and that power
includes the power to decide when to displace state laws.
In sum, if one thinks of the question only as one of federalism,
one might suppose that the constitutional structure implies the
President's supremacy over the states in foreign affairs. Viewed as
a question of separation of powers at the national level, however,
nothing in the Constitution's text or structure implies the superior-
ity of the President over Congress, particularly in matters of
lawmaking.
E. Garamendi, Executive Agreements, and the Treaty Power
Garamendi's treatment of executive agreements also threatens
the balance between the President and the Senate in undertaking
international obligations. As discussed above, much of the Court's
discussion centered upon the U.S. agreement with Germany-and
a later one with Austria-relating to Holocaust claims. Most of this
was essentially dicta, for (as we have pointed out) the preemptive
effect of the executive agreements, standing alone, could not have
been the determinative factor in the case.33 ' Indeed, the Court
conceded as much, stating that if the executive agreements
themselves purported to override state law, the case would have
been an easy one requiring much less discussion.339 The dissent
seemed to agree, at least for purposes of argument, for it empha-
sized that the executive agreements were (in its view) not preemp-
337. THE FEDERALIST No. 75, at 425 (Alexander Hamilton) (Kramnick ed., 1987).
338. Supra Part II.C.
339. Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396,416-17 (2003) ("[Iff the agreements here
had expressly preempted laws like HVIRA, the issue would be straightforward.").
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tive.3 4' The combination of the two opinions leaves the impression
that preemption by the executive agreements, if supported by the
agreements' language, would have been unremarkable.
That is a fundamentally mistaken impression, for it discards
the Court's previously cautious approach to executive agreements.
It is true, of course, that executive agreements have long been a
mainstay of presidential diplomacy, and that the Court three
times prior to Garamendi rejected a direct constitutional attack
on an executive agreement. 341 But that statement, without more,
oversimplifies the Court's prior approach and overlooks the
cautious manner in which the Court had previously sought to
integrate executive agreements into the constitutional scheme.
1. The Case for (Some) Executive Agreements
To begin, the constitutional case for some executive agreement
power is quite strong.342 The Treatymaking Clause, of course,
provides that the President may make treaties with the advice and
consent of the Senate, 343 and by obvious negative implication
indicates that the President may not make treaties without the
advice and consent of the Senate. That is not a constitutional
argument against all forms of executive agreement, however,
unless one thinks that "treaties" are the only type of international
agreement recognized by the Constitution.344 It seems clear that
they are not. First, the Constitution's text itself-in Article I,
Section 10-recognizes two categories. States, it says, may not
enter into treaties, but may enter into "agreements" with foreign
powers upon the consent of Congress. 345 Second, the international
treatise writers of the eighteenth century, with whom the Framers
were familiar, also recognized at least two classes of international
340. Id. at 436-43.
341. See supra Part II.C.
342. See Ramsey, Executive Agreements, supra note 139, at 160-83 (expanding these
arguments).
343. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
344. See Adler, supra note 133, at 27-32; Berger, supra note 133, at 55.
345. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10 ("No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or
Confederation .... No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, ... enter into any
Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a foreign Power....").
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undertakings: "treaties" and other agreements. 46 This confirms
that the phrasing of Article I, Section 10, is not a mistake or an
idiosyncracy, but rather reflects a common eighteenth century
understanding of international agreements. Presumably the
national government can enter into both kinds of international
undertakings, and "agreements" not encompassed within the
Treatymaking Clause would seem to fall within the President's
executive power in foreign affairs.3 4' Third, constitutional practice,
dating to near the time of the Constitution's framing, included
Presidents making agreements on their own authority without the
consent of the Senate, and without constitutional objection.348
Moreover, for those who count tradition and precedent alongside
text and original understanding, the case is equally strong. The
practice of executive agreements began in the late eighteenth
century and continued, with increasing strength, through the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries.3 49 This practice was rarely
questioned in court, and when it was, the practice was invariably
upheld.35 ° Nor was it substantially questioned by the other
branches. The closest either Congress or the Senate came to a
serious objection was the Case Act in the 1970s, which required the
executive to disclose to Congress executive agreements made on
behalf of the United States.351
346. See EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS § 192 (Joseph Chitty ed., 1863)
(1758) (distinguishing between "treaties" on one hand and "accords, conventions [and]
compacts" on the other); see also Ramsey, Executive Agreements, supra note 139, at 166-71
(discussing other sources).
347. Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 6, at 264; Ramsey, Executive Agreements, supra note
139, at 160-83.
348. See Ramsey, Executive Agreements, supra note 139, at 173-83. The Garamendi Court
erroneously stated that the first sole executive agreement, the 1799 settlement with the
Netherlands concerning the ship Wilmington Packet, occurred during the Washington
administration. John Adams was President in 1799 and his administration concluded the
Wilmington Packet agreement. Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 415 (2003); see
5 TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL ACTS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1075-1105
(Hunter Miller ed., 1931-48).
349. See WALLACE MCCLURE, INTERNATIONAL EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS: DEMOCRATIC
PROCEDURE UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 4 (1941).
350. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 679-80 (1981); United States v. Pink, 315
U.S. 203, 229-30 (1942); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 330-32 (1937).
351. Case-Zablocki Act, 1 U.S.C. § 112b (1972) (amended 1978) ("The Secretary of State
shall transmit to the Congress the text of any international agreement ... other than a treaty,
to which the United States is a party as soon as practicable after such agreement has entered
into force.....). The Act did not, however, contain any restrictions upon the entry into
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There should be no substantial objection, therefore, to the Court
unreflectively assuming that some executive agreements are within
the constitutional power of the President. The problem is that the
Court unreflectively assumed that this particular executive
agreement was within that power. Although most commentators
accept some executive agreements as constitutional, for several
reasons there must be limits upon them.352
There are two obvious difficulties with an unlimited presidential
power to make executive agreements. First, the Treatymaking
Clause seems to require a limit upon the scope of executive
agreements. If everything that can be done by treaty can also be
done by executive agreement, the Treatymaking Clause is superflu-
ous, and the constitutional check of the Senate, which the Framers
valued highly, is of no effect.353 Second, there must be some limit to
the preemptive effect of executive agreements. Treaties, of course,
are preemptive by the plain language of Article VI. Article VI,
however, does not mention executive agreements by name, and the
entire constitutional argument for executive agreements in the first
instance depends upon them not being treaties. That is not to say
that no executive agreements should be preemptive, although one
of us has made that argument elsewhere,354 but it does suggest
some limit on the preemptive effect of executive agreements.
Otherwise, one would be in the peculiar situation of arguing that
while treaties are preemptive only because of Article VI, executive
agreements, which are a lesser form of agreement, are preemptive
even without Article VI. Yet if some other mechanism in the
Constitution makes executive agreements preemptive across the
board, presumably that same mechanism would make treaties
preemptive and thus render this aspect of Article VI superfluous.
These objections are sufficiently serious that they seem to
require a careful constitutional theory of executive agreements. The
executive agreements.
352. See HENKIN, supra note 119, at 219-30.
353. Id. at 222. On the Framers' strong desire for a two-thirds supermajority in the Senate
as a check on treaty making, see Charles Warren, The Mississippi River and the Treaty
Clause of the Constitution, 2 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 271, 293-301 (1934). We note that it is a
separate question-and one we do not address here-whether executive agreements
approved by Congress can cover the same ground as treaties. Cf. Ackerman & Golove, supra
note 134.
354. Ramsey, Executive Agreements, supra note 139, at 218-35.
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Court has never developed one, but rather-prior to Garamendi-
embraced the alternative approach of proceeding extremely
cautiously and narrowly in approving executive agreements.
2. The (Prior) Cautious Approach to Executive Agreements
As discussed above, the Court has considered constitutional
challenges to two executive agreements."' United States v.
Belmont. 6 and United States v. Pink 7 challenged President
Roosevelt's agreement with the Soviet Union regarding claims
settlement and other matters ancillary to the U.S. diplomatic
recognition of the Soviet government. Neither case engaged the
constitutional difficulties of executive agreements, and in some
places the Court worded its decisions quite broadly. But the Court
also emphasized the specific context of the agreement, which arose
in connection with diplomatic recognition. 5 ' As the Court pointed
out, recognition is widely assumed to be an exclusive presidential
power,359 and one may easily conclude that this power also includes
the power to make bargains relating to recognition.
Dames & Moore v. Regan reaffirmed the Court's cautious
approach to executive agreements. 3 0 That case challenged the
executive agreements ending the Iran hostage crisis, which among
other things terminated private claims against the Iranian
355. See supra Part II.C.
356. 301 U.S. 324 (1937).
357. 315 U.S. 203 (1942).
358. The Belmont Court stated that:
We take judicial notice of the fact that coincident with the [executive
agreement], the President recognized the Soviet Government, and normal
diplomatic relations were established between that government and the
Government of the United States, followed by an exchange of ambassadors....
The recognition, establishment of diplomatic relations, the assignment, and
agreements with respect thereto, were all parts of one transaction, resulting in
an international compact between the two governments. That the negotiations,
acceptance of the assignment and agreements and understandings in respect
thereof were within the competence of the President may not be doubted.
Belmont, 301 U.S. at 330; see Pink, 315 U.S. at 229 ("Power to remove such obstacles to full
[diplomatic] recognition as settlement of claims of our nationals ... certainly is a modest
implied power of the President...."); Wuerth, supra note 139, at 11-14 (suggesting that Pink
and Belmont rest on the recognition power).
359. Pink, 315 U.S. at 229-30; Belmont, 301 U.S. at 330.
360. 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
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government and transferred them to an international tribunal.
In upholding the agreement, the Court was careful to point out
the narrowness of its holding. Indeed, the Court went out of its way
to emphasize that it was not upholding executive agreements
generally.361 Rather, it focused on the fact that Congress had
consented to the type of executive agreement at issue in Dames &
Moore. According to the Court, Congress manifested that consent
in two ways, both of which the Court discussed at length. Congress
had passed statutes that contemplated the exercise of unilateral
presidential power to settle claims against foreign governments by
executive agreement, thereby "indicating congressional acceptance
of a broad scope for executive action in circumstances such as those
presented in this case," and the President had exercised that power
without objection throughout constitutional history, thereby
showing "a history of congressional acquiescence in the conduct of
the sort engaged in by the President."3"2 "We do not decide," the
Court cautioned, "that the President possesses plenary power to
settle claims, even as against foreign governmental entities. '"363
In sum, prior to Garamendi the Court had not established a
general theory of executive agreements, but rather had identified
specific instances in which they might be used, without explaining
their outer boundaries. There must be some boundaries, however,
both because the Constitution's text seems to require it, and
because the Court's extreme caution in approving the agreements
in Dames & Moore shows that the Court thought it was dealing
with an instrument available only in limited circumstances. For
what it is worth, that was also the view of the modern executive
branch. The President, in ordinary practice prior to Garamendi, did
not claim a universal power of executive agreement. Rather, the
State Department had developed guidelines for deciding when a
matter could be handled by executive agreement and when it
required senatorial or congressional approval.3"4 Indeed, apparently
the executive branch negotiators of the Holocaust settlements
361. Id. at 660-61 (stressing that the decision rested "on the narrowest possible grounds"
and did not "attempt to lay down any general guidelines").
362. Id. at 677-79.
363. Id. at 688.
364. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, 11 FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL 721.3 (1985).
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thought they did not, or at least might not, have the power to make
preemptive settlement agreements on their own authority.365
3. Garamendi and Executive Agreements
This cautious approach was casually swept away in Garamendi,
if one takes the Court's statements seriously. According to the
Court, there would have been no substantial issue if the only
question had been whether an executive agreement plainly
intended to be preemptive could displace California's law: "Gener-
ally, then, valid executive agreements are fit to preempt state law,
just as treaties are." '366 That, though, was not at all obvious under
prior law. First, there should have been a question of whether the
subject matter of the agreement was properly handled by treaty
rather than by executive agreement. Second, there should have
been the issue of whether the agreement, even if constitutional,
was preemptive. As Pink, Belmont, and Dames & Moore show,
these points are not automatic, but depend (or at least depended)
upon an examination of the particular context.
The casual approach could be defended if Garamendi was
essentially on all fours with one of the prior cases, but it was not.
It lacked the context of recognition, emphasized in Pink and
Belmont. Perhaps the case fits within another exclusive constitu-
tional power of the President that conveyed a similar unilateral
power, but it was hard to see what that would be.36 ' Further, the
evidence of congressional acquiescence, crucial in Dames &
Moore, was quite weak in Garamendi. Moreover, although both
Garamendi and Dames & Moore involved international claims,
there was a critical distinction: Dames & Moore involved claims
365. EIZENSTAT, supra note 43, at 257 ('There was no precedent in American history for
such a legal negotiation by the U.S. government with private companies and for intervening
this way in present and future private lawsuits.'); Bettauer, supra note 43, at 6 ("[Tlhere was
no precedent in U.S. law for the settlement of claims of nationals against foreign private
entities by executive agreement (as opposed to by treaty), and thus such a method could be
subject to serious challenge.").
366. Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 416 (2003). For this proposition the Court
cited, without elaboration, only Pink and Belmont (notably omitting Dames & Moore at this
point). Id. at 416-17.
367. Cf. Deutsch v. Turner Co., 324 F.3d 692, 711-12 (9th Cir. 2003) (describing claims
settlement in war as an aspect of war power).
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against a foreign government (and its instrumentalities), whereas
Garamendi involved claims against private parties. That was
important because the indicia of congressional intent identified
in Dames & Moore related to settlement of claims against
governments-neither the practice nor the applicable statutes
relied on in Dames & Moore extended to settlement of private
claims. As the executive branch acknowledged, settlement of
private claims by executive agreement was "unprecedented. 368
The central problem in the Garamendi litigation was that no
one directly based the argument upon the executive agreements.
Rather, the argument, and the Court's decision, turned upon an odd
combination of the executive agreements plus the executive policy
stated more broadly. Arguments about the scope of preemptive
executive agreements did not play a major role, because the parties
assumed that was not the key to the case. This may have produced
the Court's unreflective dicta that if the only issue was whether the
executive agreement could be preemptive, the case would have been
an easy one. That only appeared to be true, because that was not
the issue and thus no one contested it. As a result, the Court cast
aside the restraint it had shown in previous cases, and approved a
broad role for preemptive executive agreements.
If taken seriously, that pronouncement portends a substantial
shift of power from the Senate to the executive. Prior to
Garamendi, Presidents had entered into many executive agree-
ments but had been circumspect about their subject matter, and
the executive branch seemingly had doubts as to whether it could
enter into a preemptive agreement in the Holocaust settlement
itself. Garamendi appears to invite a much broader use, and
certainly indicates that the executive branch was taking far too
narrow a view of its own power.
Moreover, by not questioning the preemptive nature of executive
agreements, the Court abandoned the most promising avenue for
judicial limitation on the President's agreement-making power. It
would appear quite difficult to mount a judicial challenge to a non-
self-executing (i.e., not preemptive) executive agreement.3 9 The
368. Bettauer, supra note 43, at 4 (calling the Foundation Agreement "unprecedented").
For an elaboration of this point, see Wuerth, supra note 139, at 14-40.
369. In particular, it is hard to see how anyone would have standing to assert such a
claim.
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line between non-self-executing treaties and nonpreemptive
executive agreements will in most cases have to be worked out
between the President and the Senate, and the President would
have wide latitude to decide what should and should not be
submitted to the Senate. However, so long as the judiciary declines
to make executive agreements part of the domestic legal system,
particularly in the sense of declining to give them preemptive
effect, that again forces a cooperative approach upon the President.
The President must get the Senate, or Congress, involved in order
to displace state law that interferes with an executive agreement.
In short, a cautious approach to making executive agreements
preemptive prevents the President from taking too much advantage
of the uncertain, and judicially non-cognizable, line between the
permissible subject matters of executive agreements and treaties.
Of course, it may be that the Court's pronouncement on this
score should not be taken at face value-the issue was not really
before the Court. Moreover, the case did involve settlement of
claims, albeit of a different sort than those at issue in Dames &
Moore; perhaps it means no more than that the President can make
preemptive executive agreements in the area of claims settlement.
We believe that future decisions should not read Garamendi as a
blanket approval of preemptive executive agreements, whatever the
Garamendi decision appears to say. The structural issues are too
important to be decided in a case in which they were not seriously
argued by the parties or considered by the Court.
The larger point is that the relationship between executive
agreements and state law is as much, if not more, a question of
separation of powers as it is a question of federalism. The Court's
endorsements of executive agreements have never fully appreciated
that perspective.37 ° In Pink and Belmont, that was less problematic
because those cases involved an independent constitutional power
of the President-recognition-which could mark out a narrow and
defined area in which the President could safely be a lawmaker. In
Dames & Moore, the lawmaking by executive agreement was less
problematic because the Court relied on the approval of Congress.
As a matter of separation of powers, this fell short of a complete
370. See Ramsey, Executive Agreements, supra note 139, at 145-54 (elaborating this point
with particular reference to Belmont).
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answer because the issue of executive agreements, at least in part,
involves the Senate as well as the Congress as a whole. But given
that the matter in Dames & Moore involved foreign commerce,
Congress clearly had an enumerated power over it. Whether the
President could enter into the international settlement without the
approval of the Senate, Congress could plainly terminate the claims
and transfer them to arbitration in support of the settlement, and
that was the extent of Dames & Moore's objection. Again the Court
provided a separation of powers solution, without exactly calling it
that.
Garamendi, on the other hand, lost sight of any separation of
powers limitations on executive agreements. To the Garamendi
Court, it was all about federalism, and so it seemed an easy result
to say that the federal interest overrode the state interest. The
difficulty, here as elsewhere, was that the Court did not inquire as
to the appropriate procedures for establishing a preemptive federal
interest.
Garamendi thus sows the seeds for serious inroads on separation
of powers law as it stood prior to the Court's opinion. First, the
Court endorsed the entirely novel concept that presidential
policy, unaided by explicit or implicit congressional authorization,
possesses the quality of a legislative act, at least to the extent of
displacing state law. The practical result is that the President may
make policy altering the rights of individuals and preempt contrary
state law unilaterally, without the coordination and cooperation
with Congress-or the Senate, in the case of treaties-previously
required. Second, the Court seemed to abandon its prior tentative
approach toward sole executive agreements, opening the way for a
substitution of unilateral agreement making for the constraints of
the Treatymaking Clause. While future decisions may prove us
incorrect, it seems clear that the President's foreign policymaking
power has grown as a result of Garamendi, that its growth comes
at the expense of Congress and the Senate, and that it has grown
in a way not countenanced by the Constitution's text, structure,
and history.37'
371. A further problem with the decision is that it effectively allowed the President to have
it both ways. By declining to enter into an explicitly preemptive executive agreement, the
President managed to avoid taking a clear stance against litigation of Holocaust claims and
state regulation of the Holocaust insurers, while quietly persuading the Court to resolve the
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V. GARAMENDI AND FEDERALISM IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS
We now turn to the federalism aspects of the Garamendi
decision. What one thinks of Garamendi and foreign relations
federalism depends to some extent upon what one thinks of
Zschernig and its theory of a structural exclusion of states from
foreign affairs. Given that we disagree in some respects between
ourselves on this matter, we necessarily state our conclusions
cautiously. We can nonetheless identify at least three unsatisfac-
tory implications of the Garamendi decision that should trouble
even those who would endorse some form of "dormant" foreign
affairs exclusion. First, the Court seemed to revive the previously
inoperative "dormant" foreign affairs exclusion of Zschernig, while
doing nothing to clarify its scope and constitutional basis. It is not
even clear, after Garamendi, whether dormant exclusion is now
broader or narrower than the Court envisioned it in Zschernig.
Second, the Court shifted much of the decision making power, in
terms of which state laws should be overridden, from the judiciary
to the executive, in the context of a test that is extraordinarily
malleable and difficult to apply. The test seems to require that
state laws-even in areas of traditional state authority-must give
way to executive policies where the conflict between them is
sufficiently sharp. In this sense Garamendi goes beyond even a
broad view of Zschernig. Third, the Court's endorsement of a broad
preemptive power through independent executive action disables
the political safeguards--endorsed in other contexts by members of
the Court's majority-that are supposed to protect state interests
in the national lawmaking process.
A. Garamendi's Balancing Test
We begin by describing, as best we can, the new test articulated
by the majority. It apparently balances the strength of the state's
interest against the degree of conflict with federal policy. Neither
prong of the new test is adequately explained or easy to apply, as
insurers' concerns about "legal peace." See EIZENSTAT, supra note 43, at 205-78. At the very
minimum, it would seem that the Court should require a fairly forthright executive policy,
so that political accountability is placed squarely with the executive.
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evidenced by the Court's own breezy implementation. As a result,
Garamendi imposes new substantive limits on the states' involve-
ment in foreign affairs that are thinly justified, difficult to articu-
late, and lacking in guidance to lower courts or state policymakers.
The Court described its test as follows:
If a State were simply to take a position on a matter of foreign
policy with no serious claim to be addressing a traditional state
responsibility, field preemption might be the appropriate
doctrine, whether the National Government had acted and, if it
had, without reference to the degree of any conflict [because]
the Constitution entrusts foreign policy exclusively to the
National Government.372
If, the Court continued, a state tries to address matters within its
legislative competence, "but in a way that affects foreign relations,
it might make good sense to require a conflict, of a clarity or
substantiality that would vary with the strength or the traditional
importance of the state concern asserted. 373
It is not clear what one is to make of the hedges-"if a state
were," "field preemption might be," "it might make good sense"
-with which the Court salted its "synthesis" of Douglas and
Harlan's Zschernig opinions. The Court seemed to devise an
entirely new test, taking into account "the strength of the state
interest, judged by standards of traditional practice" in deciding
"how serious a conflict must be shown"-or whether one need be
shown at all-"before declaring the law preempted" by executive
action.37
4
This seems to establish a two-step inquiry. The apparent
threshold question is whether the state is "tak[ing] a position on a
matter of foreign policy" without a "serious claim to be addressing
a traditional state responsibility. 375 In such a case, Justice Souter
said "field preemption" might apply.376 What he meant, however,
was that Zschernig's dormant foreign affairs exclusion might apply,
because he also made clear that the federal government need not
372. Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 420 n.ll (2003).
373. Id.
374. Id. at 420.
375. Id. at 420 n.ll.
376. See id.
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have acted at all (another example of misleading use of statutory
preemption terms). Put more directly, if the state is operating
outside its traditional sphere-whatever that may mean-its
actions are excluded by the Constitution itself, without regard to
federal action. This follows, Justice Souter wrote, from the Constitu-
tion's "exclusiv[e]" vesting of power over "foreign policy" in the
federal government.377
The key to the threshold inquiry, of course, is how 'areas of
traditional competence"378 are defined. The Court offered only that
they are to be "judged by standards of traditional practice, 379
without identifying where those standards can be found. Given
Justice Souter's opposition to tests looking to traditional state
concerns in ascertaining the scope of congressional power under
the Commerce Clause, it is passing strange to see him invoke that
very concept in defining the line between state and federal power
in foreign affairs.3"' Leaving aside the odd position in which this
places Justice Souter, one might suppose that Commerce Clause
cases such as Morrison and Lopez might offer at least some
guidance.
It does seem, at a minimum, that despite Garamendi's use of
statutory preemption language, Justice Souter's reformulation of
Zschernig suggested that some state legislation could be invali-
dated even if no branch of the federal government had acted. The
Court apparently did not invoke that rule in Garamendi because it
concluded that preemptive effects could be imputed to an articu-
lated executive branch policy. It did say, however, that state action
in foreign affairs outside traditional state areas of competence
might fail even in the absence of any conflict with the executive.38'
The discussion was heavily qualified and relegated to a footnote.
The Court further confused the matter by using the term "field
preemption" to describe this process, which, as we have dis-
377. Id.
378. Id. at 420 (quoting Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 459 (1968) (Harlan, J.,
concurring)).
379. Id.
380. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 652 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting)
(criticizing "[tihe Court's choice to invoke considerations of traditional state regulation" in
cases addressing the scope of congressional power under the Commerce Clause); United
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 611 (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting).
381. See Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 420 n.11.
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cussed, is a complete misnomer. 8 2 There is, nonethless, substantial
evidence that the Court gave dormant foreign affairs preemption
an "extended lease on life" rather than the "burial" one subsequent
commentator thought it deserved." 3
Assuming the state passes the threshold inquiry, as a second
step the Court said it would look to conflict preemption analysis
(with federal policy defined by the executive branch); the strength
and clarity required of the conflict will vary with the strength of the
state's interest."s Again, although the Court used the language of
preemption, it apparently intended a distinct approach. There is no
parallel in the law of statutory preemption for what the Court
proposed, which is essentially a balancing test comparing the
degree of conflict with the extent of the state's interest.3 5 At least
as the Court stated it, however, it appears that even a state
regulation solidly within its traditional responsibilities would be
ousted by an unmistakable conflict with executive foreign policy.
That, in any event, seems to be the implication of roping the
analysis to statutory conflict preemption.
B. Zschernig: Overruled or Broadened?
The first problem with the Court's test is identifying its thresh-
old. How demanding is the requirement that a state regulate only
in its traditional area of interest? Apparently the HVIRA was
sufficiently within that area to invoke the balancing test. Justice
Souter wrote that when federal executive authority is exercised,
"state law must give way where, as here, there is evidence of a clear
conflict between the policies adopted by the two." '386 Instead of
beginning by inquiring into the sufficiency of California's regulatory
interest, he jumped directly to the conclusion that the HVIRA
represented a conflict with presidential policy. Justice Souter
382. See supra Part III.B.2.
383. The Supreme Court, 2002 Term-Leading Cases, 117 HARv. L. REV. 226, 235 (2003).
384. Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 420 n.ll.
385. The closest counterpart is probably Harold Maier's balancing test interpretation of
Zschernig, although Maier made his proposal in the context of a dormant exclusion analysis
rather than executive preemption. Maier proposed balancing the state interest the federal
interest, rather than the state interest against the degree of conflict. See Maier, supra note
121, at 832-39.
386. Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 421.
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seemed initially to accept, at least arguendo, that the HVIRA
reflected an area of traditional state competence--though the
opinion later expressed some skepticism on this point.387
In other cases this might be a critical and difficult call. Consider
Zschernig itself, for example. The executive branch in that case
expressly disclaimed a conflicting federal policy. Under the Court's
new test, the only question would be whether the state was
regulating in an area of traditional competence. Arguably, it was,
because it was regulating inheritance-something that has always
been done at the state level.388 Justice Harlan in Zschernig, upon
whom the Garamendi Court relied as an initial matter in creating
the test, thought that the regulation in Zschernig concerned a
matter of traditional local interest, despite its novelty and impact
on foreign affairs.38 9 Of course, the state was using its regulation of
inheritance to insert itself into foreign affairs. Under the new test,
did that mean that it had stepped outside its traditional compe-
tence in a way that was constitutionally excluded, or only in a way
that triggered the balancing test in the event of a conflict? It
depends substantially on the level of generality at which one
assesses the state activity, a question on which the Court provided
no guidance. One would have thought that the Court would at least
explain whether its new test would cause its principal precedent to
come out the other way, but it did not. We find ourselves unable to
reach a conclusion on the matter.
On the other hand, the new formulation potentially broadens
Zschernig. Gone is Zschernig's inquiry into the "direct" or "inciden-
tal" effects of state laws on foreign relations.39 ° Under Garamendi,
regardless of the level or existence of executive action, or the effect
on the government's ability to conduct foreign affairs, if a state
legislates outside its area of traditional competence, its law will be
struck down. Under Zschernig, at least, states could argue that the
impact of their law was only "indirect" or "incidental."39' The new
387. See supra Part III.A.
388. See Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503, 517 (1947).
389. Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429,458-59 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring in the result)
(referring to the Oregon statute as legislating within the state's "area[ ] of ... traditional
competence").
390. Id. at 432-36.
391. Id. at 432-33.
2004] 929
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
exclusion is potentially categorical. Given the dramatic implications
of falling on the wrong side of the traditional/nontraditional state
competence line, one might expect the Court to describe how that
line was to be drawn, or what factors should drive the inquiry.
Finally, though the Court endorsed Zschernig's constitutional
holding-and perhaps even expanded it-it did not supply the
constitutional analysis that Justice Douglas's opinion lacked,
justifying such a rule in terms of text, history, or structure.392 The
Court offered little support other than a tendentious rendering of
prior cases in support of its conclusions.393 It conflated statutory
and constitutional preemption, citing cases like Pink, Hines, and
Crosby, on the one hand, but reviving and applying Zschernig,
which was decided on constitutional preemption grounds, and
recharacterizing it as a statutory preemption case. It also com-
pounded the error of Zschernig by endorsing the "dormant foreign
affairs" doctrine as a restraint on states without any attempt to
justify its proscription in terms of text, history, or structure, and
without furnishing any useful guidelines for state governments or
lower courts to determine what is and is not permissible. Opinions
differ over the existence and scope of any structural restriction, but
when the Court decides the issue, surely it is not too much to ask
that the Court not merely announce a rule of constitutional
preemption but also articulate reasons for the rule that at least
acknowledge the textual, historical, and structural arguments for
and against it.
C. The Balancing Test: Problems in Application
Once past the threshold, the Court's test encounters two serious
problems, reflected in Garamendi itself. The first is the strength of
the conflict required for preemption. Justice Souter claimed that
"the consistent Presidential foreign policy has been to encourage
European governments and companies to volunteer settlement
funds in preference to litigation or coercive sanctions." '394 California,
392. This is not to say that the analysis could not be provided. See generally Denning &
McCall, supra note 14, at 327 (arguing that a form of dormant preemption derived from
Zschernig would invalidate the Massachusetts law in Crosby even absent federal action).
393. See discussion supra Part III.
394. Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 421 (2003).
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he contended, had chosen to provide "regulatory sanctions to
compel disclosure and payment, supplemented by a new cause of
action for Holocaust survivors if the other sanctions should fail." 395
Unfortunately for the Court, the "new cause of action" was not at
issue in the case, which encompassed only the challenge to the
disclosure provisions.396 The Court's mention of the cause of action
suggests it lacked confidence in the clarity of the conflict between
the disclosure provisions and the executive policy. Mentioning the
cause of action, however, was more misdirection. Surely the Court
did not mean to suggest that if California repealed the cause of
action law, the HVIRA would become constitutional.
The Court's trouble was that, with respect to the HVIRA's
disclosure provision standing alone, it had only the executive
branch's statements as evidence of a conflict. As the dissent
pointed out, the executive agreements, even read broadly, related
only to ending claims litigation in U.S. courts: The policy reflected
in the agreements was only that claims would be settled through
ICHEIC rather than litigation.397 The HVIRA, considered in
isolation, had no relationship to that policy-as the state argued,
the HVIRA reflected no preference whatsoever as to where or how
claims should be settled. It just took the understandable position
that claims would be easier to settle in an atmosphere of full
disclosure.398 It was a further step to say that the executive policy
was that disclosure should not be compelled-a step taken only in
relatively informal, though pointed, executive branch communica-
tions (and, of course, in the executive branch filings in the
Garamendi case itself). Yet even with only informal statements, the
Court was hardly in a position to dispute with the executive over
the content of executive policy. The Court had to take at face value
the executive's claims of conflict, or else engage in an independent
395. Id. at 423 (emphasis added).
396. See id. at 410 n.4 ("Challenges to [the cause of action] were dismissed by the District
Court for lack of standing, a ruling that was not appealed.").
397. Id. at 434.
398. It is worth repeating that there was no necessary connection between the HVIRA and
the cause of action legislation. Insurance claimants wanted the disclosure provision, even
without the cause of action, so that they could make claims through ICHEIC, the voluntary
settlement organization. Indeed, claimants viewed ICHEIC as an essentially empty remedy
without disclosure mandates, but a potentially powerful one with disclosure.
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evaluation of the needs of U.S. foreign policy-an enterprise in
which courts tend to doubt their own ability.
The second problem with the test is assessing the state's interest.
The Court questioned whether the HVIRA actually represented
legislation in a state's area of traditional competence, and in any
event found the state's interest wanting when weighed against the
federal government's responsibility for foreign policy.399 Even if the
conflict was not as clear as the majority found it, the Court wrote,
"it would have to be resolved in the National Government's favor,
given the weakness of the State's interest, against the backdrop of
traditional state legislative subject matter" in enacting HVIRA's
disclosure requirements.4 °°
California justified the HVIRA as, among other things, a
consumer protection measure alerting citizens to insurance
companies that have failed to pay valid claims, and as an informa-
tional provision to permit state citizens to know which insurance
companies failed to pay valid claims of Holocaust victims should
they not want to do business with such firms. 41 The Court
dismissed California's stated purposes, claiming that the HVIRA's
limitation of the disclosure requirements to Holocaust-era policies
"raises great doubt that the purpose of the California law is an
evaluation of corporate reliability in contemporary insuring in the
State," without explaining why.40 2
Instead, the Court held that "there is no serious doubt that the
state interest actually underlying HVIRA is concern for the several
thousand Holocaust survivors said to be living in the State."403 This,
it turned out, was insufficient "[a]s against the responsibility of
the United States of America," given that "only a small fraction
of [survivors reside] in California. 4 4 No attempt was made,
however, to justify the conclusion that, when "judged by standards
of traditional practice," California acted outside its area of
"traditional competence" in requiring insurance companies to
399. Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 425-26.
400. Id.
401. Respondent's Brief at 5, Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003) (No. 02-
722).
402. Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 426.
403. Id.
404. Id. at 426-27.
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disclose information about payment of Holocaust-era policies.4 °5
States have traditionally assumed responsibility for protecting
insurance policy holders residing within their borders-a responsi-
bility Congress has recognized and endorsed. 4 6 The real problem,
it seemed, was that the burden California imposed on the insurers
was disproportionate to the state interest involved. The HVIRA
required an enormous volume of disclosure to aid a relatively small
number of claimants. This comparison, however, did not seem to be
part of the Court's test, at least not overtly.40 v
D. Breard and Executive Preemption of Traditional State
Functions
The Court's language seemed to assume that at some level of
conflict, any state law must give way to presidential foreign policy.
That, at least, seems to be the natural conclusion from the Court's
use of the terminology of statutory conflict preemption, and from its
405. Id. at 420. Further, in applying its test the Court never addressed whether the
analytical framework developed for dealing with legislative preemption-express versus
implied preemption, obstacle and conflict forms of implied preemption-applied, and if it does
not, what should take its place, and why. When the Court discussed the "conflict preemption"
aspect of its new test, it offered little explanation of the terms it was using and little
guidance for prospective application. Because the Foundation Agreement disclaimed
preemptive intent, the Court apparently regarded this inquiry as a species of implied
preemption but did not employ the usual vocabulary used in its implied preemption cases
that involve congressional legislation. As one could comply with both the Foundation
Agreement and the HVIRA, it was not a case of "clear conflict," as the Court suggested. The
Court had to recharacterize the disclosure requirement as a "sanction" and link it to the
cause of action not at issue in the case even to suggest that California's regulatory scheme
presented a real "obstacle" to the achievement of executive branch goals. The Court also
never made it clear whether the HVIRA represented an area of traditional state competence,
and if it did not, what criteria were used to make that determination, other than to suggest
that whatever California's interest, it was not sufficient to outweigh that of the federal
government. As noted above, this does not sound like statutory preemption analysis at all,
but rather more like the tests the Court has developed for the dormant Commerce Clause
doctrine. See, e.g., Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (evaluating whether
facially neutral commercial regulations nevertheless offend the dormant Commerce Clause
doctrine because the burdens on interstate commerce are "clearly excessive" as to the
"putative local benefits"); Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. 299, 319 (1851) (holding that
states are prohibited from regulating commerce where national problems require uniform
solutions).
406. See supra Part III.C.
407. But see infra Conclusion.
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discussion of the President's preeminence in foreign affairs.408 An
explicitly preemptive presidential foreign policy, then, would
overcome a state regulation even in an area of traditional compe-
tence. Particularly in a time of increasing globalization, this
reading concentrates immense power in the executive to oversee
state activities.
As an example, consider the Court's prior decision in Breard v.
Greene.4"9 As discussed above, that case held-or rather took as
axiomatic-that a request by the President to the governor of a
state to stay Breard's execution to avoid interference with federal
foreign affairs goals was just that: a request, lacking any force of
law enforceable by the courts. 41' The principal issue in Breard was
whether the state policy to pursue the execution contravened a
treaty obligation, such that it would be displaced by Article VI; once
the Court found that it did not, the Court thought it obvious that
an executive branch request not based upon a treaty obligation was
simply addressed to the discretion of the state governor.41' Yet in
Garamendi, the Court thought an executive branch request to a
state governor--even though similarly not based on a treaty
obligation-was enough to overturn state law.
412
Breard seems to merit some reconsideration after Garamendi,
which did not mention it. To be sure, Virginia's death penalty law,
and its refusal to recognize Breard's claimed right to retrial, seem
sufficiently within the state's area of traditional competence to pass
Garamendi's threshold test. But then matters become complicated.
The conflict with federal policy was difficult to assess, because the
executive did not state its policy clearly, and (naturally enough)
appeared to think that it lacked the power to order Virginia to stay
Breard's execution. The President plainly had a policy of respecting
408. See Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 420 n.ll (noting that when a state regulates within its
traditional competence in a way that affects foreign affairs, preemption requires "a conflicto
of a clarity or substantiality that would vary with the strength or the traditional importance
of the state concern asserted").
409. 523 U.S. 371 (1998).
410. Id. at 378. See supra Part III.B.3.
411. See Breard, 523 U.S. at 376-78. The question was whether Virginia could execute a
capital defendant despite a directive from the International Court of Justice that he not be
executed. The executive branch requested that Virginia postpone the execution, but the
Court held, and the executive branch agreed, that the state was not obligated to do so.
412. Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 420-22.
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the ICJ's request, however, and Virginia plainly took the opposing
position. Even in an area of traditional state competence, that
might seem sufficient to weight the Garamendi test toward the
federal interest. In any event, it seems that under Garamendi's test
the executive could override the state by a sufficiently clear
statement of policy, creating an irreconcilable conflict. In other
words, Garamendi appears to give the President independent
power to do what most everyone, including the executive, assumed
he did not have independent power to do in Breard: direct a state
to conform its laws and actions to executive foreign policy.413
The potential implications reach well beyond Breard. It is a
common observation that in an increasingly interconnected world
even activities that appear purely local may have international
effects. In the context of the death penalty, for example, interna-
tional interest has focused not merely upon the treatment of
defendants such as Breard, but also upon the treatment by the
states of their own citizens. Indeed, if recent briefs are to be
believed, this issue has become a matter of some diplomatic
inconvenience to the United States.414 The President has, of course,
not taken a position against state applications of the death penalty
in general. But would the President have the power to establish
preemptive policies on the implementation of state death penalties,
as a matter of the conduct of foreign affairs? This seems an unlikely
result, particularly given the make-up of the current Court, but it
is hard to see how the Garamendi opinion avoids it.
We make these observations not to suggest that Breard should
have come out the other way, but to suggest that the Court was not
thinking systematically about how its balancing test fit into the
rest of the law of state-federal relations. That may be understand-
able, because no party in the case cited Breard. This in turn was
because, prior to the Garamendi decision, the idea of executive
foreign affairs preemption was, as the Court said in Breard,
413. In sum, Garamendi seems to vindicate Professor Kirgis's position with respect to
Breard. See supra note 242. Of course Kirgis's view, that the state action could be overturned
by the President even in the absence of a binding law or treaty, was a minority view and
flatly contrary to both the executive branch's position and the Supreme Court's decision in
Breard.
414. See Brief of the European Union as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, McCarver
v. North Carolina, No. 00-8727 (June 8, 2001); Brief of Morton Abramowitz et al. as Amici
Curiae in Support of Petitioner, McCarver v. North Carolina, No. 00-8727 (June 8, 2001).
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supported by "nothing in our existing caselaw. 415 In any event, as
a practical matter we think the Court's balancing test is profoundly
misguided, as demonstrated by the Breard case. We cannot imagine
how the Court could "balance" the importance of respecting ICJ
decisions against the state's interest in domestic application of its
own criminal justice system, other than by unbridled intuition.416
E. Executive Preemption and the "Political Safeguards" of
Federalism
As discussed above, there is a tension between our constitutional
structure and claims by the executive branch of independent
lawmaking power. Although the Court has recognized some
executive lawmaking in past cases, it has always been careful to
limit those cases to their facts. Such limiting language is gone in
Garamendi and is replaced only with citations to those prior,
circumspect cases. This shift is unaccompanied by any discussion
of text, structure, or history demonstrating why previous Courts
and prior commentators were wrong to take it as a given that the
President does not have broad lawmaking powers, especially those
that can displace or preempt state laws. As we have suggested, this
has serious implications for the distribution of federal power in
foreign affairs.
From a federalism perspective, however, it may not be obvious
that the states are worse off under the Garamendi system than
they would be under an expansive view of Zschernig. It may be
that Garamendi in practice effectively replaces judicial preemp-
tion under Zschernig with executive preemption. One might even
conclude that, whatever doctrinal manipulations occurred, from the
perspective of the states the Court's new approach is an improve-
ment over Zschernig. After all, Zschernig, read broadly, might allow
a court to strike down all sorts of state activity that, as a nonpoliti-
cal branch with little expertise in foreign affairs, it did not like. The
new approach generally envisions action by at least one political
415. Breard, 523 U.S. at 378.
416. See Goldsmith, supra note 125, at 1414-16 (commenting on courts' lack of ability to
make such judgments). To be clear, we express no opinion on the view that Virginia's policy
was preempted by treaty obligations, or by executive implementation of treaty obligations.
See Vdzquez, supra note 75.
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branch-the executive-before state laws would be displaced. The
states, moreover, can hardly complain about federal foreign policy
overriding state law, as that is the essence of the federal system
reflected in the Constitution; disputing that proposition is tanta-
mount to calling for a return to the Articles of Confederation. To be
sure, there is a substantial separation of powers question as to
which branch of the federal government sets preemptive federal
foreign policy, but at least on its face that is not a matter of
immediate concern to the states.
The truth of these statements, though, depends on the relative
scope of Zschernig preemption and the Court's new executive
policy preemption. The dormancy of Zschernig prior to the
Garamendi case, and the lower courts' relatively narrow reading
of it in Garamendi and in similar cases, suggested that as a
practical matter courts were not inclined to apply Zschernig
broadly, whatever its language might say. The creation of executive
policy preemption hands a potentially powerful weapon to a branch
that is much more likely to wield it aggressively. As previous
commentators have observed, moreover, it does matter to the
states which branch of the federal government sets preemptive
federal policy, because one branch-the executive-operates under
substantially fewer constraints than the others. Finally, not only
does Garamendi concentrate power in the executive branch to the
detriment of the states, but it also may constrain Congress's ability
to limit executive preemption. All of these matters add up to a
serious undermining of federalism protections, even if one is
inclined to think that Zschernig itself contained some valuable
insights.
1. Disabling the Structural Protections of the States
It is an article of faith among critics of court-imposed federalism
limits on Congress that states' interests are adequately secured
in Congress through "political safeguards" offered by either the
formal institutions of national lawmaking in which states are
represented,417 or in informal institutions like political parties that
417. See generally JESSE CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL
PROCESS: A FUNCTIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT (1980);
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take account of state interests.418 Justice Souter himself embraced
this view in his Morrison dissent, where he emphasized "[p]olitics
as the moderator of the congressional employment of the commerce
power." '419
Professor Bradford Clark has argued that political safeguards
enthusiasts should, therefore, vigorously enforce textual and
structural restrictions on national lawmaking power in order to
ensure that national lawmaking will displace state law only when
such lawmaking complies with the Constitution's forms and
formalities.42 ° In his view, the Supreme Court's enforcement of
separation of powers principles "preserve[s] federalism both by
making federal law more difficult to adopt, and by assigning
lawmaking power solely to actors subject to the political safeguards
of federalism." Federal lawmaking outside the constitutionally
recognized avenues "does not clearly fall within the terms of the
Supremacy Clause, and thus provides a questionable basis for
displacing state law. 42'
Jesse H. Choper, The Scope of National Power Vis-&-vis the State: The Dispensability of
Judicial Review, 86 YALE L.J. 1552 (1977); Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of
Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National
Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954).
418. See Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of
Federalism, 100 COLuM. L. REV. 215 (2000). On the differences between Wechsler and Choper
on the one hand, and Kramer on the other, see Bradford R. Clark, Putting the Safeguards
Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 80 TEX. L. REV 327, 327-28, 333-38 (2001)
[hereinafter Clark, Safeguards].
419. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 649 (1999) (Souter, J., dissenting); see id.
at 647-51 (arguing that the Framers intended for state interests to be safeguarded through
the political processes). Justice Breyer, too, stressed that the Court's role should be limited
to the monitoring of process. Id. at 662-63 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Souter did not join
the portion of Justice Breyer's opinion arguing for a judicial role in enforcing process
protections. Id. at 655.
420. See Clark, Safeguards, supra note 418, at 333 (arguing that "[a]t a minimum, courts
should enforce the political safeguards by restricting 'the supreme Law of the Land' to
measures adopted in accordance with the precise lawmaking procedures prescribed by the
Constitution").
421. Clark, Separation of Powers, supra note 17, at 1324. The Supremacy Clause, he
noted, recognizes only the Constitution, laws adopted pursuant to the Constitution, and
treaties as the supreme law that displaces state law. Only 'lawmaking procedures governing
the adoption of the 'Constitution,' 'Laws,' and 'Treaties' of the United States," he argues,
"creat[e] 'the supreme Law of the Land."' Id. at 1326. Further, "the procedures established
by the Constitution make adoption of such law[s] more difficult by requiring the participation
and assent of multiple actors subject to the political safeguards of federalism-especially the
Senate." See also id. at 1330 ('"[The ultimate procedural safeguard may be the procedural
938
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Though Professor Clark looked at lawmaking by all three
branches of government, his comments on executive branch
lawmaking and sole executive agreements are of particular
relevance here. As we noted in our earlier discussion, he saw a
rejection of executive lawmaking in Youngstown. The Court
demanded that the federal government use the Constitution's
prescribed lawmaking procedures if it wished to seize the steel
mills.422 Relatedly, he expressed concern over the use of executive
agreements. Since executive agreements allow Presidents to avoid
the difficult supremacy procedures of Article VI, Clark questioned
whether these agreements-particularly sole executive agreements
that do not involve Congress-should preempt state law.42 3 If
congressional-executive agreements are a source of concern because
they avoid the Senate's supermajority requirement designed to
protect state interests, sole executive agreements also avoid the
lawmaking requirements in Article I, Section 7. Although "these
procedures render lawmaking more difficult than congressional
inaction ... this difficulty was meant to protect ... state governance
prerogatives. '"424
gauntlet that any legislative proposal must run and the concomitant difficulty of overcoming
legislative inertia."' (quoting Ernest A. Young, Constitutional Avoidance, Resistance Norms,
and the Preservation of Judicial Review, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1549 (2000))).
422. The Court, he argued, "has ... invalidated attempts by the executive branch to engage
in lawmaking outside the constitutionally prescribed process." Clark, Separation of Powers,
supra note 17, at 1393. Even Justice Jackson's opinion concurring with the Court's
invalidation of President Truman's seizure of the steel mills, widely regarded as a paradigm
"functional" approach to separation of powers questions, "confirms that Justice Jackson
agreed with the Court's essential premise that the President possesses no independent
lawmaking authority." Id. at 1400. The decision, Clark argued, preserved federalism by
preventing displacement of state law permitting possession of steel mills by confiscatory
federal law enacted by presidential fiat: "The constitutional distinction between executive
and legislative power recognized by both Jackson and the Court ensures that the federal
government cannot interfere with private rights unless it employs the lawmaking procedures
established by the Constitution." Id.
423. Id. at 1439.
424. Id. at 1450 (citation omitted). Clark was particularly troubled by the Court's holding
in Dames & Moore that congressional acquiescence authorized the President's assignment
of pending claims to a special tribunal, though there was no statutory authority for that
power. Placing on Congress the burden of disapproving executive action, Clark wrote, "flips
the burden of inertia established by federal lawmaking procedures. The absence of
congressional disapproval ordinarily does not authorize the President to alter important legal
rights, even if necessary to implement a sole executive agreement." Id. He offered the
tentative opinion that Dames & Moore was "limited to its facts" and "lack[ed] significant
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On our reading, Garamendi significantly eroded the protections
Professor Clark described. First, the opinion deprives states of
the protections of Article VI by adding to the list of federal actions
having preemptive effects. Further, encouraging independent
executive branch lawmaking removes essential safeguards by
ensuring that law can be made by a political institution not as
subject to state pressure as Congress. By uncritically extending
Belmont, Pink, and Dames & Moore, the Court essentially amended
Article VI to make executive agreements, and executive policy more
broadly, the supreme law of the land. Not only is this inconsistent
with the omission from Article VI of the "other agreements"
mentioned in Article I, Section 10, but it also permits displacement
of state law without subjecting legislative actors to state
pressure.425 Although the President does have a national constitu-
ency, and depends on popularity in key states to stay in power, as
Hamilton wrote in Federalist No. 68, it was an "important desidera-
tum ... that the executive should be independent for his continu-
ance in office on all but the people themselves" lest he "be tempted
to sacrifice his duty to his complaisance for those whose favor was
necessary to the duration of his official consequence." '426 In other
words, the presidency is an office with a national constituency,
one-by design-less likely to take account of individual states'
interests.427 This may be normatively desirable, but there is little
doubt that judicial attribution of preemptive effect to executive
statements reduces the ability of states to have their interests
taken into account prior to having their policies displaced.
Assuming the political safeguards argument embraced by Justice
Souter in Morrison was not simply a makeweight, and that there
are "safeguards" in the "political safeguards" approach, it is
surprising that the majority was indifferent to the ways in which
generative force." Id. at 1451. On our reading, Garamendi goes further than Dames & Moore,
as it dispenses with the need even for implicit congressional approval.
425. See supra Part II.B.3. In fact, given that the executive agreement in question did not
claim preemptive intent, and the executive branch argued for preemption only after the
litigation arose, states would not have even been on notice that they needed to resist
displacement of state law at all.
426. THE FEDERALIST No. 68, at 413 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987).
427. Professor Powell argues that this makes the President particularly well suited to
make foreign policy. H. Jefferson Powell, The President's Authority over Foreign Affairs: An
Executive Branch Perspective, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 527 (1999).
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its endorsement of executive preemption in Garamendi eroded or
disabled protections that political institutions furnish states.
Though one may disagree with Professor Clark on the desirability
of relying largely on political safeguards to protect federalism, 48
focusing first on the process safeguards endangered by Garamendi
should furnish common ground on which those who favor vigorous
judicial review to protect state interests, and those who do not, can
gather to criticize the decision.
2. New Limitations on Congress's Ability to Protect the States?
Not only does Garamendi empower the President to displace
state law unilaterally and without the participation of Congress,
but its treatment of congressional acts also suggests that the Court
applied to Congress what Professors Eskridge and Frickey have
termed a "super-strong clear statement rule."42 Making it more
difficult for Congress to act further insulates the President from
even an attentive Congress and imposes additional burdens on a
state seeking legislative protections for its actions.
In 1992, Eskridge and Frickey identified a "super-strong" rule
against curbing executive power. In Japan Whaling Ass'n v.
American Cetacean Society, the Court found the Commerce
Department had not violated congressional statutes when it failed
to certify that Japan's whaling practices violated international
agreements, apparently contrary to the congressional enactments'
plain language.43 ° According to Eskridge and Frickey, Japan
Whaling potentially created "a super-strong clear statement rule
428. See Saikrishna B. Prakash & John C. Yoo, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based
Federalism Theories, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1459, 1460 (2001) (concluding that "the theory of the
political safeguards offederalism remains fundamentally mistaken" and that Clark's attempt
to rehabilitate it "is rather akin to reinforcing the walls of a sand castle as the tide turns").
429. Clear statement rules "require a 'clear statement' on the face of the statute to rebut
a policy presumption that the Court has created"; a "super-strong clear statement rule"
requires "a clearer, more explicit statement from Congress in the text of the statute, without
reference to the legislative history, than prior clear statement rules have required." William
N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules as
Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 595 n.4, 597 (1992). A"presumption" about
different policies that the Court has made can, on the other hand, be overcome "by
persuasive arguments that the statutory text, legislative history, or purpose is inconsistent
with the presumptionD." Id. at 595 n.4.
430. Japan Whaling Ass'n v. Am. Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221, 231-41 (1986).
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requiring the statutory clear statement to target the specific issue
unmistakeably" in order to "protect[] presidential discretion in
foreign affairs matters. '431
After Garamendi, what Eskridge and Frickey tentatively
characterized as merely a possible transformation is arguably
complete. To ensure that the McCarran Act permits California to
pass a law like the HVIRA, Congress will apparently have to
amend it, clearly specifying that it applies in cases with foreign
affairs overtones and even in the face of contrary presidential
policies. Similarly, the Holocaust Commission Act would require an
unmistakably clear statement that Congress recognizes that states
are compiling the insurance information in question and that such
collection efforts, including the use of penalties to motivate
recalcitrant insurance companies, should continue regardless of the
future actions of the executive branch.
Though it was not explicit, the Court's disregard of both statutes
apparently stemmed from its reluctance to countenance interfer-
ence with what it concluded was the President's premier role in
"foreign affairs." The Court did-not define this role, but repeatedly
contrasted it with congressional responsibilities for "foreign
commerce" and "domestic commerce." '432 Japan Whaling at least
evinced concern about congressional interference with an enumer-
ated presidential power-the power to negotiate agreements with
foreign governments.433 Likewise, as we stressed earlier, Dames &
Moore took pains to emphasize the limited nature of the presiden-
tial power it authorized, disclaimed any intent to pass on the
question of a general presidential power to settle claims, and
suggested that-though not expressly authorized-the transfer of
431. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 429, at 617.
432. See, e.g., Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 US. 396, 428 (2003) (contrasting the
McCarran-Ferguson Act's concern about "implied preemption by domestic commerce
legislation" with "preemption by executive conduct in foreign affairs"); id. at 429 (stating that
the Holocaust Commission Act "can hardly be read to condone state sanctions interfering
with federal efforts to resolve such claims"); see also id. at 422 n. 12 (explaining that Barclays
did not apply because it dealt with Congress's power over foreign commerce, as opposed to
"the field of foreign policy" in which the President has "the lead role"); id. at 424 n.14
(recharacterizing Crosby as a decision involving the President's "independent constitutional
authority to act on behalf of the United States on international issues').
433. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 429, at 617 ("What seemed to move the Court was the
argument that the President needed flexibility not to certify so that he could negotiate a
bilateral agreement with Japan on this matter.").
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the claims out of U.S. courts was at least similar to remedies
Congress had prescribed in the past and to which Congress had not
objected.434 Garamendi, by contrast, claimed the potentially broad
universe of "foreign affairs" or "foreign policy" for the President.
Not only does this empower the President at the expense of
Congress, but it also harms federalism interests by making it
difficult for Congress to come to the states' defense.
CONCLUSION: ADJUDICATION BY INTUITION?
In sum, Garamendi cannot be defended as an example of the so-
called constitutional common law method, at least in the idealized
form that David Strauss and others present it. Garamendi is not an
example of analogical reasoning from prior decisions, nor indeed
does it have much relationship with prior decisions at all. To be
sure, the lower court opinions in the case followed the outlines
suggested by Strauss. They took the Court's most relevant
precedents-principally Zschernig, Japan Line and Barclays-and
attempted a synthesis in light of the new facts of the case and the
way those cases had been applied in the past. As we have argued,
however, that is not what the Supreme Court did. Instead, it
essentially ignored Barclays, gave an odd and inaccurate
recharacterization of the concurring opinion in Zschernig (by
ignoring that case's facts and majority opinion altogether), and
created a wholly new idea of executive preemption-a constitu-
tional rule so novel that it was not even squarely argued in the
lower courts. To the extent the Court's opinion relied on prior cases,
its justifications seemed decidedly post-hoc.
Garamendi also cannot be defended on the basis of the Constitu-
tion's text, structure, and history. As we have explained, it creates
a new executive power whereby the President can displace state
laws that interfere with the President's foreign policy. Nothing in
the Constitution gives the President such a power. To the contrary,
Article VI of the Constitution expressly assigns the preemptive
power to Congress, in the case of statues, and to the President
plus two-thirds of the Senate, in the case of treaties. To be sure,
the President has the "executive Power" granted by Article II,
434. See supra Part V.E.
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Section 1. Yet even if one believes (as the Court apparently did)
that this conveys to the President independent power in foreign
affairs, the historical understanding of "executive Power" denies
that it could contain the lawmaking power of preemption. The
interaction of Article II, Section 1 and Article VI assure that while
the President can formulate foreign policy independently, the
cooperation of Congress (or a supermajority of the Senate) is
needed to conform domestic law to foreign policy objectives.
This creates a check upon the President's foreign policy powers
that protects both the states and, perhaps more importantly,
the legislative branch of the federal government. Ignoring this
structure, as we argue the Court did in Garamendi, harms both
federalism and separation of powers.
It seems unlikely, though, that the Court was deliberately
pursuing a pro-executive foreign affairs agenda, or indeed that it
was proceeding with much attention to the structural implications
of its decision. The Court's discussion of structural constitutional
issues is so thin that one suspects the Court did not consider the
broader picture with much focus. Moreover, all of the Justices in
the majority had either joined or substantially agreed with the
central holding of Barclays, which took a deliberately anti-executive
line.4" 5 It is not that the majority ignored a prior Court's precedent;
it ignored one of its own precedents. So, even though the Court did
not articulate a distinction with Barclays, there must have been
one. As the opinion does not contain limiting language, we therefore
doubt that the Court actually saw itself engaged in the sweeping
extension of executive power that we have attributed to its opinion.
Instead, we believe that the case was driven not by a broader
structural vision of the Constitution, nor by incremental reasoning
from prior cases, but by intuition about the facts of this particular
case.
Although any suggestions about unstated judicial intuitions are
necessarily speculative, we can imagine at least two ways of looking
at Garamendi that made it an intuitively attractive case in which
to find against the state. One possibility is that the Court saw the
435. Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298, 301 (1994) (majority opinion
joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Kennedy, Souter, & Breyer, JJ.); id. at 334 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting) (agreeing with the majority that preemption should not turn upon "statements
made and briefs filed by the executive branch").
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case as driven by the particular context of executive agreements
settling international claims. Of course, there were material
technical barriers to making this the legal basis of the decision. The
agreements did not purport to be preemptive, the agreements did
not cover all of the plaintiffs, prior law had been cautious about the
permissible scope of executive agreements in general, and the
Constitution does not establish international settlement as a
plenary and preemptive presidential power. Nonetheless, all three
of the Court's prior cases upholding executive agreements had been
settlements; no executive settlement had ever been overturned for
any reason, and executive settlements had a long and essentially
uncontested history.436 One might surely believe that, whatever the
contours of executive lawmaking in general, prior law had em-
braced lawmaking through settlement agreements as a presidential
power.
Further, although the Garamendi case challenged only the
HVIRA, which did not seem in great tension with the settlement,
it was difficult to ignore the fact that the HVIRA was part of a
set of laws that explicitly contemplated resolving Holocaust-era
insurance claims by litigation in California.4"7 The Court did not
ignore it, stating that California had "provid[ed] regulatory
sanctions to compel disclosure and payment, supplemented by a
new cause of action for Holocaust survivors if the other sanctions
should fail."4 8 As a legal matter, that sentence was almost wholly
misconceived. The HVIRA did not provide sanctions for non-
payment, only for nondisclosure. At most, the HVIRA supple-
mented the cause of action, not the other way around, but in fact
the two were almost entirely independent. Disclosure was needed
whether the remedy came through ICHEIC or through litigation.
Most importantly, the cause of action statute was not before the
Court. This reference showed, though, that the Court was thinking
of California's actions more broadly, which were in substantial
tension with the settlement.
If one views negotiation and implementation of international
settlements as strongly presidential powers (similar to, say,
436. See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 678-79 (1981); supra Part IV.E.
437. See supra Part I.A.
438. Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 423 (2003).
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recognition), then one would likely be suspicious of state attempts
to upset a settlement.439 In particular, one would likely be comfort-
able with a "field preemption" analysis, derived from the rules of
preemptive statutes that would clear the states out of the way
altogether, without lingering over technicalities like the fact that
the agreements did not cover all of the plaintiffs or that the
agreements had little to say about disclosure issues. This would
also distinguish Garamendi from Barclays and Breard, which were
not about settlements, or any other core executive power. It also
would explain the Court's lack of interest in broader structural
concerns, because a rule applying only to settlements would not
raise such concerns.
A second possibility requires further explanation of an aspect
of the case that we have so far literally relegated to a footnote.44 °
In addition to their foreign affairs and dormant Commerce
Clause challenges, the insurers attacked the HVIRA on due
process grounds. In main, this part of the case centered upon three
particularly overreaching aspects of the California law that made
it seem especially unfair and burdensome upon at least some of the
insurers.
First, the HVIRA required disclosure of all insurance policies
issued in Europe between 1920 and 1945 441-surely a staggering
number. It was not limited to policies of Holocaust victims, or to
policies of persons who were believed to be or claimed to be
Holocaust victims, nor was it limited to persons residing in
California, or even to persons residing in the United States. True,
the state had its reasons. As the state pointed out, it would be hard
to compile a list limited to victims or based on current residency.
442
Moreover, the insurers' good faith was sufficiently suspect that the
439. As one of us observed elsewhere:
The majority was perhaps wise not to close its eyes to the reality that HVIRA
was not simply about disclosing information to assist California's insurance
consumers, but rather about creating a reservoir of information that [claimants]
and their lawyers would eagerly plumb to support the very sort of class action
litigation that the executive agreements were intended to forestall.
Denning, supra note 36, at 960.
440. Supra note 170.
441. CAL. INS. CODE § 13804(a) (West 2004).
442. See Appellant's Opening Brief at 6 n.3, Gerling Global Reinsurance Corp. of Am. v.
Low, 240 F.3d 739 (9th Cir. 2001) (Nos. 00-16163).
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state did not want to leave any discretion in deciding which names
to release. 441 At the same time, though, this meant that only a
small fraction of the names released would have any relation to
the Holocaust policies. An even smaller number would have any
relation to the United States or to California.
Second, the HVIRA required disclosure from entities that were
often only distant corporate relatives of the companies that did
business in California.44 Many of the companies regulated by the
state had no relation to the Holocaust other than that, at some time
long after it occurred, the California-licensed company had been
acquired by a company that issued Holocaust-era policies. Thus,
the HVIRA would penalize a company for the failures of a distant
corporate relative over which it likely had little control and,
perhaps, little relationship aside from remote common ownership.
This was not true of all the insurers affected by the HVIRA, but it
was true for enough of them that the point could be made quite
sharply. 4
45
Third, there was some material dispute whether the HVIRA's
required disclosures violated German or other European privacy
laws.446 In any event, the state took the position, confirmed by the
plain language of the statute, that illegality under foreign law was
not an excuse for noncompliance with the HVIRA.447 Yet surely
there were some legitimate privacy concerns. Most of the people
whose policies were covered by the HVIRA were not Holocaust
victims and so did not benefit from publication. They might have
good reason to prefer that, other things being equal, their insurance
history not be broadcast to the whole world.
448
443. Id.
444. CAL. INS. CODE § 13802(b) (West 2004) (defining "related company").
445. See Brief of Gerling Appellees at 21-51, Gerling Global Reinsurance Corp. of Am. v.
Low, 296 F.3d 832 (9th Cir. 2002) (making these points).
446. See Gerling Global Reinsurance Corp. of Am. v. Low, 186 F. Supp. 2d 1099, 1111 n.8
& 1112 n.9 (E.D. Cal. 2001).
447. Id. at 1113.
448. It would be the whole world, because the HVIRA contemplated putting the
information on an Internet-accessible database, not merely using it for the internal
regulatory activities of the insurance commissioner. See CAL. INS. CODE § 13803 (West 2004).
On the privacy point, see Brief of the Gerling Appellees at 35-37, Gerling Global Reinsurance
Corp. of Am. v. Low, 296 F.3d 832 (9th Cir. 2002).
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The combination of these ill attributes meant that in some cases
a U.S. company doing business in California might be punished
because a distant corporate relative in Europe, over which it had no
realistic control or influence, declined to supply it with an enor-
mous volume of information, most of it irrelevant to the state's
interest-perhaps in violation of European law and likely in
violation of the interests of many of its clients. It was not hard to
conclude that California had gone too far in pursuit of an entirely
legitimate goal. The insurers made various arguments, mostly
founded on the Due Process Clause, that the state's overreaching
in these and other respects rendered the HVIRA unconstitutional.
Due process jurisprudence was, however, not hospitable to the
insurers' claims once one encountered the details. For example, no
clear rule requires that illegality under foreign law excuse non-
compliance with local regulatory requirements, and the impact
upon state regulatory functions of a contrary rule as a general
matter would be daunting.449 Further, although the HVIRA's
disclosure requirements seemed out of proportion to the state's
interest, the Due Process Clause's extraordinarily low standard for
validating economic regulation meant that the state had to show
only the most minimal connection between its law and its interest,
which it surely could.45° Finally, though penalizing one member of
a corporate family for nondisclosure by another might seem unfair
in this case, in the ordinary case it is a common enough practice. As
with the asserted excuse for foreign illegality, a contrary rule
stated broadly would cripple state regulatory functions.
There was a further serious drawback to founding a decision on
the Due Process Clause. Such a decision would be hard to limit.
Most of the due process arguments had little to do with foreign
affairs, and holding for the insurers on this ground would suggest
a whole charter of potential rights available to all corporations
against all state regulatory agencies. Moreover, these rights would
potentially limit the federal government as well, assuming the Due
Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments are
parallel in this regard.
449. See Soci6t6 Nationale Industrielle A6rospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court, 482 U.S. 522, 544
n.29 (1987); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 691 F.2d 1384 (11th Cir. 1982).
450. See Gerling Global Reinsurance Corp. of Am. v. Low, 296 F.3d 832, 845-49 (9th Cir.
2002).
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Although the Due Process Clause seemed an unattractive ground
for decision, the fact remained that the state regulation, at least in
some visions of the case, bordered on the unreasonable. Of course,
in the usual case-especially in the usual economic regulatory
case-courts are reluctant to strike down laws simply because they
seem burdensome, or because the costs seem out of proportion to
the benefits. Garamendi was not the usual case, though, because
it also had the foreign affairs dimension. As a result, the state law
seemed uniquely unreasonable, because it overreached in its
treatment of the insurers and it overreached by involving the state
in matters of international concern.
In sum, we suggest that what may have moved the Court was, in
its view, an unreasonable state law combined with adverse foreign
affairs effects. This would explain why the Court said that the
HVIRA was not really within the traditional regulatory area of the
state.45' In the abstract, it seems hard to say that the conditions
under which a company, especially an insurance company, can do
business in a state lie anywhere but at the very center of the
traditional regulatory powers of the state. What was untraditional
about the HVIRA was not insurance regulation in general, nor even
the HVIRA's objective of protecting policy holders, but the peculiar
and overreaching scope of the statute in particular. This would also
explain the Court's thinking that Barclays and Breard were
different from Garamendi-in both cases, the Court likely thought
that the state's activities were more traditional and justifiable.
We do not mean to endorse the Court's intuition in these
respects, nor to endorse this method of judicial decision making. We
do think, however, that it goes further in explaining what actually
happened in Garamendi than does either a theory of constitutional
adjudication based on the trinity of text, structure, and history, or
a theory of common law constitutionalism." 2
451. Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 425 (2003).
452. For evidence that the Court's decision-by-intuition methodology is not confined to the
foreign affairs area, see Mitchell N. Berman, Guillen and Gullibility: Piercing the Surface of
Commerce Clause Doctrine, 89 IOWAL. REV. 1487, 1533 (2004) (noting that "[d]octrine did not
determine the result in Guillen.... [T]he result in Guillen is more in tension than conformity
with preexisting Commerce Clause doctrine" but also noting that "the result in Guillen seems
reasonable"); Calvin Massey, The New Formalism: Requiem for Tiered Scrutiny?, 6 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 945 (2004) (arguing that the Court's decisions in Lawrence, Gratz, and Grutter
cannot be explained solely by reference to the familiar tiered scrutiny standards of review
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Nor do we mean to suggest that Garamendi is, after all, a narrow
opinion. We are persuaded that the Court thought it was issuing a
narrow opinion, and that this Court likely would not give it wide
application to, say, reverse the outcome in Breard. The danger is
that while events come and go, and circumstances giving rise to
intuitive judgments dissipate, opinions and holdings remain, in
Justice Jackson's "loaded weapon" metaphor,453 for future courts to
use. The danger is not that this Court intends to revolutionize
foreign affairs law, but that it has left the tools for some future
court to do so.
If we are correct, that suggests caution in extending Garamendi
to its logical implications. As argued in this Article, we think that
is the right approach for other reasons as well. Taken to its logical
implications, Garamendi threatens to effect a material re-allocation
of foreign affairs power toward the executive branch, contrary to
the plain language, structural implications, and history of the
Constitution. The executive is not a lawmaker, and we should not
be tempted to think otherwise by what the Court appeared to say
in Garamendi.
for Equal Protection and Due Process cases that the Court purported to apply).
453. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 246 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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